Unmistakable Testament
The cover of the February 2002 issue underscored for me the importance of the crucifix in our faith. In a way that an empty cross cannot convey, the crucifix is a powerful reminder that God the Son became man and died for our sins.
On a practical level, the crucifix is an unmistakable testament to the world that we are followers of Jesus. An empty cross on a necklace or pin has become a non-controversial item of jewelry. But wearing a crucifix around one’s neck or carrying This Rock’s latest issue with the cover exposed is clear statement about an unpopular subject in today’s society.
I thank This Rock for its long line of bold covers. The one with Jesus on the cross gave me a much-needed reminder of Jesus’ ultimate sacrifice and another opportunity to declare my faith.
—Victor Casini
Burr Ridge, Illinois
Books for Croatia
My name is Zeljko Rakosec, and I am a Jesuit priest in Croatia. I am writing to you on behalf of the Jesuit Library in Zagreb. Presently we are struggling to recover from several decades of Communist rule and likewise from the recent war through which we finally gained our independence. The suffering we endured has made us strong in faith but has left us devoid of the material infrastructure necessary to fulfill our important role in the evangelization of God’s people here in Croatia.
Our library is used mainly by students who study at either the Jesuit Faculty of Philosophy or the Institute of Theology. The Faculty of Philosophy offers two main courses, one in philosophy and the other in religious culture. The Faculty also has a department for dialogue with the modern world and culture. The Institute of Theology offers students a bachelor’s degree in theology. But there are also many students and scholars from other faculties and other academic institutions who use the Library.
Our most urgent responsibility is to provide our students with the necessary literature in order that they may obtain knowledge of the highest possible standard. Unfortunately, our library is not in good working condition. It does not function anywhere near as efficiently as it ought to be. This problem is hindering us in our desire to provide as high as possible standard of education to our students.
Because of financial situation, we are currently unable to sufficiently improve the library’s collection of books and journals. Could I possibly count on your kind assistance and that of you readers?
For additional information please contact:
Fr. Zeljko Rakosec, S.J.
Jordonovac 110, pp 169
10000 Zagreb, Croatia
rakosec@libero.it
I would greatly appreciate any assistance with which you could help us to build up our library.
—Fr. Zeljko Rakosec
Zagreb, Croatia
What If There Is No Morally Correct Solution?
I have never made any sort of in-depth study on this issue of the morality of “saving” frozen human embryos (“Can Frozen Embryos Be Saved?” January 2002), but I do know Msgr. William Smith and would take seriously any position he approves of. In addition, his analysis seems to be clearer and more objective than the analyses offered by Dr. William May et al, which seem to be rationalizations for an answer these authors want to be true.
In my ignorance I would like these theologians one question: Morally, how does this situation differ from any human living on life support? Although they come to be on life support in vastly different circumstances, both a frozen embryo and a person without functioning kidneys who is on dialysis are both dependent on the use of technology to continue living.
Would it be morally acceptable, for example, for the person on dialysis to buy a kidney on a black market so that he could get off the machine and live a normal life? If no, then why would it be morally okay to use immoral means to rescue the embryo? After all, the person on dialysis has a morally good object, et cetera.
I know as Americans we believe that every problem is fixable if we put enough time, effort, resources, and ingenuity into it, but that’s simply not the case. Isn’t the bottom line in the embryo debate that our technology has gone so far that we can now do morally bad actions for which there are no morally correct solutions?
—Rick Conason
Gulfport, Mississippi
Editor’s reply: Is is an axiom of Catholic moral theology that there is always a morally licit option, even if there are no desirable or even preferable options.
Of Course Saving Embryos Is Morally Licit
“Can Frozen Embryos be Saved” (January 2002) summarizes a new theological debate that deals with the morality of practices made possible by new medical technology. The technology is new, but this is not new theological territory. The basic morality of the issue is clearly settled. We are not breaking new ground.
There has never been any dispute on the morality of giving aid to a person immorally conceived through fornication, adultery, incest, and rape. In vitro conception (not in vitro fertilization, please) is only another albeit new immoral means of conception. The Church has never taught or even raised the question that it is immoral to give life-giving aid to those conceived immorally on the grounds that such aid would legitimize the particular sin by which a human life is conceived.
If it is immoral for a woman to aid the life that began in vitro because such aid would legitimize the immorality of the in vitro process (which Bishop Sgreccia seems to assert in the article), then it must also be true that giving aid to an illegitimate orphan infant legitimizes fornication. The type of aid given to those immorally conceived becomes the issue.
Under the subheading, “The gift of a child,” we read in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, “Techniques which entail the dissociation of the husband and wife by the intrusion of a person other than the couple (donation of sperm and ovum, surrogate uterus) are gravely immoral. These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertilization) infringe the child’s right to be born of a father and mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage. They betray the spouses’ right to become a father and a mother only through each other.”
Much could be said to demonstrate that this does not apply to the woman who hopes to save a living human. Does it apply to the situation of a woman who gives herself to save a life, not for selfish reasons but motivated by charity? I don’t think it does.
But what analogy from decided moral law might apply where it is the intention not the act that determines the morality of the act? Assume an intruder who had a knife entered a home, and a policeman arrived to find him with knife raised about to kill a child. Assume the policeman drew his pistol and warned the intruder to stop, but the criminal stabbed the child. If the policeman shot the intruder, it would be a virtuous rather than sinful act. The morality of the act of using a gun to shoot and even to kill would depend on circumstances and intent, not the act itself.
In the same way, the same tools or techniques that are used for the purpose of adopting and saving a life are also used to implant fertilized ovum in a woman who does so for reasons which are immoral. It is the latter that CCC 2376 intended to address.
When has the Church ever taught that any victim whose rights have been violated by an immoral act of a second party does not deserve and have the right to aid, or that aiding the victim would legitimize the first act of violating his rights? Never.
Paragraph 2376 clearly is not about Good Samaritans saving lives. If 2376 does prohibit saving the lives of “spare” humans (a vulgar and detestable term), then it can equally be applied to prohibiting saving the life of a baby left on the convent doorstep with a note from the mother confessing that she regretted her fornication. What should society do with a baby whose rights have been violated by the immoral behavior of his parents or a doctor? What age would the child have to reach before he became worthy of aid and the aid not legitimize his sinful conception?
Is it really possible, as Msgr. Smith uses the CDF document Donum Vitae to show, that we can face a circumstance of life and death of a human being and there be no moral option? God help us. Msgr. Smith may be stumped or confused, but surely that does not mean there is no moral option.
This is not that difficult an issue and it is astonishing and troubling that it is causing so much strain. If there are no safe means which can be pursued licitly to saving the life, then are we to conclude it is licit to take the life by an another deliberate willful act, such as turning up the heat on the frozen embryo and killing it? The only other option is suspending the embryonic stage indefinitely until the power fails.
—Robert Salter
Corvallis, Oregon
Our Father Bother
I was pleased to read your “Quick Questions” response in the January 2002 issue about the translation of the Lord’s Prayer. Too often I have heard the translation arguments used to discredit the validity of our English translations. You are correct in reminding those who would use such arguments that Jesus spoke in Aramaic, not Greek nor Latin. You are also to be commended for instructing readers to look at the words as they are used in context.
However, you fell into the very trap you were warning the questioner about when you said, “The English translators of the Our Father chose one option rather than another, but it isn’t an option where you can look at the Greek and say, ‘That’s wrong. That’s not what the Greek says.’ On the other hand, one can look at the ‘forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,’ and say ‘That is wrong.’ The words in Greek are debts and debtors. ” You then go on to favor the Latin Pater Noster.
By this last point you have contradicted yourself. You can’t say that the Greek must be understood in its context and adjusted to fit English language patterns in other instances but then throw out that argument when it comes to debts and debtors. What idea was the original author trying to convey? Monetary debts, or sins?
I think the latter is more the case, especially when looking at the Latin roots of the word trespass. Tres comes from the Latin trans, which means “to go to the other side of,” or “across.” Passer means “to pass.” So we are asking God, in the English translation, to forgive our crossing or going to the other side (i.e., away from him) as we forgive those who go to the other side of or across from us (i.e., hurt us). Furthermore, the Latin word trans is also the root of the word transgress, from the Latin word transgredi, which means “to step beyond” or “go across.”
While the Greek understanding of the words debt and debtors may have that idea of “owing” in terms of our obligations to God and going against that, in the English translation and usage those words have monetary connotations. Because the idea of language is to convey an intended idea (as you state in your reply), while debts and debtors may be technically correct in the Greek, the English word trespass connotes more accurately what we are asking for in the Lord’s Prayer.
The Latin roots of trespass also hold to that idea of what we are asking for. The translators were merely choosing words that more accurately reflect this request on our part and we can’t use words, beautiful as they may be, whose meanings no longer accurately convey the intended idea. The word trespass keeps faithful to what Christ taught his disciples to pray for.
—Thomas A. Williams
Geneva, Ilinois
Editor’s reply: The Latin roots of trespass aren’t relevant here. What counts is what word trespass means in the language in which it is being used: English.
In English, the primary meaning of trespass is going into territory where one is not allowed. This concept is not more accurate a metaphor for sin than the concept of debt. The difference is, Jesus used one metaphor and not the other. As long as that metaphor will not hopelessly confuse the audience, there seems to be no reason not to use it in translation.
Other groups have not had a problem understanding the metaphor of debts for sins. Are English-speaking Catholics less able to pick up on the metaphor than Latin-speaking Catholics? Or English-speaking Protestants? Or Jesus’ original audience? As long as English-speaking Catholics can understand or be taught the meaning of what Jesus said, it is fair to point to elements of unnecessary paraphrasing as a flaw in the translation.
Millennial Nonsense Is Nondenominational
Rapture novels were around long before any of the examples Carl Olson cited in “Recycled Rapture” (September 2001). Sydney Watson’s In the Twinkling of an Eye and Mark of the Beast were popular in the early part of the twentieth century.
These books were so bad and so offensive to both Catholics and Jews that they’d make the Left Behind series look artistic. And of course there are Catholic apocalyptic novels, most famously Lord of the World by Robert Benson, The End by Hugh Venning (who was really Dom Hubert van Zeller), and The Clock Struck Twenty by “S.M.C.” The End is witty and charming, long overdue for reprinting.
For a good survey of Protestant millennialism, see Paul Boyer’s When Time Shall Be No More (Harvard, 1992).
But before we feel superior to Rapture-ridden Protestants, what about the Three Days of Darkness nonsense that enthralls many conservative Catholics? That’s not to be found in Catholic books on the End Times before World War II and may represent an intrusion of Protestant millennialist thought during the Cold War. But the order of events is different in the Catholic version, with the bad people taken away to hell during the Chastisement rather than the good people raptured to heaven before the Tribulation.
—Sandra Miesel
Indianapolis, Indiana