When faced with the problem of moral evil, Christian apologists often express God’s dilemma in creating free human beings. The argument goes like this: since God willed to create creatures with free will, the possibility of evil necessarily exists.
But apologists who put forth this argument don’t take into account the blessed in heaven, whom the Church views as exercising free will while being impeccable (unable to sin). If freedom necessarily involves the capacity to choose evil, then the blessed in heaven would seem to have no freedom.
We know, however, the blessed in heaven do have freedom. Therefore, there must be something awry with the idea that free will necessarily involves the capacity to choose evil.
St. Thomas Aquinas concurs. He writes in De Malo:
We note a second difference regarding which there can be free choice as the difference between good and evil. But this difference does not intrinsically belong to the power of free choice but is incidentally related to the power inasmuch as natures capable of defect have such free choice. . . . And so nothing prevents there being a power of free choice that so strives for good that it is in no way capable of striving for evil, whether by nature, as in the case of God, or by the perfection of grace, as in the case of the saints and the holy angels (Q.16, a.5).
I believe there are two key phrases that help illuminate Aquinas’s position on this issue. The first is “natures capable of defect” and the second is “the perfection of grace.” These two phrases become intelligible once we understand Aquinas’s understanding of man’s faculty of will and its relation to the intellect.
Understanding human will
For Aquinas, the human faculty we call will is an intellectual appetite, a tendency to be drawn to the good apprehended by the intellect. Where the sensitive appetites respond to sensual goods presented through sense knowledge, the intellectual appetite—will—responds to the good as understood or perceived through intellectual knowledge.
The intellect presents an object (or objects) as a good, and the will responds. You might say the intellect relates to the will like a man relates romantically to a woman. As the man, as a part of his wooing the woman, bestows her with gifts, the intellect “woos” the will by presenting to it objects under the aspect of good—providing it with a desirable object.
The good without qualification—not this good or that good but goodness in general—is the formal object of the will. Just as truth is the ultimate end of the intellect, goodness is the ultimate end of the will. In this we have no choice. The human will is necessarily ordered to universal goodness as “necessity of end” (Summa Theologiae I:82:1)—not “necessity of coercion,” which is repugnant to freedom.
The freedom to choose
Our freedom of choice and self-determination arises when faced with finite or particular goods. Because finite goods do not express goodness in its universality (totality) but express it only in this or that particular mode, and thus exclusive of other goods, the will is not necessitated to them. The will is free to choose among particular goods as means to its end, goodness itself. This is called “freedom of specification.”
But whenever the will does choose, it does so only sub specie boni—under the aspect of good (see Summa Theologiae I-II:8:1). The human will cannot choose evil as evil.
“But wait a minute,” you may object, “humans choose objective evil all the time. What gives?”
It is true humans choose evil things, but the psychological explanation for our being able to do this is that some good is always perceived.
The apparent good
Consider how the intellect could mistake an apparent good (something that goes counter to the requirements of our nature) for a true good (something perfective of our nature). For example, a married couple that intends to avoid pregnancy for justifiable reasons may see contraception as a means to achieve that end and therefore judge contraception to be a good. What they fail to realize is that such activity violates the nature of human sexuality. Nevertheless, the apparent good draws the will, and so it consents.
The drug addict may perceive heroin as a good, since it satisfies his desire for sensory pleasure—not realizing it violates his dignity by impeding the two faculties that make him human, intellect and will.
In both cases, the will chooses under the aspect of good, but the intellectual apprehension of the good is flawed.
Lower goods for higher goods
Even when we correctly apprehend an act as evil, we still choose under the aspect of some good. In these cases, we simply misapprehend a lower good for a higher good.
Take for example the contracepting couple. They may know the Church teaches contraception is a grave violation of God’s design for sexuality and that it is a good thing for them to avoid such an act. But they judge the satisfaction of sexual desires as a higher good and thereby choose it over obedience to God’s will.
The drug addict may believe it’s good to uphold his human dignity and avoid heroin but judge sensory pleasure as a higher good and thus choose it over the former.
The influential will
Now, in Aquinas’s view (see ST I-II:17:2 and I-II:17:5, ad 1), immoral actions are not merely the result of mistakes in deliberation; they also involve the will’s influence over the intellect—as in the case when the will influences the intellect to reconsider an evil action as good under a different description.
For example, a married couple may be deliberating the act of contraceptive sex. The intellect judges this action to be contrary to the good of human nature. But the intellect recognizes this action could be considered as a good under a different aspect—e.g., this is an act by which we can physically express our love without the risk of pregnancy—and presents that to the will.
The will influences the intellect to keep its attention on the good under the new description, which in turn keeps the intellect’s attention away from the evil of violating human nature. Since the good of expressing love without the risk of pregnancy wins the day, the will consents, chooses, and causes the action to be performed.
And so we see the intellect’s capacity to be mistaken in its judgment about what is good, the misapprehension of the ordering of goods, and the will’s ability to influence the intellect to consider an act initially judged as evil as good under a different description. All this seems to be what Aquinas is getting at when he refers to the power of free choice for evil arising from “natures capable of defect.”
The state of perfection precludes ability to sin
This leads to the question, “What if our nature, our intellect and will, were not capable of defect?” In other words, what if the intellect was able to perfectly recognize what is truly good and beneficial for attaining our ultimate end, perfectly recognize the proper ordering of goods, and our will never influence the intellect to present an evil act as good under different descriptions?
The answer is, we wouldn’t be able to choose evil. Since the will is naturally ordered to the good, the good relative to our ultimate end would always be known, and no aspects of good would be seen in evil actions, the will would always choose appropriately. In short, we would be impeccable—unable to sin.
We get a hint of what this might be like even in this life. Consider that humans, barring psychopaths, are perfected in nature when it comes to torturing babies for fun. can’t fathom committing such a heinous crime, because our wills are repulsed by it. Our intellect perfectly judges such an action for what it is—namely, evil—and sees no good in it. As such, our will cannot influence the intellect to consider the act as good under a different description—that is to say, we are in no way drawn to it. This makes us impeccable when it comes to this specific action.
In the beatific vision, which is a direct intuitive knowledge of God, who is Goodness itself, we will not be impeccable with regard to this sin or that sin but all sin. Why? As Aquinas points out in the above passage from De Malo, our natures—intellect and will—will be perfected by grace.
The intellect will have a clear apprehension of the Infinite Good and an upright will will necessarily follow. For example, the intellect will always know what is objectively good as opposed to apparent goods. Deception concerning apparent goods will no longer occur. Since the will follows the intellect, it will never be drawn to anything evil and will only choose things that are good.
Furthermore, particular goods will be seen in perfect relationship to universal goodness, thus the will will always choose goods according to their proper order. It will no longer be able to choose a lower good in place of a higher good.
Finally, the intellect’s perfect apprehension of the good will preclude it from ever finding a different description under which it can present as a good what it initially judged to be evil. Consequently, the will will never be able to influence the intellect to reconsider an objectively evil action.
This perfection, as Aquinas points out, is the lot of the blessed saints and angels in heaven.
Why not the beatific vision immediately?
Why didn’t God create us with the beatific vision to begin with? Why not just create us with perfect intellects and wills so that we always perceive the good and always choose the good?
One possible reason is the dignity of meriting our eternal reward (see sidebar, p. xx). It is nobler to achieve the reward of heaven as a result of something we did in cooperation with God as opposed to God simply giving it to us without our participation.
I think this principle is made manifest in our experience of athletic competition. For example, what is nobler and more rewarding: to be the number-one seed because your team is the only team in the league, or to be the number-one seed because your team has won the most games against opponents? I think we can agree it’s the latter.
Since God has seen fit to create us in such a noble condition, it’s inevitable that man have the power to sin. The call to merit heaven due to victory necessarily involves the possibility of defeat.
Another possible reason for God creating us without the beatific vision is it’s more valuable to have a relationship that involves a choice to commit one way or the other. As Jimmy Akin points out in his online article entitled “Will We Have Free Will in Heaven?” (ncregister.com), we value this type of commitment in our own lives.
For example, we prefer non-arranged marriages to arranged marriages. Although arranged marriages can be valid and involve authentic love wherein each spouse wills the good of the other and commits to a lifelong relationship, we prefer a situation where people have the option of who they will commit to in a loving relationship for the rest of their lives.
It is also reasonable to value a relationship that involves a choice to commit, because the choice expresses how valuable the other individual is to the one making the choice. Consider how a man’s choice to commit to a woman in a non-arranged marriage is also at the same time his choice to not commit to other women (the same reasoning applies to the woman’s choice). This type of commitment better expresses how valuable the woman is to the man.
When a man has the option to choose from many women and chooses only one, he is in essence saying, “You are so valuable to me that I want to commit my life to you and to no other in this unique way.” The woman is saying the same thing with her choice to commit.
So, just as we value the ability to choose whom one will commit one’s life to, so to God values this type of committed relationship with human beings.
Why God values commitment
But why would God value this type of committed relationship when he is perfect in himself? Since there is nothing that man’s commitment can add to God, this type of relationship must be for man’s sake. But what does man gain from it?
One answer is that man gains an awareness of God’s greatness. Recall how the commitment in marriage reveals how valuable one is to the other relative to marital love. Similarly, the requirement for humans to commit to God in a relationship that involves him as the highest priority reveals his value in comparison to the things of the created order. He is most valuable above all things.
This awareness of God’s value in turn reveals man’s value. If man is called to a relationship with such a valuable being, then man himself is valuable. The committed relationship that God asks of man, to use the words of the Pope St. John Paul II, “reveals man to himself” (Redemptor Hominis 10).
Another grace man gains from having to commit one way or the other is a deeper experience of happiness in the beatific vision. There is greater glory in receiving our final beatitude as the fruit of our labors—receiving recompense for a hard-won victory.
Consider the following example. Let’s say in the championship game a football player plays all four quarters without a break. The game has been a close and long drawn-out battle. It comes down to the last few seconds, and he scores the final touchdown to win the game. I think it’s reasonable to conclude that player is going to experience a deeper sense of happiness than the player who sat the bench the whole game.
Similarly, having to put forth effort in making the choice for or against God, the choice to orient one’s will away from self and to God, will bring forth a greater depth of happiness in the beatific vision.
Conclusion
The tendency of apologists to appeal to freedom for the possibility of moral evil is understandable. It’s the lot we’ve been given on this side of heaven. But such possibility is not essential to freedom. This is good news, since we don’t want to spend an eternity in heaven knowing that evil could rear its ugly head.