Name given to the book of Holy Scripture which usually follows the Proverbs
Ecclesiastes (Sept. ekklesiastes, in St. Jerome also CONCIONATOR, “Preacher”) is the name given to the book of Holy Scripture which usually follows the Proverbs; the Hebrew Qoheleth probably has the same meaning. The word preacher, however, is not meant to suggest a congregation nor a public speech, but only the solemn announcement of sublime truths [Heb., HQHYL, passive NQHL), Lat. congregare, I (III) K., viii, 1, 2; BQHL, in publico, palam, Prov., v, 14; xxvi, 26; QHLT to be taken either as a feminine participle, and would then be either a simple abstract noun, proeconium, or in a poetic sense, tuba clangens, or must be taken as the name of a person, like the proper nouns of similar formation, Esd., ii, 55, 57; corresponding to its use, the word is always used as masculine, except vii, 27]. Solomon, as the herald of wisdom, proclaims the most serious truths. His teaching may be divided as follows.
Introduction.—Everything human is vain (i, 1-11); for man, during his life on earth, is more transient than all things in nature (i, 1-7), whose unchangeable course he admires, but does not comprehend (i, 8-11).
Part I.—Vanity in man’s private life (i, 12-iii, 15): vain is human wisdom (i, 12-18); vain are pleasures and pomp (ii, 1-23). Then, rhetorically exaggerating, he draws the conclusion: “Is it not better to enjoy life’s blessings which God has given, than to waste your strength uselessly?” (ii, 24-26). As epilogue to this part is added the proof that all things are immutably predestined and are not subject to the will of man (in, 1-15). In this first part, the reference to the writer himself, the self-accusation, on account of the excessive luxury described in III Kings, x, is placed in the foreground. Afterwards, the author usually prefaces his meditations with an “I saw”, and explains what he has learned either by personal observation or by other means, and on what he has meditated. Thus he saw:
Part II.—Sheer vanity also in civil life (iii, 16-vi, 6). Vain and cheerless is life because of the iniquity which reigns in the halls of justice (iii, 16-22) as well as in the intercourse of men (iv, 1-3). The strong expressions in iii, 18 sqq., and iv, 2 sq., must be explained by the writer’s tragic vein, and this does credit to the writer, who, speaking as Solomon, deplores bitterly what has often enough happened in his kingdom also, whether through his fault or without his knowledge. The despotic rule of the kings was described in advance by Samuel, and Solomon cannot be cleared of all guilt (see below). But even the best prince will, to his grief, find by experience that countless wrongs cannot be prevented in a large empire. Qoheleth does not speak of the wrongs which he himself has suffered, but of those which others sustained. Another of life’s vanities consists in the fact that mad competition leads many to fall into idleness (iv, 4-6); a third causes many a man through greed to shun society, or even to lose a throne because his unwisdom forbids him to seek the help of other men (iv, 7-16). Qoheleth then turns once more to the three classes of men named: to those who groan under the weight of injustice, in order to exhort them not to sin against God by murmuring against Providence, for this would be tantamount to dishonoring God in His temple, or to breaking a sacred vow, or to denying Providence (iv, 17-v, 8); in the same way he gives a few salutary counsels to the miser (v, 9-19) and describes the misery of the supposed foolish king (vi, 1-6). A long oratorical amplification closes the second part (vi, 7-vii, 30). The immutable predestination of all things by God must teach man contentment and modesty (vi, 7-vii, 1, Vulg.). A serious life, free from all frivolity, is best (vii, 2-7, Vulg.). Instead of passionate outbreaks (vii, 8-15), he recommends a golden mean (vii, 16-23). Finally, Qoheleth inquires into the deepest and last reason of “vanity” and finds it in the sinfulness of woman; he evidently thinks also of the sin of the first woman, through which, against the will of God (30), misery entered the world (vii, 24-30). In this part, also, Qoheleth returns to his admonition to enjoy in peace and modesty the blessings granted by God, instead of giving oneself up to anger on account of wrongs endured, or to avarice, or to other vices (iii, 22; v, 17 sq.; vii, 15).
Part III—begins with the question: “Who is as the wise man?” (In the Vulg. these words have been wrongly placed in chap. vii.) Qoheleth here gives seven or eight important rules for life as the quintessence of true wisdom. Submit to God‘s (“the king’s”) will (viii, 1-8). If you observe that there is no justice on earth, contain yourself, “eat and drink” (viii, 9-15). Do not attempt to solve all the riddles of life by human wisdom; it is better to enjoy modestly the blessings of life and to work according to one’s strength, but always within the narrow limits set by God (viii, 16-ix, 12.—In the Vulg. ad aliud must be dropped). In this “siege” of your city (by God) seek help in true wisdom (ix, 13-x, 3). It is always most important not to lose your temper because of wrongs done to you (x, 4-15). Then follows the repetition of the advice not to give oneself up to idleness; sloth destroys countries and nations, therefore work diligently, but leave the success to God without murmuring (x, 16-xi, 6). Even amid the pleasures of life do not forget the Lord, but think of death and judgment (xi, 7-xii, 8).
In the epilogue Qoheleth again lays stress upon his authority as the teacher of wisdom, and declares that the pith of his teachings is: Fear God and keep the Commandments; for that is the whole man.
In the above analysis, as must be expected, the writer of this article has been guided in some particulars by his conception of the difficult text before him, which he has set forth more completely in his commentary on the same. Many critics do not admit a close connection of ideas at all. Zapletal regards the book as a collection of separate aphorisms which form a whole only exteriorly: Bickell thought that the arrangement of the parts had been totally destroyed at an early date; Siegfried supposes that the book had been supplemented and enlarged in strata; Luther assumed several authors. Most commentators do not expect that they can show a regular connection of all the “sayings” and an orderly arrangement of the entire book. In the above analysis an attempt has been made to do this, and we have pointed out what means may lead to success. Several parts must be taken in the sense of parables, e.g. what is said in ix, 14 sqq., of the siege of a city by a king. And in viii, 2, and x, 20, “king” means God. It appears to me that iv, 17, is not to be taken literally; and the same is true of x, 8 sqq. Few will hesitate to take xi, 1 sqq., figuratively. Chap. xii must convince every one that bold allegories are quite in Qoheleth’s style. Chap. iii would be very flat if the proposition, “There is a time for everything”, carried no deeper meaning than the words disclose at first sight. The strongest guarantee of the unity and sequence of thoughts in the book is the theme, “Vanitas vanitatum”, which emphatically opens it and is repeated again and again, and (xii, 8) with which it ends. Furthermore, the constant repetition of vidi or of similar expressions, which connect the arguments for the same truth; finally, the sameness of verbal and rhetorical turns and of the writer’s tragic vein, with its hyperbolical language, from beginning to end.
In order to reconcile the apparently conflicting statements in the same book or what seem contradictions of manifest truths of the religious or moral order, ancient commentators assumed that Qoheleth expresses varying views in the form of a dialogue. Many modern commentators, on the other hand, have sought to remove these discrepancies by omitting parts of the text, in this way to obtain a harmonious collection of maxims, or even affirmed that the author had no clear ideas, and, e.g., was not convinced of the spirituality and immortality of the soul. But, apart from the fact that we cannot admit erroneous or varying views of life and faith in an inspired writer, we regard frequent alterations in the text or the proposed form of a dialogue as poor makeshifts. It suffices, in my opinion, to explain certain hyperbolical and somewhat paradoxical turns as results of the bold style and the tragic vein of the writer. If our explanation is correct, the chief reproach against Qoheleth—viz. that against his orthodoxy—falls to the ground. For if iii, 17; xi, 9; xii, 7, 14, point to another life as distinctly as can be desired, we cannot take iii, 18-21, as a denial of immortality. Besides, it is evident that in his whole book the author deplores only the vanity of the mortal or earthly life; but to this may be truly applied (if the hyperbolical language of the tragical mood is taken into consideration) whatever is said there by Qoheleth. We cannot find fault with his comparing the mortal life of man and his death to the life and death of the beast (in vv. 19 and 21 C11i must always be taken as “breath of life”). Again, iv, 2 sq., is only a hyperbolical expression; in like manner Job (iii, 3) curses in his grief the day of his birth. True, some allege that the doctrine of immortality was altogether unknown to early antiquity; but even the Savior (Luke, xx, 37) adduced the testimony of Moses for the resurrection of the dead and was not contradicted by his adversaries. And ix, 5 sq. and 10, must be taken in a similar sense. Now, in dooming all things earthly to destruction, but attributing another life to the soul, Qoheleth admits the spirituality of the soul; this follows especially from xii, 7, where the body is returned to the earth, but the soul to God.
Sometimes Qoheleth also seems to be given to fatalism; for in his peculiar manner he lays great stress on the immutability of the laws of nature and of the universe. But he considers this immutability as dependent on God‘s will (iii, 14; vi, 2; vii, 14 sq.). Nor does he deny the freedom of man within the limits set by God; otherwise his admonitions to fear God, to work, etc. would be meaningless, and man would not have brought evil into the world through his own fault (vii, 29, Heb.). Just as little does he contest the freedom of God‘s decrees, for God is spoken of as the source of all wisdom (ii, 26; v, 5). His views of life do not lead Qoheleth to stoical indifference or to blind hatred; on the contrary he shows the deepest sympathy with the misery of the suffering and earnestly deprecates opposition against God. In contentment with one’s lot, in the quiet enjoyment of the blessings given by God, he discerns the golden mean, by which man prevents the vagaries of passion. Neither does he thereby recommend a kind of epicurism. For the ever-recurring phrase, “Eat and drink, for that is the best in this life”, evidently is only a typical formula by which he recalls man from all kinds of excesses. He recommends not idle, but moderate enjoyment, accompanied by incessant labor. Many persist in laying one charge at Qoheleth’s door, viz., that of pessimism. He seems to call all man’s efforts vain and empty, his life aimless and futile, and his lot deplorable. It is true that a sombre mood prevails in the book, that the author chose as his theme the description of the sad and serious sides of life: but is it pessimism to recognize the evils of life and to be impressed with them? Is it not rather the mark of a great and profound mind to deplore bitterly the imperfection of what is earthly, and, on the other hand, the peculiarity of the frivolous to ignore the truth? The colors with which Qoheleth paints these evils are indeed glaring, but they naturally flow from the poetical-oratorical style of his book and from his inward agitation, which likewise gives rise to the hyperbolical language in the Book of Job and in certain psalms. However, Qoheleth, unlike the pessimists, does not inveigh against God and the order of the universe, but only man. Chap. vii, in which he inquires into the last cause of evil, closes with the words, “Only this I have found, that God made man right, and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of questions [or phantasms]”. His philosophy shows us also the way in which man can find a modest happiness. While severely condemning exceptional pleasures and luxury (chap. ii), it counsels the enjoyment of those pleasures which God prepares for every man (viii, 15; ix, 7 sqq.; xi, 9). It does not paralyze, but incites activity (ix, 10; x, 18 sq.; xi, 1 sq.). It stays him in his afflictions (v, 7 sq; viii, 5; x, 4); it consoles him in death (iii, 17; xii, 7); it discovers at every step how necessary is the fear of God. But Qoheleth’s greatest trouble seems to be his inability to find a direct, smooth answer to life’s riddles; hence he so frequently deplores the insufficiency of his wisdom; on the other hand, besides wisdom, commonly so called, i.e. the wisdom resulting from man’s investigations, he knows another kind of wisdom which soothes, and which he therefore recommends again and again (vii, 12, 20; Heb. viii 1; ix, 17; xii, 9-14). It is true, we feel how the author wrestles with the difficulties which beset his inquiries into the riddles of life; but he overcomes them and offers us an effective consolation even in extraordinary trials. Extraordinary also must have been the occasion which led him to compose the book. He introduces himself from the beginning and repeatedly as Solomon, and this forcibly recalls Solomon shortly before the downfall of the empire; but we know from the Scriptures that this had been prepared by various rebellions and had been foretold by the infallible word of the prophet (see below). We must picture to ourselves Solomon in these critical times, how he seeks to strengthen himself and his subjects in this sore trial by the true wisdom which is a relief at all times; submission to the immutable will of God, the true fear of the Lord, undoubtedly must now appear to him the essence of human wisdom.
As the inspired character of Ecclesiastes was not settled in the Fifth Ecumenical Council but only solemnly reaffirmed against Theodore of Mopsuestia, the faithful have always found edification and consolation in this book. Already in the third century, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, in his metaphrase, then Gregory of Nyssa, in, eight homilies, later Hugh of St. Victor, in nineteen homilies, set forth the wisdom of Qoheleth as truly celestial and Divine. Every age may learn from his teaching that man’s true happiness must not be looked for on earth, not in human wisdom, not in luxury, not in royal splendor; that many afflictions await everybody, in consequence either of the iniquity of others, or of his own passions; that God has shut him up within narrow limits, lest he become overweening, but that He does not deny him a small measure of happiness if he does not “seek things that are above him” (vii, 1, Vulg.), if he enjoys what God has bestowed on him, in the fear of the Lord and in salutary labor. The hope of a better life to come grows all the stronger the less this life can satisfy man, especially the man of high endeavor. Now Qoheleth does not intend this doctrine for an individual or for one people, but for mankind, and he does not prove it from supernatural revelation, but from pure reason. This is his cosmopolitan standpoint, which Kuenen rightly recognized; unfortunately, this commentator wished to conclude from this that the book originated in Hellenistic times. Nowack refuted him, but the universal application of the meditations contained therein, to every man who is guided by reason, is unmistakable.
The Author of the Book.—Most modern commentators are of the opinion that Qoheleth’s style points not to Solomon, but to a later writer. About this the following may be said:
(I) As a matter of fact, the language of this book differs widely from the language of the Proverbs. Some think that they have discovered many Aramaisms in it. What can we say on this point?—It cannot be gainsaid that Solomon and a great, if not the greatest, part of his people understood Aramaic. (We take the word here as the common name of the dialects closely related to the Biblical Hebrew.) Abraham and Sara, as well as the wives of Isaac and Jacob, had come from Chaldea; it is therefore probable that the language of that country was preserved, beside the language of Palestine, in the family of the Patriarchs; at any rate, in Moses‘ time the people still use Aramaic expressions. They exclaim (Ex., xvi, 15) MN HVA, while Moses himself at once substitutes the Hebrew MH_HVA; the name of the miraculous food, however, remained MN. A large portion of David’s and Solomon‘s empire was peopled by Arameans, so that Solomon reigned from the Euphrates to Gaza [I (III) K., v, 4, Heb.; II Sam. (K.): x, 19; cf. Gen., xv, 18]. He was conversant with the science of the “sons of the East” and exchanged with them his wisdom (I K., v, 10-14, Heb.). But, as Palestine lay along the commercial routes between the Euphrates and Phoenicia, the Israelites, at least in the north of the country, must have been well acquainted with Aramaic. At the time of King Ezechias even the officials of Jerusalem understood Aramaic (Is., xxxvi, 11; II K., xviii, 26, Heb.). Solomon could therefore assume, without hesitation, a somewhat Aramaic speech, if reason or mere inclination moved him. As a skillful writer, he may have intended, especially in his old age, and in a book whose style is partly oratorical, partly philosophical, partly poetical, to enrich the language by new turns. Goethe’s language in the second part of “Faust” differs greatly from the first, and introduces many neologisms. Now Solomon seems to have had a more important reason for it. As it lay in his very character to remove the barriers between pagans and Israelites, he may have had the conscious intention to address in this book, one of his last, not only the Israelites but his whole people; the Aramaic coloring of his language, then, served as a means to introduce himself to Aramaic readers, who, in their turn, understood Hebrew sufficiently. It is remarkable that the name of God, Jahveh, never occurs in Ecclesiastes, while Elohim is found thirty-seven times; it is more remarkable still that the name Jahveh has been omitted in a quotation (v, 3; cf. Deut., xxiii, 22). Besides, nothing is found in the book that could not be known through natural religion, without the aid of revelation.
The Aramaisms may perhaps be explained in still another way. We probably possess the Old Testament, not in the original wording and orthography, but in a form which is slightly revised. We must unquestionably distinguish, it seems, between Biblical Hebrew as an unchanging literary language and the conversational Hebrew, which underwent constant changes. For there is no instance anywhere that a spoken language has been preserved for some nine hundred years so little changed in its grammar and vocabulary as the language of our extant canonical books. Let us, for an instance, compare the English, French, or German of nine hundred years ago with those languages in their present form. Hence it seems exceedingly daring to infer from the written Hebrew the character of the spoken language, and from the style of the book to infer the date of its composition. In the case of a literary language, on the other hand, which is a dead language and as such essentially unchangeable, it is reasonable to suppose that in the course of time its orthography, as well as single words and phrases, and, perhaps, here and there, some formal elements, have been subjected to change in order to be more intelligible to later readers. It is possible that Ecclesiastes was received into the canon in some such later edition. The Aramaisms, therefore, may also be explained in this manner; at any rate, the supposition that the time of the composition of a Biblical book may be deduced from its language is wholly questionable.
(3) This is a fact admitted by all those critics who ascribe Ecclesiastes, the Canticle of Canticles, portions of Isaias and of the Pentateuch, etc., to a later period, without troubling themselves about the difference of style in these books.
(4) The eagerness to find Aramaisms in Ecclesiastes is also excessive. Expressions which are commonly regarded as such are found now and then in many other books. Hirzel thinks that he has found ten Aramaisms in Genesis, eight in Exodus, five in Leviticus, four in Numbers, nine in Deuteronomy, two in Josue, nine in Judges, five in Ruth, sixteen in Samuel, sixteen in the Psalms, and several in Proverbs. For this there may be a twofold explanation: Either the descendants of Abraham, a Chaldean, and of Jacob, who dwelt twenty years in the Land of Laban, and whose sons were almost all born there, have retained numerous Aramaisms in the newly acquired Hebrew tongue, or the peculiarities pointed out by Hitzig and others are no Aramaisms. It is indeed astonishing how accurately certain critics claim to know the linguistic peculiarities of each of the numerous authors and of every period of a language of which but little literature is left to us. Zöckler affirms that almost every verse of Qoheleth contains some Aramaisms (Komm., p. 115); Grotius found only four in the whole book; Hengstenberg admits ten; the opinions on this point are so much at variance that one cannot help noticing how varying men’s conception of an Aramaism is. Peculiar or strange expressions are at once called Aramaisms; but, according to Havernick, the Book of Proverbs, also, contains forty words and phrases which are often repeated and which are found in no other book; the Canticle of Canticles has still more peculiarities. On the contrary the Prophecies of Aggeus, Zacharias, and Malachias are without any of those peculiarities which are supposed to indicate so late a period. There is much truth in Griesinger’s words: “We have no history of the Hebrew language”.
(5) Even prominent authorities adduce Aramaismswhich are shown to be Hebraic by clear proofs or manifest analogies from other books. There are hardly any unquestionable Aramaisms which can neither be found in other books nor regarded as Hebraisms, which perchance have survived only in Ecclesiastes (for a detailed demonstration cf. the present writer’s Commentary, pp. 23-31). We repeat here Welte’s words: “Only the language remains as the principal argument that it was written after Solomon; but how fallacious in such cases is the merely linguistic proof, need not be mentioned after what has been said.”
It is alleged that the conditions as described in Ecclesiastes do not agree with the time and person of Solomon. True, the author, who is supposed to be Solomon, speaks of the oppression of the weak by the stronger, or one official by another, of the denial of right in the courts of justice (iii, 16; iv, 1; v, 7 sqq.; viii, 9 sq.; x, 4 sqq.). Now many think that such things could not have happened in Solomon‘s realm. But it surely did not escape the wisdom of Solomon that oppression occurs at all times and with every people; the glaring colors, however, in which he describes them originate in the tragic tone of the whole book. Besides, Solomon himself was accused, after his death, of oppressing his people, and his son confirms the charge [I (III) K., xii, 4 and 14]; moreover, long before him, Samuel spoke of the despotism of the future kings [I Sam. (K.), viii, 11 sq.]. Many miss in the book an indication of the past sins and the subsequent repentance of the king, or, on the other hand, wonder that he discloses the mistakes of his life so openly. But if these readers considered vii, 27-29, they could not help sharing Solomon‘s disgust at women’s intrigues and their consequences; if obedience towards God is inculcated in various ways, and if this (xii, 13) is regarded as man’s sole destination, the readers saw that the converted king feared the Lord; in chap. ii sensuality and luxury are condemned so vigorously that we may regard this passage as a sufficient expression of repentance. The openness, however, with which Solomon accuses himself only heightens the impression. This impression has at all times been so strong, precisely because it is the experienced, rich, and wise Solomon who brands the sinful aspirations of man as “vanity of vanities”. Again, what Qoheleth says of himself and his wisdom in xii, 9 sqq., cannot sound strange if it comes from Solomon, especially since in this passage he makes the fear of the Lord the essence of wisdom. The passages iv, 13; viii, 10; ix, 13; x, 4, are considered by some as referring to historical persons, which seems to me incorrect; at any rate, indications of so general a nature do not necessarily point to definite events and persons. Other commentators think they have discovered traces of Greek philosophy in the book; Qoheleth appears to be now a sceptic, now a stoic, now an epicurean; but these traces of Hellenism, if existing at all, are nothing more than remote resemblances too weak to serve as arguments. Cheyne (Job and Solomon) sufficiently refuted Tyler and Plumptre. That iii, 12, is a linguistic Graecism, has not been proved, because the common meaning of `SH TVB is retained by many commentators; moreover, in II Sam. (K.), xii, 18, `SH R`H means “to be sorry”; the verb, therefore, has about the same force as if we translated `SH TVB by eu prattein.
As all the other internal proofs against the authorship of Solomon are not more convincing, we must listen to the voice of tradition, which has always attributed Ecclesiastes to him. The Jews doubted not its composition by Solomon, but objected to the reception, or rather retention, of the book in the canon; Hillel‘s School decided definitely for its canonicity and inspiration. In the Christian Church Theodore of Mopsuestia and some others for a time obscured the tradition; all other witnesses previous to the sixteenth century favor the Solornonic authorship and the inspiration. The book itself bears testimony for Solomon, not only by the title, but by the whole tone of the discussion, as well as in i, 12; moreover, in xii, 9, Qoheleth is expressly called the author of many proverbs. The ancients never so much as suspected that here, as in the Book of Wisdom, Solomon only played a fictitious part. On the other hand, the attempt is made to prove that the details do not fit Solomon, and to contest his authorship with this single internal argument. The reasons adduced, however, are based upon textual explanations which are justly repudiated by others. Thus Hengstenberg sees (x, 16) in the king, “who is a child”, an allusion to the King of Persia; Grätz, to Herod the Idumaean; Reusch rightly maintains that the writer speaks of human experiences in general. From ix, 13-15, Hitzig concludes that the author lived about the year 200; Bernstein thinks this ridiculous and opines that some other historical event is alluded to. Hengstenberg regards this passage as nothing more than a parable; on this last view, also, the translation of the Septuagint is based (it has the subjunctive; elthe basileus, “there may come a king”). As a matter of fact, Qoheleth describes only what has happened or may happen somewhere “under the sun” or at some time; he does not speak of political situations, but of the experience of the individual; he has in view not his people alone, but mankind in general. If internal reasons are to decide the question of authorship, it seems to me that we might more justly prove this authorship of Solomon with more right from the remarkable passage about the snares of woman (vii, 27), a passage the bitterness of which is not surpassed by the warning of any ascetic; or from the insatiable thirst of Qoheleth for wisdom; or from his deep knowledge of men and the unusual force of his style. Considering everything we see no decisive reason to look for another author; on the contrary, the reasons which have been advanced against this view are for the greatest part so weak that in this question the influence of fashion is clearly discernible.
The time of the composition of our book is variously set down by the critics who deny the authorship of Solomon. Every period from Solomon to 200 has been suggested by them; there are even authorities for a later time; Grätz thinks that he has discovered clear proof that the book was written under King Herod (40-4 B.C.). This shows clearly how little likely the linguistic criterion and the other internal arguments are to lead to an agreement of opinion. If Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes towards the end of his life, the sombre tone of the book is easily explained; for the judgments of God (III Kings, xi) which then came upon him would naturally move him to sorrow and repentance, especially as the breaking up of his kingdom and the accompanying misery were then distinctly before his eyes (see vv. 29 sqq.; 40). Amid the sudden ruin of his power and splendor, he might well exclaim, “Vanity of vanities!” But as God had promised to correct him “in mercy” (II Kings, vii, 14 sq.), the supposition of many ancient writers that Solomon was converted to God becomes highly probable. Then we also understand why his last book, or one of his last, consists of three thoughts: the vanity of earthly things, self-accusation, and emphatic admonition to obey the immutable decrees of Providence. The last was well suited to save the Israelites from despair, who were soon to behold the downfall of their power.
There is an unmistakable similarity between Ecclesiastes and the Canticle of Canticles, not only in the pithy shortness of the composition, but also in the emphatic repetition of words and phrases, in the boldness of the language, in the obscure construction of the whole, and in certain linguistic peculiarities (e.g. the use of the relative c’). The loose succession of sententious thoughts, however, reminds us of the Book of Proverbs, whence the epilogue (xii, 9 sqq.) expressly refers to Qoheleth’s skill in parables. In the old lists of Biblical books, the place of Ecclesiastes is between Proverbs and the Canticle of Canticles: Sept., Talmud (Baba Bathra xiv, 2), Orig., Mel., Concil. Laodic., etc., also in the Vulgate. Its position is different only in the Masoretic Bible, but, as is generally admitted, for liturgical reasons.
As to the contents, the critics attack the passages referring to the judgment and immortality: iii, 17; xi, 9; xii, 7; furthermore the epilogue, xii, 9 sqq., especially verses 13, 14; also some other passages. Bickell expressed the opinion that the folios of the original, while being stitched, were deranged and completely confused; his hypothesis found few advocates, and Euringer (Masorahtext des Qoheleth, Leipzig, 1890) maintains, in opposition to him, that books had not at that early date taken the place of rolls. There is not sufficient evidence to assume that the text was written in verse, as Zapletal does.
Owing to its literalism, the translation of the Septuagint is frequently unintelligible, and it seems that the translators used a corrupt Hebraic text. The Itala and the Coptic translation follow the Septuagint. The Peshito, though translated from the Hebrew, is evidently also dependent on the text of the Septuagint. This text, with the notes of Origen, partly forms the Greek and Syriac Hexapla. The Vulgate is a shillful translation made by Jerome from the Hebrew and far superior to his translation from the Greek (in his commentary). Sometimes we cannot accept his opinion (in vi, 9, he most likely wrote quid cupias, and in viii, 12, ex eo quod peccator). (See the remnants of the Hexapla of Origen in Field, Oxford, 1875; a paraphrase of the Greek text in St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Migne, X, 987.) The Chaldean paraphrast is useful for controlling the Masoretic text; the Midrash Qoheleth is without value. The commentary of Olympiodorus is also serviceable (seventh century, M., XCIII, 477) and Aecumenius, “Catena” (Verona, 1532). A careful translation from the Hebrew was made about 1400 in the “Graeca Veneta” (ed. Gebhardt, Leipzig, 1875).