Just War Theory (JWT) is not a teaching designed to justify hostile actions against another country. It exists to help us preserve as many goods as possible when states have failed to promote, preserve, and defend peace. After all, our Lord did not say, “Blessed are the war-makers.” Rather, his injunction to all of us is to gift to others the very gift of peace that he breathed upon the disciples at Pentecost. “Blessed are the peacemakers.”
To understand JWT, it has to be framed properly. We have to understand that it is one means by which the common good can be preserved. This is why the provisions of JWT all focus on the preservation of some corporate good that aids the flourishing of the individuals within belligerent nations. It is not a way to give cover to those who would make war for the sake of some personal or corporate end that is either hidden or merely self-serving. The goods sought must include those with whom war is being made. Yes! Even in war, you are required to love your enemies.
In our attempt to accomplish this moral expectation we evaluate three stages of warfare: ius ad bellum, ius in bello, and ius post bellum.
Most of people’s energy is spent discussing the justice of going to war (ius ad bellum). However, the manner in which war is prosecuted (ius in bello) and how belligerent states deport themselves following hostilities (ius post bellum) are also of grave concern. Each of these “parts” of warfare is treated as morally distinct. This is important, because in the past, some atrocities were committed against soldiers or civilians of one country by another due to a consensus that the ius ad bellum of the former’s nation was illicit.
Separating each of these parts allows us to preserve more common and individual goods than it does by creating inextricable causal links among them. Put simply, if you were fighting on the side of an unjust aggressor, you do not lose your right to be treated fairly. In other words, you cannot be summarily executed simply because you fought on the wrong side. However, there remain some connections. One example is that it becomes the responsibility of the victorious nation to aid the rehabilitation of the defeated nation. Generally speaking, there is some relationship among these three parts of warfare, but it is also limited. Both the connections and limitations are subordinated to the promotion of the common good.
In our time, it seems as if certain nations, particularly the so-called “superpowers” of the world, are perpetually in all three stages of war. The world has become significantly smaller since Cicero, Augustine, or Aquinas treated the matter. Even Vittoria or Grotius could not fathom the manner in which power is projected in our time.
For them, warfare was fairly straightforward. It involved the overt movement of troops to a border, invasion, the manifest destruction of a nation’s goods or properties, or some clear excess of a tyrant against his own people. Today, however, belligerence is not so clear.
Setting aside the obfuscating terms that are often used today, presumably for legal rather than moral reasons, JWT considers all of these under the classical definition of war. We can observe this by how recent scholars, such as Michael Walzer, GEM Anscombe, and John Finnis, have included non-standard forms of conflict into their own analysis of the matter. But among nations, the reasons to engage in war and the means to prosecute it are ever evolving. If we are attentive to the real world, then our analysis of what constitutes a just war must grow and develop in step.
It is also important to understand that when the term “Just War” is used, not everyone is talking, precisely, about the same thing. Those who rely on Augustine or Aquinas may not accept the conclusions of Vittoria, Grotius, Walzer, Finnis, or others. Those who rely on modern thinkers may not accept the premises upon which classical considerations of Just War are established. Even the Catechism of the Catholic Church does not represent the totality of thought within the academy (whether Catholic or not) on the matter. For instance, it departs from classical thought (and some modern thought) on the possibility of punitive war, expansion, and preventative actions. It expresses a position that war is always to be defensive in nature. However, this unnecessarily excludes many segments of the debate that may hobble important modern considerations of warfare.
We have to be able to ask:
- “Can prevention of the development and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons be a just reason for engaging in warfare?”
- “Is a cyber-attack targeting the Linux kernel, which would grant unfettered access to worldwide defense and infrastructure assets, as nearly happened in 2016, an act of war?”
- “How do we deal with proxy wars?”
- “Does funding terrorism constitute an act of war?”
Certainly, as Catholics, we must reject any form of utilitarian or consequentialist justifications. However, answering these sorts of questions is precisely what is necessary today. Most of the wars that we see are billed as preventative or even punitive (consider the current action in Iran and the recent action against Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela by the United States). Both types of actions could be allowed according to the thought of Vittoria, but not, it would seem, of Finnis.
There are at least two hidden variables that affect the way in which JWT is treated by different scholars. The first is the definition one may be using for “international law.” The second is the definition used for “natural law.” It is unclear if these terms, used by various authors, are the same, or even similar. For instance, it is not clear that the New Natural Law theories proposed by Finnis easily comport with traditional notions. Related to this confusion is the definition of international law and who is the arbiter of such a body of law, written or unwritten. Even something that should be clear—“who can authorize war”—is a subject of dispute. These are just some of the questions that cause significant debate among scholars and pundits.
One strategy to navigate this labyrinth is to focus on the primary intent of JWT: to preserve and promote the common good. At its heart is the ardent concern for human flourishing. It is obvious that the state of chaos warfare causes does not immediately provide for that. This is true of any conflict, even if it is merely defending oneself against an aggressor.
However, warfare, defensive, punitive, or otherwise, can only possibly be justified if the common good is under threat. Consider the classical position that one sovereign may have an obligation, assuming other necessary conditions are met, to invade a tyrant’s land to bring that tyrant to justice. This is because the care of the common good extends beyond one’s own borders to the whole of humanity. Those tasked with the care of the common good must take the universal brotherhood of man into consideration.
On this account, JWT cannot champion nationalism. However, it is also not a license to wantonly invade lands. There must be a reasonable hope of success, legal authorization, a consideration of proportional effects, etc., if there is to be a just cause for war. Honest diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other tools of statecraft must precede any military action.
Heads of state must always keep in view the axiom that peace is always preferable to war. Peace through strength cannot be accompanied by a heavy trigger finger. Rather, and this may seem odd to many readers, the decision to go to war must stem from a love of one’s neighbor, along with the just defense of oneself and those under his care. It must not stem from fear, a desire for vengeance, or merely some foreseen threat. It must seek to restore justice, promote peace, limit harm, provide for stability, and secure all of the necessary goods to aid the flourishing of the people. To depart from this disposition and these ends is to depart from right reason, sound morals, and the laws of God.