Every election cycle the issue of Catholics voting for politicians who are less than 100 percent opposed to abortion and euthanasia comes up. Since this is an election year, it’s coming up again.
Based on an awareness that abortion and euthanasia are intrinsically evil and thus never permissible under any circumstances, some Catholics feel obligated to never vote for a politician who is less than 100 percent pro-life on these issues—e.g., a politician who opposes abortion except for cases of rape and incest.
While such a politician’s position is inconsistent (and stupid), the Church does not teach that Catholics cannot vote for such individuals in the circumstances that commonly prevail in our country.
Many Catholics seem to be of a contrary opinion. They feel that the Church does require them to vote only for 100-percent pro-life candidates in all circumstances.
The Basis
The Church never says that this is the case, so the position is supported by inference from things the Church has said. The most commonly cited basis for the claim seems to be what John Paul II wrote in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae. This is a key section of the encyclical, and we will discuss in it detail.
The statement offered as a basis for the claim that Catholics can vote only for 100-percent pro-life politicians is this: “In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or to vote for it” (EV 73).
The relevant part of the statement pertains directly to voting on a law permitting abortion. Except in cases where a referendum is being held on an abortion measure (not a common circumstance in the United States, since the courts all but removed the issue from the legislative sphere), this part of the statement does not apply directly to the situation in which Catholic voters find themselves.
But it does apply to their situations indirectly, for it is their votes that elect the politicians who do vote on abortion legislation or who appoint or confirm the judges that adjudicate abortion in the courts. Those who apply the statement to ordinary Catholic voters are right to do so. The principles it contains are pertinent to those who do not vote directly on abortion legislation, even if the statement applies indirectly to their situation.
“Such Cases Are Not Infrequent”
If the Pope stopped with this statement, one might conclude that he was saying that one could never vote for an abortion law that did not completely restrict it. But he does not stop there. He goes on to note that one can vote for an imperfect law in order to avoid the effects of an even worse law.
“A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on. Such cases are not infrequent” (ibid.).
This situation has several characteristics: (1) “a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions” is being proposed (2) “in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on,” and (3) “a legislative vote [for the more restrictive law] would be decisive.”
The Holy Father says that such situations are not infrequent, and he is right. For example, laws have been proposed that say abortions can be performed for minors only after parental notification, or for any woman only with informed consent, or only before a certain stage of pregnancy, or not by particular methods (e.g., partial-birth abortion).
These laws are proposed by pro-life legislators who are trying to restrict the otherwise completely unrestricted access to abortion that followed Roe v. Wade. And for the foreseeable future, such legislative proposals are likely to be the only ones dealt with in this country.
Since such proposals are not handled by popular referenda but by legislatures, they are not directly applicable to the average voter. But since it is the ordinary voters who elect the legislatures, the principles are relevant to how ordinary citizens cast their votes.
Note the terms that the Pope uses in describing the two laws. He describes the first as “a more restrictive law,” as compared to “a more permissive law.” This means that the first law itself is permissive of abortion to some degree. It allows abortion in some cases, though it places more restrictions than the more permissive law. The aim of these restrictions, John Paul notes, is “limiting the number of authorized abortions.”
It is important to recognize this distinction, because some have scrupled on this issue, suggesting that one could vote for a law only if it imposed a restriction, for example, by saying that “abortion is prohibited in the third trimester.” Such a law would not contain any authorization of abortion. If it did contain an authorization, such as saying, “Abortion is allowed in the first and second trimesters but not the third,” then some would say that one could not vote for it.
But this is not the situation that the Pope is considering. He has in mind a case where “a more restrictive law” is being proposed, not “a law that [only] creates restrictions.” His reference to the law being “more restrictive” shows that he is thinking of a law that may permit abortion but with more restrictions than the contrasting law.
He envisions this latter law as either in place (“already passed”) or soon-to-be passed (“ready to be voted on”). In the U.S., legislators commonly face the first situation: The Supreme Court legalized abortion across the board in 1973, and now legislators are trying to place some restrictions on it. In other countries, the other situation may exist: Legislators may be proposing a more restrictive law in order to prevent a less restrictive one from being passed.
The final element of this situation is that the legislative vote to be cast “would be decisive.” That is, voting for the more restrictive law would enable it to be passed in place of the less restrictive law. In other words, this is not a hopeless case in which the more restrictive law has no chance of passing; it is a case in which passing the law has a real chance of reducing the number of legal abortions.
A Proper Attempt to Limit Evil
What is the Holy Father’s judgment about these situations? What are the responsibilities of lawmakers and—by extension—the ordinary voters who elect them? He continues:
“In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil.aspects” (ibid.).
John Paul indicates that a lawmaker can vote for a more restrictive abortion law in such circumstances, but he adds two new conditions: It can be done only if (4) “it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law,” and (5) the lawmaker’s “absolute personal opposition to procured abortion [is] well known.”
Without the first of these conditions, the lawmaker shouldn’t be voting for the more restrictive law at all. He should work at once to overturn or abrogate the existing pro-abortion law or to stop the passage of a proposed law permitting abortion.
When the Pope speaks of it being impossible to overturn or abrogate a pro-abortion law, he is speaking in terms of practical possibility judged according to the legislator’s best assessment of the situation. In the political process, it is never possible to anticipate the outcome of a vote with complete certainty. God can always perform a miracle leading pro-abortion legislators to repent—or allow the devil to deceive wavering pro-life legislators, leading them to stumble when the vote comes. The Holy Father is not asking legislators to foresee such eventualities but to use their best political judgment to assess whether condition (4) is met.
The same applies to condition (3)—whether the vote in question would be decisive. Whether the vote actually would be decisive cannot be known before it is taken, since the legislators’ free will could change the outcome. Yet a pro-life lawmaker must make his best assessment of whether it would be decisive.
If it would not, if the passage of a less restrictive law is a foregone conclusion and there is no practical chance of passing a more restrictive law, then condition (3) is not fulfilled.
The final condition is that the lawmaker’s absolute personal opposition to abortion is well-known. This is not so much a condition on how he casts the vote itself. The Pope certainly would not urge a lawmaker with an ambiguous position on abortion to vote for a less restrictive law or by abstaining make its passage more likely.
John Paul is expressing a condition that speaks to an independent responsibility of pro-life lawmakers: They must always make their absolute opposition to abortion known. They should have done so before this situation arose, and if they have not, then they should do so at once.
Even apart from this last condition, the more restrictive of them are quite extensive. When they do exist, the Pope tells us, “this does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil.aspects” (ibid.).
The Ordinary Voter
Most of what Evangelium Vitae 73 says pertains to the lawmaker voting directly on an abortion law rather than to the average voter. But as we have noted, the voter cannot let himself off the hook by saying that since he doesn’t vote directly on abortion legislation then he is free to ignore abortion in deciding whom he should vote for. He may not vote on the laws, but he does vote on the lawmakers, and so by extension the principles apply to him.
They apply in two ways:
First, since legislators can vote for more restrictive abortion laws in such circumstances, voters can elect legislators willing to do so.
In fact, they should elect such lawmakers. When it is not possible to outlaw abortion completely, the goals that the Pope sets before us are “limiting the harm done by such a law and lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality” (ibid.).
Legislators who would not vote for more restrictive abortion laws in the circumstances that the Holy Father enumerates are equivalent to pro-abortion legislators. The result of not voting for more restrictive laws when casting such votes would be decisive is to not limit the harm done by new or existing abortion legislation. To put it simply: It means that more babies die.
But there is a second way in which John Paul’s principles apply to the ordinary voter. This can be seen by applying his words directly to the voter, making the modification that the average citizen votes on lawmakers rather than laws. When we do this, we get the following modified version:
“A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where voting would be decisive for the election of a more restrictive lawmaker who would aim at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more-permissive lawmaker already elected or ready to be elected. Such cases are not infrequent. . . . When it is not possible to prevent the election of even a partially pro-abortion lawmaker, an ordinary voter, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion is well-known, can licitly support the election of lawmakers who aim at limiting the harm done by abortion legislation and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil.aspects.”
Applying these principles to the ordinary citizen results in the possibility of him voting in a way that limits the harm done by existing or proposed abortion legislation, even if the lawmakers for whom he votes are not 100-percent pro-life but are merely more restrictive of abortion than the lawmakers who would be elected in their place.
To enumerate the conditions more formally: (1) There must be a candidate who is more restrictive of abortion opposing (2) a candidate or candidates who are less restrictive of abortion, where (3) voting for the more restrictive legislator would be decisive, and (4) it is not possible to elect a completely pro-life lawmaker, and (5) the voter’s absolute personal opposition to abortion is known.
As with the case of the lawmaker himself, condition (5) speaks more to the responsibilities of the voter every day rather than on Election Day in particular. Conditions (1) and (2) are generally ascertainable by inspecting the candidates’ platforms, public statements, and voting records. And conditions (3) and (4) must be determined by the voter’s best prudential judgment of whether a majority can be put together for a more restrictive lawmaker when the election of a completely pro-life lawmaker does not seem to him to be a practical possibility.
The last two conditions are the most difficult to ascertain. They will continue to frustrate ordinary voters trying to limit the harm done by abortion legislation—just as their parallel conditions will frustrate lawmakers trying to achieve the same goal.