When you look at the tree outside what do you see? For the longest time, when I looked at a tree I saw just a tree. But since I’ve studied philosophy and the various arguments for God’s existence, I now see something far greater: I see God.
Now, you’re probably thinking, “Oh, no. Karlo has gone off the deep end and become a pantheist!” No, no, no. When I say, “I see God,” what I mean is that I see the tree, and every other created thing, God-bathed. I see something that doesn’t have to exist existing and being held in existence by God.
How did I arrive at such a conclusion? Let me explain.
To be or not to be
When I see the tree, I notice it exists. There is something to the tree that distinguishes it from nothing. What is that something? St. Thomas Aquinas calls it esse, namely, the act of being—that by which a thing exists (On Being and Essence, ch. 4).
If the tree didn’t have this act of being to distinguish it from nothing, then it would be nothing, for where there is no difference there is identity. But the tree is distinct from nothing. Therefore, the tree has an act of being that distinguishes it from nothing.
The tree’s whatness and thatness
The tree’s act of being is either going to be identical to its nature or not. If the tree’s act of being is identical to its nature, then it would belong to its nature to exist. Just like what a triangle is necessarily involves three straight sides—because a triangle has three straight sides by nature—so too if the tree’s act of being was identical to its nature, what the tree is would necessarily involve existence. What it is (essence) would be the same as that it is (existence).
If the tree’s act of being is not identical to its nature, then what it is wouldn’t necessarily involve existence. What it is (essence) would be different than that it is (existence).
Which is it? Does the tree exist by nature or not? Is the tree’s act of being identical to its nature or not? The answer is, “not!” How do we know this?
Consider this. If the tree’s act of being was identical to its nature, then there never could be a time when it did not exist. Just like there can never be a time when a triangle doesn’t have three straight sides because three straight sides is identical to the essence of a triangle, so too if existence were identical to the tree’s nature there never could be a time when the tree didn’t have existence.
But obviously there was a time when the tree didn’t have existence, and there will be a time in the future when the tree will no longer exist.
Therefore, the tree’s act of being (existence) is not identical to its nature (essence)—it doesn’t belong to its nature to exist. There is a difference between what it is (essence) and that it is (existence).
An “existential” quest
If the tree’s act of being doesn’t belong to its nature, then we must ask the question, “Whence does it come?” Perhaps the tree gave itself its own act of being? This is impossible, because to cause itself to exist, it would have to have the act of existence (in order to give it) and not have the act of existence (since it’s receiving it) in the same respect at the same place and time, which of course is a contradiction.
Perhaps the tree’s act of being simply came from nothing. The philosophical response to this claim goes far beyond the scope of this article (for an in-depth response, see “It’s Not Beginner’s Luck” in Catholic Answers Magazine March-April 2016). I will simply say, “ex nihilo nihil fit—from nothing only nothing comes.”
The only other option is that the tree’s act of being must come from some cause outside itself. Such a cause is called an existential cause.
We’ve arrived at a very important metaphysical principle: something whose nature (essence) is distinct from its act of being (existence) is that which must receive its act of being from some cause outside itself.
Anticipating what you might be thinking, I can’t help but bust out a variation of an old Tina Turner song: “What’s God got to do with it, got to do with it. . . .” God has everything to do with it.
Consider the following syllogism:
Premise 1: If everything was caused to exist by something else, then there would be an infinite series of existential caused causes ordered in an essential way.
Premise 2: But there cannot be an infinite series of existential caused causes ordered in an essential way.
Conclusion: Therefore, not everything can be caused to exist by something else. There must exist at least one existential cause that doesn’t have to receive its existence from something outside itself, i.e., an uncaused cause.
Can I take your order?
Let’s take premise one. No legwork is needed to see that if everything is caused, then there would be an infinite series of caused causes. However, the kind of ordered series this argument involves is often misunderstood. Someone could read the argument and think of an existential causal series as, “Oh, I get it, I came from my dad, my dad came from his dad, and my grandfather came from his dad, and so on.” But this is not the kind of causal series the above argument has in mind. This is called an accidentally ordered series as opposed to an essentially ordered series.
An accidentally ordered series is a series where the causal activity of the causes in the series is not essential but accidental, for the effect here and now. For example, I am able to exercise my generating powers independent of my father’s. Sure, his generating power was necessary for me to receive mine, but I can exercise my generating power without my father exercising his. His power to generate is not essential to my power to generate.
In an essentially ordered series of causes, the causal activity of each cause in the series is necessary at every moment the effect exists. This type of series is akin to a series of interlinked train cars that are moving, where the motion of each car, no matter where you’re at in the series, is essential to the caboose’s motion. Similarly, the above argument involves a series of existential causes where every cause in the series (whether proximate or remote) is essential for the existence of the effect.
The reason for this is that whatever does not have existence by nature, like the tree, not only requires a cause to come into existence but to remain in existence. Just like each train car needs another moving car to keep its motion (since it doesn’t have motion within itself), so too at every moment the tree exists it needs an existential cause (a cause giving existence) outside itself to remain in existence, since existence doesn’t belong to its nature.
Now, if the cause of the tree’s continued act of being, Cause1, also does not have its existence by nature, then it too would need an existential cause (a cause giving existence) to remain in existence, Cause2. Notice that in this series the tree’s act of being right here and right now would not only be dependent on the existential causal activity of Cause1 but also the existential causal activity of Cause2, since Cause1 could not cause the existence of the tree without the simultaneous existential influence of Cause2. Cause1 would be an instrument of Cause2. This is what is meant by an essentially ordered series of existential causes.
(Note: The question of whether there can be instrumental causes of sheer existence has no bearing on the argument. For an in-depth treatment of this issue, see my article “Between Existence and Annihilation” in Catholic Answers Magazine, July-August 2016).
To infinity and beyond
Can there be an infinite series of existential caused causes ordered essentially? In other words, is it possible for the tree’s act of being to be caused by a series of causes where every cause derives its existence from something else? This brings us to premise two in the above argument: “There cannot be an infinite series of existential caused causes ordered in an essential way.”
Imagine you see the caboose of the coupled train cars mentioned above passing by. What car is the caboose receiving its motion from? You might be inclined to say, “The moving car in front of it.” But then I would ask, “What is that car receiving its motion from?” and you would say, “The car in front of it,” and so on.
Although this would be correct, ultimately the caboose is receiving its motion from the engine car through the intermediate cars. No intermediate car is the proper cause (the cause ultimately responsible for the effect) of the caboose’s motion but only an instrumental cause, deriving its causal power ultimately from the engine car.
In other words, the intermediate cars cause the caboose to move only in as much as the engine car is imparting motion to them. Without the engine car, which is a car outside the series of cars with derived motion, no intermediate car—an instrumental cause—would have the power to cause motion, and thus the caboose would not move.
Similarly, if there were an infinite series of existential caused causes, where every cause’s nature is distinct from its existence, and thus every cause would have to derive and continue to derive its existence from an outside cause, then no cause would exist outside the series of causes that have derived existence. In other words, no uncaused cause would exist.
But if that were true, then no existential caused cause would ever be able to have causal influence on the existence of the effect in question, because there would be no ultimate cause from which it could derive its existence. Just like in the train example no car would ever be able to influence the motion of the caboose without a car outside the series of cars that have derived motion, so too no existential caused cause would ever influence the existence of the effect in question without a cause outside the series of causes with derived existence.
Back to our roots
Let’s flesh this out a bit with our tree example. Recall the tree’s nature is distinct from its act of being, and thus for every moment it exists it depends on the causal activity of a Cause1. But, as mentioned above, Cause1 doesn’t have existence by nature either and can cause the tree’s act of being only inasmuch as Cause2 is causing Cause1 to exist—which means the tree really derives its act of being from Cause2through the instrumental causality of Cause1.
Let’s say Cause2 itself doesn’t have existence by nature but would have to derive existence from something outside itself. If this were the case, then we would have a series of instrumental existential causes and no proper cause from which the instrumental causes can derive their existence—that is to say, a cause that doesn’t derive existence but has it within its nature to give. If there is no proper cause from which Cause2, and consequently Cause1, can derive its existence, then the tree wouldn’t exist.
But adding an infinite number of instrumental existential causes doesn’t solve the problem. If a series of two instrumental existential causes can’t cause the tree to exist, then an infinite number of instrumental existential causes would not be able to do so either. This is no more possible than a caboose receiving motion from an infinite series of interlinked train cars without an engine car.
Decisions, decisions, decisions
We either have to deny the possibility of an infinite essentially ordered series of existential caused causes or deny the existence of the tree. Barring extreme skeptics for the moment, who by the way do deserve adequate responses, I believe most would opt for the former.
If an infinite essentially ordered series of existential caused causes is impossible, then there must exist at least one existential cause that is not caused. Unlike the existential caused causes in the series, such a cause would not have to derive its existence from something outside itself because its nature (essence) and act of being (existence) would be identical. Its nature would be to be. It would be what St. Thomas Aquinas called ipsum esse subsistens—subsistent being itself (Summa Theologiae, I:4:2).
But is it God?
Now, is such a reality worthy of being called God? Let’s take a look.
We know an uncaused cause would have to be unlimited in its being—that is to say, infinite. Every limited being (finite being) must have a cause, because it must have a sufficient explanation for why its mode of being—say, the mode of being a frog—was actualized and not some other possible mode of being, for instance, the mode of being a butterfly. But an uncaused cause can’t have a cause. Therefore, an uncaused cause must be infinite, or unlimited and unrestricted, in being.
We also know an uncaused cause would have to be absolutely simple. What this means is that it could not be composed of any parts whatsoever, whether physical or metaphysical. We’ve already seen in our reasoning how an uncaused cause would be metaphysically simple in that its nature (essence) would have to be identical to its act of being (existence).
A further reason, however, that precludes any sort of composition all together is that anything that is composed of parts needs a composer—a cause that puts the parts together. But the uncaused cause can’t be caused. Therefore, the uncaused cause can’t have any parts, which means it’s absolutely simple.
From absolute simplicity follows immateriality (non-matter). Every material thing is composed of parts. An uncaused cause can’t be composed of parts. Therefore, an uncaused cause can’t be material.
The absolute uniqueness of an uncaused cause also follows from absolute simplicity. If there were more than one uncaused cause, there would have to be a differentiating factor—something to distinguish one from the other. But if there were a differentiating factor, then the one with the differentiating factor would be a composite of existence plus the differentiating factor. But an uncaused caused can’t be a composite being, since a composite being requires a composer. Therefore, there can be only one uncaused cause whose essence is existence.
Furthermore, the uncaused cause must be immutable (unable to change). Wherever there is change, there is an actualized potency—a movement from potency to act. But no potency can be actualized without something already actual—that is to say, a cause. Since the uncaused cause can’t be caused, it follows it can’t change.
Eternality follows from immutability. Everything bound by time changes. The uncaused cause can’t change. Therefore, the uncaused cause is not bound by time.
The uncaused cause must also be personal. As pure infinite being, it must have all actuality and perfections. But intelligence and will are perfections. Therefore, the First Cause must have both intelligence and will.
Finally, and most important, we know that the uncaused cause is the continuous cause of existence for everything else that exists (the tree, you, and me). Because everything whose essence is distinct from its existence is dependent right here and right now on an essentially ordered series of existential causes that terminates in an uncaused cause, and there can only be one uncaused cause, then it follows everything that exists besides the uncaused cause (the tree, the train, you, and me) is continuously sustained in existence at every moment it exists by the one uncaused cause. Without the uncaused cause, the tree, you, and I would lapse into nothingness.
Conclusion
This is what I meant when I said, “When I see the tree, I see God.” Everything whose essence is distinct from its existence I see as God-bathed: receiving its act of being from God at every moment it exists. Perhaps now you’ll never look at a tree the same.