From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex.
It has been shown that according to nature’s order, pleasure is on account of operation, and not conversely. Wherefore if an operation is not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above, are not the last end, for they are directed to certain manifest ends — eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them.
The will is higher than the sensitive appetite, for the former moves the latter. But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved. Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures, which are seated in the sensitive appetite.
Moreover, happiness is a good proper to man, for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them.
Besides, the highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely certain sensible objects. Therefore we must not assign happiness to such pleasures.
That which is not good unless it be moderate is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate, for otherwise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the sovereign good is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore suchlike pleasures are not man’s supreme good, which is happiness.
In all per se predications, if A be predicated of B simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B. Thus, if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly, if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false, because it is considered sinful to use them too much. Besides, it is hurtful to the body and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good, and human happiness does not consist in them.
Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness. If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue, for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures.
The last end of everything is God, as was proved above. We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.
Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans, who ascribed man’s happiness to pleasures of this kind. In their person Solomon says, “This therefore hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labor . . . and this is his portion” (Eccles. 17), and, “Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy: for this is our portion, and this is our lot” (Wis. 2:9).
The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted, for they pretended that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table, wherefore they are called “Chiliastae,” or believers in the Millennium.
The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted, who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in such pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.
Like arguments avail to prove that man’s supreme good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty, and strength. For they are common to good and evil, and are unstable, and are not subject to the will.
Besides, the soul is better than the body, which neither lives nor possesses these goods without the soul. Wherefore the soul’s good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body’s good. Therefore, the body’s good is not man’s supreme good. These goods are common to man and other animals, whereas happiness is a good proper to man. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the things mentioned.
Many animals surpass man in goods of the body: for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man’s supreme good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals, which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
By the same arguments it is evident that neither does man’s supreme good consist in goods of his sensitive faculty. For these goods again, are common to man and other animals. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect’s good is better than the sense’s. Consequently man’s supreme good is not seated in the senses.
The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them. Therefore man’s supreme good is not in the senses.
The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of the senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is directed to intellective: wherefore animals devoid of intelligence take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, insofar as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore man’s supreme good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive faculty.
Accordingly, if man’s ultimate happiness consists not in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive faculty; it remains for us to conclude that man’s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of the truth.
For this operation alone is proper to man, and none of the other animals communicates with him therein. This is not directed to anything further as its end, since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake. By this operation man is united to things above him, by becoming like them, because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.
Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it. All other human operations seem to be directed to this as their end. Because perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which all the regulations of the civil life are directed.
So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations are brought into the service of those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man’s ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles: for this is most imperfect, as being universal and containing potential knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human study, and comes to us from nature, and not through the study of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object, since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the highest objects of intelligence.
It follows then that man’s ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. It is therefore evident by way of induction that man’s ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.