God Talk: Reason, Arguments for God, and the Problem of Evil

In this episode of the Dr. Karlo podcast, we explore arguments for God’s existence, the problem of evil, divine simplicity, hell, providence, and the role of miracles in Christian apologetics.

 

TRANSCRIPT:

Matthew:

Hi everyone. So today I have the pleasure of receiving Carlo Broussard on my channel, who is a Catholic apologist for Catholic Answers. For many years now, he has been devoting his life, his career, to defending the Catholic faith. He has a PhD in philosophy and he has dedicated a lot of his many books to defending the faith against Protestantism, atheism, skeptics. And so today I have the pleasure of interviewing him on many apologetics questions. Also, you can check out his channel, his new channel, Karlo Broussard on YouTube. You can find him easily, and he is going to have one of the best apologetic channels that is on YouTube, in my opinion. So please go check it out and welcome to the show, Karlo.

Dr. Karlo:

Well, Matthew, that’s some pretty high praise man. I appreciate that.

Matthew:

So no problem. Can you tell us about where you come from, how did you start doing apologetics? What got you interested in that domain, and yeah, just a bit of your background.

Dr. Karlo:

Sure. Yeah, so I’m from southern Louisiana. I’m a Cajun boy from southwest Louisiana. Grew up pursuing a musical career in southern Louisiana, playing Cajun music, French Cajun music. I was the accordion player, had my own band from the time I was 13 all the way to 20, recorded a couple of albums, but when I was 20, well, I decided to give up that music career or that pursuit of the music career and devote my life to studying theology, philosophy and apologetics. And the reason for that, Matthew, was because my heart was captured by the Lord through Apologetics, primarily through the ministry of my colleague, now colleague, and good friend Tim Staples. So when I was about 17 and a half or so, I’d heard his conversion story from being anti-Catholic to one of the nation’s leading Catholic evangelists and apologists, and by an invasion of grace that captured my heart and captured my mind.

And so I started informally studying apologetics, which was interesting because I was not an intellectual kid. The intellectual formation knowledge and all of that was just not on my radar, but for some reason apologetics grabbed me. And so I started studying and developed a desire to want to do what Tim Staples was doing. So he became my mentor, dragged me along the rope, so to speak, and gave me direction. And eventually 10 and a half years ago, brought me on at Catholic Answers to be a full-time apologist after 15 years of formation, both informally and informally getting my degrees in theology and philosophy. And so I’ve been working for Catholic Answers now as a full-time staff, apologist and speaker for 10 and a half years. Eventually got my doctorate in philosophy, as you said. And so I’ve just been living the dream, my friend.

Matthew:

Well, that’s nice to hear. What would you say is your favorite domain of apologetics? Because we all know that apologetics is very wide. You could speak about the existence of God, the historical reliability of the gospels, the case for the divinity, the resurrection of Christ, answering Islam, answering Protestants, answering Jews and bioethics, lots of domains where you have to defend the faith and the moral of the Catholic church. So what would you say is your favorite domain of all these possibilities?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, I think my favorite is theistic apologetics in dealing with and thinking through the metaphysical arguments for God’s existence. That’s what I did my dissertation on, or at least related to that. I did it on divine immutability and the variability of creation. So I really enjoy the rigor of metaphysical thought and dealing with arguments for God’s existence as well as the ancillary issues, theistic apologetics such as the problem of evil, thinking through those issues. Problem of divineness, I also really enjoy natural law apologetics and so ethical apologetics or moral apologetics. And in thinking through those issues of grounding morality and fundamental moral principles that derived or derived from our human nature and looking to nature our human nature as the measure for assessing what is good or bad for us and thereby assessing what is morally good or bad for us, I really enjoy those issues. Now at the same time, the majority of my work at Catholic Answers deals with the Catholic Protestant arena of conversations, and I really enjoy those conversations as well. And so I mean maybe perhaps my intellect is delighted more with the theistic apologetics just because of the philosophical nature of that discussion. But I really do enjoy and receive great satisfaction in having those conversations about the Catholic Protestant distinctives.

Matthew:

That’s interesting. I would say that I share a similar approach to aps too. Intellectually, I’m more interested in theistic argumentations and just classical philosophy more than Catholic Protestant debates. I do it because people ask me the questions, so I also have to get into these domains. But what would motivate me more would be to study in depth philosophy, especially in ethics, natural theology, things like that. So I think we share this point in common.

Dr. Karlo:

And Matthew, with regard to that, one of the things I’ve been thinking about, and I try to do at least subtly so far, but maybe perhaps more explicitly as I move forward in my career, is to try and synthesize those two, to try and bring my philosophical training to bear on the Catholic Protestant distinctives and conversations. Because one of the things I’ve come to realize in my training as an apologist is that many problems that arise in the minds of our Protestant friends is due to a lack of proper philosophical insight and training. And then once the underlying philosophical issues are dealt with and resolved, then the Protestant problems or hangups with Catholic theology dissolve as well. And so that’s one thing that I have an intention to try and develop more in my work as a Catholic cancers apologist in the near future. And so it’s a beautiful thing to kind of see how that philosophy and the theology or wedded together, and you can’t, your theology will only be as good as your philosophy.

Matthew:

Sure, yeah, I agree with that, especially when it comes to debating central themes like sola scriptura. Sometimes there’s just a lack of logic and fallacious arguments when you look at Protestants writing, and it’s important to bring these basic rules of logic and philosophy into the apologetic debate. So that’s very helpful. What would you say for going back to theistic apologetics, what is your favorite argument for the existence of God and what do you think is the strongest one intellectually? If you could summarize it here, explain it to the audience.

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah. I think the strongest is aquinas’s argument in the Deante on being in essence, because once the mind is able to grasp first and foremost essay as Aquinas puts it in Latin, which is just the act of being the act of existence, once the mind is able to grasp that and then subsequently see that a particular thing of our experience within this created world like the tree outside does not have that being or act of existence in virtue of its own nature, it doesn’t have it in virtue of what it is as a tree. Once the mine is able to grasp that and then understand and have the insight that if the tree doesn’t have that act of existence that in virtue of which it is something rather than nothing in virtue of its own essence or nature, then that act of existence must be given to it by a cause outside of itself.

And once the mind is able to have that insight that if essay is not had in virtue of a thing’s essence, it must be caused by something outside of itself, then you’re off to the races in logic in order to see the necessity of there being a cause that’s going to have that essay or act existence in virtue of its own essence to be a source from which the essay can be derived for. If all things are such that they do not have that active existence in virtue of their own essence or nature, then no thing has essay, in which case there would be nothing, but there is something therefore it follows that there must be something that has essay or the act of existence in virtue of its own essence or nature. And that’s what we would call God. Because once you have being itself or existence itself, then you’re able to dece all of the various divine attributes that would lead us to the conclusion this is God. And so obviously that’s a summary and each of those premises would have to be justified. But I do think that’s the strongest and most airtight argument there is not only because of the validity or the argument leads to the true conclusion, but also because I think it dodges all of the various objections and challenges that many atheists will pose to us as theists because we’re dealing with what is most fundamental of all things. They’re very active existence itself.

Matthew:

And so what do you think of the modern approach of some apologists, especially in Protestant circles, arguing from natural sciences to God’s existence? So fine tuning type arguments or scientific versions of the Columnal. I know on your YouTube channel you’ve once made a video defending the board good in theorem, so you seem to be open to defending some scientifical arguments that can be used in philosophy for the existence of God. So do you think that the mistic approach and that the approach from natural sciences are complimentary in a way and they can both be used in apologetics, or should we only mainly focus on purely metaphysical arguments that can reach a certainty of metaphysical certainty?

Dr. Karlo:

I think they are both tools in the toolkit that can be used while we recognize that one tool is better than another for some end, we can still utilize both tools. So with regard to thomistic metaphysical arguments, I do think that they lead to CIA or knowledge. I do think that once you reduce the premises of Aquinas, five ways to fundamental metaphysical principles to deny the conclusion that God exists would end up logically in a contradiction that’s not self-evident on the surface. It requires an unpacking, but I do think it ends up in there such that we can know that if denying God’s existence ultimately leads to a denial of fundamental principles of metaphysics, which cannot be denied without the pain affirming their validity, then you have knowledge, you have metaphysical knowledge and certainty as well. Whereas other arguments I think can be used for some other end, namely to lead the mind to the conclusion that it’s at least credible and reasonable to believe that God exists.

Some arguments don’t quite get us across the bridge to metaphysical certainty, but they provide strong reason to believe giving us probable knowledge that God exists. And I think there Matthew is where some of the contemporary arguments that appeal to scientific evidence come into play. I think they are legit tools in the toolkit. They don’t quite get us to the goal where the mistic metaphysical arguments get us, but they can be useful and persuasive. So for example, if I’m talking to some eighth grade kids and they’re asking me about whether or not God exists, the question becomes which tool in the toolkit do I use? Well, I think about the goal in the end, who’s my audience, eighth grade kids. Are they equipped intellectually to follow the argumentation of a mistic proof like in the day and intake? Probably not. So if I were to propose that argument, they probably wouldn’t feel the persuasive force of the argument because they’re not intellectually disposed to see it.

However, if I utilize the fine tuning argument and illustrate to them the high improbability of our universe, having the initial material conditions and constants needed for the universe to develop in a way to have life forms, I think an eighth grade intellect is disposed to receive that sort of information and see and feel the persuasive force of that argument to provide at least credibility that there is an intelligence behind the universe itself. So given my audience and the ends that I want to achieve will determine which tool in the toolkit that I’m going to use. So to answer your question, I think there are both legitimate tools in the toolkit that we’re going to use based upon the audience to whom we’re speaking.

Matthew:

I totally agree with this pastoral approach. As you could say, not everyone is going to be receptive to high metaphysical arguments. And so yeah, totally

Dr. Karlo:

Agree with that. It’s the same principle as you don’t teach second graders algebra, nor do you teach second graders calculus, right? You have to convey the information based upon the disposition of the audience. As Thomas says, the knower can only receive according to the mode of the knower.

Matthew:

For Thomas who want to learn more about the anti arguments, of course you can read Aquinas, but Edward Feer has a nice book called Five Proofs of the Existence of God, and he covers this way between the distinction of essence and existence in I think it’s the third or fourth proof I’d have to check, but he does cover it.

Dr. Karlo:

He calls it the Mistic proof. I would also recommend Matthew, my dissertation director, Dr. Gavin Kerr, in his book Aquinas’s Way to God, and the entire book is dedicated to Aquinas’s argument on being in essence, and Dr. Kerr does a great job of articulating and explaining the argument on a metaphysical level, even in a way that at some minor points here, and there might be a little nuance diversion from the way phaser interprets the Deante and presents it. So I would recommend that resource as well.

Matthew:

What is your stance on the mistic contingency argument versus the Lian contingency argument? Because we all know it’s two different types of contingency argument. Aquinas argues from the impossibility of infinite regress of contingent causes to a necessary being, whereas Leni focuses more on the question, why is there something rather than nothing and not so much on infinite regresses? So which is your favorites of the two versions of these contingency arguments?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah. Well, it depends upon what you mean by the mistic contingency argument, the way you just articulated

The third way. The third way, okay. Yeah. So the third way is entirely different in the first part than any sort of Ian argument. So Aquinas is in the first part of the third way. Aquinas in my opinion, is not dealing with the metaphysical reality of essay that only comes into play in the second part of the third way, where he reasons from a necessary being to an absolutely necessary being, rather what Aquinas is dealing with in the first part of the third way, or beings that come into existence and go out of existence. In other words, beings that have a beginning of existence. And I interpret Aquinas’s third way to be focusing on the non being before existence. So I think he’s starting with beings that begin to exist and then asking the question, is it possible that all of reality could consist of beings that begin to exist alone?

And so his argument goes, if that were so, you would come to a point in the past to where there would be a single or at least all beings coming into existence at the same time before which there was nothing. So it’s kind of a quasi kalm argument. I argue he’s not arguing for a beginning, but he’s hypothesizing. If all of reality consisted only of beings that began to exist such that before their existence they had non being, then there would be a time at which there was nothing. And since from nothing, nothing only comes, it follows that there would have to be an everlasting being, because his argument is if all of reality consisted of only beings that began to exist, and at some point in the past there would be nothing but from nothing, only nothing comes, but there is something. And so therefore, all of reality cannot consist only of beings that begin to exist.

And so all that conclusion entails is a being existing without beginning and without end. And as all classical theists know, that is not God yet because you can have a created effect without beginning and without end. That’s still caused in its very active existence. And so this is why he hypothesizes in the second part of the third way, he asks the question, does this necessary being? What he means by that is, does this everlasting being have its active existence in virtue of its own essence or not? If so, that everlasting being would be God, pure essay itself, pure being itself. If that everlasting being does not have its essay in virtue of its own essence, then it would have to receive it from a cause outside of itself. And then we’re asking the question, can every cause in that causal series be like that everlasting being that doesn’t have existence in virtue of its essence?

The answer is no. And so therefore he concludes there must exist a necessary everlasting being that has essay or the act of existence in virtue of itself. And that’s this absolute necessary being that we call God when it comes to nian arguments. The question in the sound and legit, why is there something rather than nothing? But I think those sorts of arguments are appealing to the principle of sufficient reason. By way of explanation, we intuitively recognize that things need to be explained when they’re not self-explanatory. Now, I think that’s more of a surface level approach to trying to offer an explanation of something, which I do think it’s beginning to track what Aquinas offers to be more fundamental on a metaphysical level, something that’s more grounded and rooted. And so I think live nian type arguments are trying, or in some ways tracking what Aquinas is saying on a more metaphysical level. And I think Aquinas’s approach on the metaphysical level is going to provide what the Ian arguments are trying to argue for.

Matthew:

Okay. And how would you answer the objection of some philosophers who argue that Aquinas commits what you could call in logic, modal quantifier shift fallacy when he says that if everything could not exist at sometimes, then there is one time at which nothing exists? How would you answer this?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah. So I don’t think he’s committing a fallacy there because he’s just taking into consideration things that have a beginning, right? So let’s say I have a collection of things. I have A, B, and C, and those three things represent all of reality. Okay? Now, if every single one of those things has a beginning, then at one time there’s going to be nothing. So consider A at some point, A had a beginning, okay? At before, which it was nothing. B, at some point had a beginning at some point before which it was nothing. And C, if it had a beginning, there was that time before which it was nothing. So if C is the first thing that came into existence, having a beginning subsequent to which B and A came into existence, well then at some point in the past, there was nothing because C came into existence before, which it was nothing.

Or hypothetically, if all three A, B and C came into existence at the same time, there would still be a point at which there was nothing because before A, B and C came into existence, there was nothing. And so I don’t think Aquinas is committing this sort of fallacy because he’s just following the logic of what things having a beginning entails. And if everything in all of reality had a beginning, then it logically follows that at some point in the past there was nothing because everything had a beginning before which there was nothing. It was nothing.

Matthew:

Yes. So what you’re saying here is interesting because it seems that Aquinas with this argument would be defending aala type of arguments because the universe according to him would be contingent. And since everything that is contingent according to him has a beginning, it would follow that the universe has a beginning. And if you look at the prima parts of the summa in question 46, Aquinas argues against the possibility of proving the fact that the universe has a beginning. So to me, it’s not so easy to reconcile these two elements. I don’t know if you’ve thought about this issue. I

Dr. Karlo:

Have. Yeah, I have precisely because in my reading of the first part of the third way, Aquinas is not trying to prove that there was a beginning of the universe. There was in fact a beginning of the universe. What he’s proving is that if all of reality, it’s a hypothetical situation, a hypothesis. If all of reality consisted of things that had a beginning, then there would be a point at which there was nothing. But the conclusion is that not everything had a beginning, that there must be an everlasting being. And this is where I agree with Faser in his book, Aquinas, A beginner’s Guide, Aquinas would be content with even that everlasting reality without beginning, without in which not necessarily God being matter itself, which would be consistent with what Aquinas says of the possibility of their being an everlasting universe where the universe itself does not have a beginning.

So in this articulation and framework, the everlasting being that Aquinas arrives at the end of the first part of the third way again, is not necessarily God. It could be even a physical material reality that has been existing without beginning, without in that conception would fit what he calls a necessary being or an everlasting being without beginning and without end. So even the everlasting or even his argumentation, the first part of the third way does not entail a proof that there is a beginning of the universe itself. And so that’s how I would reconcile my reading with the first part of the third way with his other statements, that it cannot be proved that the universe has a beginning.

Matthew:

And do you ultimately agree with question 46 of the prima par when Aquinas argues that there is no apriori argument that can be put forward in favor of the beginning of the universe? Because there has been lots of new arguments that have been proposed in contemporary analytic metaphysics proposed by even Thomas, like Robert Coons, Coons, Alexander Per David Oberg, guys like that who are Thomas usually, but they defend the column, a philosophical version of the column. And so it seems that Aquinas might not have thought of these new metaphysical arguments. What is your stance on this?

Dr. Karlo:

I am open to it. I have not read in depth the new literature from Thomas of trying to argue for the finitude of the past from philosophy. I have read some, and it’s been a while, it’s been a while since I’ve swam in these, but currently right now, I haven’t come across anything that has convinced me. Like I said, I haven’t read it all. So there may very well be something that would convince me. But currently where I’m at right now intellectually is that many times there’s a lot of assumptions being made and insertions into the arguments that I think just beg the question against a denier of these sorts of arguments. Like for example, the idea that you can’t traverse the infinite, right? Well, that assumes that there is something going from one moment and succeeding from one moment to the other, but we can hypothesize a situation where there’s not one thing that’s trying to traverse the infinite because all you need is just God who is outside of that temporal succession of events in order to hold that temporal succession into existence.

And there not be one thing trying to traverse that infinite gap. So a lot of times there’s insertions of things within the scenarios that I think would end up begging the question against a denier of these arguments. Now, again, this is a cursory reading of some of the arguments where I’m at currently intellectually, but I am open to being convinced of new arguments from a philosophical perspective for the finitude of past. I’m open to that. I’m not a Thomas who’s going to say Aquinas is right on every single thing, right? I’m open to a Thomas Thomas being proven wrong on some things. But all I got to say is you better have your oars in the water jack, and you better have your ducks in a row if you’re going to go up with Aquinas and prove them wrong.

Matthew:

So I’ve thought about this issue because I’ve read some of the literature, and I would say that even according to mystic standards, if you agree with Aquinas, that actual infinites are impossible, that’s what he says in the Summa theology. Question seven, article four of the Prima par, he argues that there cannot be an actual infinite number of things. Then you can read the following arguments. Premise one, if an infinite past were possible, then there could be an actual infinite number of things. Premise two, there cannot be an actual infinite number of things, and therefore it follows that the past cannot be infinite since Aquinas agrees with premise two, that leaves us with premise one, that if the infinite past is possible, then there could be an actual infinite. And to prove that, you would just have to say that, okay, well suppose God decided to create one atom every day from the infinite past. What would be the number of atoms today in reality? And the answer to that is an actual infinite, because there would have been an actual infinite number of days from the beginning up until today. So if God can create any object an atom and make it persist into being, then the number we would have today would be an actual infinite. And so you justify the premise. If the past could be infinite, then you could get an actual infinite today. And since Aquinas himself rejects the actual infinite,

It would follow that he has to accept that the

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, but that assumes premise. One assumes that God actually has always been creating that there has always been in sequential order, A coming into being of Adams, but one could just deny that hypothesis and say maybe on that hypothesis of Adams always being sequential, coming into existence in sequence, yeah, maybe that would be an actual infinite, but if Aquinas is right, that’s impossible. So that scenario is an impossible created effect for God. And so therefore it would follow that there could not be a forever coming into being of atoms and sequence to each other. So notice there in that premise one, there’s an assumption of the scenario that you’re creating in order to get the actual infinite, but one could just simply deny that and say, well, I reject the possibility of that scenario, so therefore you’re begging the question against Aquinas and premise two who denies the possibility of an actual infinite. So that particular scenario, so it seems to me initially assumes the actual infinite is impossible, which of course begs the question against Aquinas.

Matthew:

I would say the assumption is just that an omnipotent God can create objects x nilo and make them persist into existence. And if that is true and the past is infinite, the two compiled together would get you to an actual infinite today. So in order to deny the conclusion, Aquinas would either have to accept the possibilities of actual infinites or he would have to deny that an omnipotent God can create X nilo objects that persist into existence. And it would seem intuitively that this would go against divine omnipotence because omnipotence is the capacity to do anything that’s logically possible. And it doesn’t seem prima facie logically impossible for God to create X neo objects and make them persistent into existence.

Dr. Karlo:

Well, there’s a difference. There’s a difference between God creating something ex nelo for them to persist in existence and the hypothetical scenario of God forever without beginning creating an atom in sequential order with each other. So if you say omnipotence entails that God could do the latter and bring about the latter order of providence, that would beg the question against Aquinas because that latter order of providence would logically entail an actual infinity. But Aquinas is saying that ladder order of providence is incompatible with omnipotence because that ladder order of providence is logically impossible. Again, that first premise assumes the hypothetical scenario of the latter order of providence where God forever is bringing into existence atoms in sequential order after each other without beginning. But Aquinas would say omnipotence is incompatible with that. So Aquinas would argue because it’s logically impossible, and so therefore he would deny the possibility of that setup or scenario. And so Aquinas would say the only possible order of providence is that there is a beginning, right, of a creation of atoms at least. And so therefore, there couldn’t be this infinite going back in the infinite regress of atoms coming into existence in a sequential order in order to get the actual infinity. So it just seems that it’s begging the question against aquinas’s dismissal of the actual infinite.

Matthew:

Yeah, I see what you’re saying. I don’t know if this ultimately convinces me that on this, but

Dr. Karlo:

Obviously we’d have to think about it a little bit more, right, and work through it and go through it some more.

Matthew:

Yeah, because Alexander Pro put out a book in 2018 called Infinity Causation and Paradox. And in this book he has a nice little arguments in the beginning, which is the chicken egg paradox. It says, if the past were logically were could be infinity, then you could have an infinite causal series of chicken, egg, chicken, egg, chicken, egg, chicken, egg, like a chicken lays exactly one egg before dying every year. And you would have an infinite causal series chicken, egg, chicken, egg back into the infinite past. And then if that were possible, you could ask the questions, the question, why do the eggs exist? And the answer to that would be, well, it’s because the chickens exist and when you ask the question, but yeah, but why do the chickens exist? The answer would be, well, they exist because the eggs exist. And so you have a circular reasoning, circular causation. The totality of eggs is justified in existence by the totality of chickens and same way around. And so since circular causation is not possible, it would seem fitting that there is a first member of this causal theory.

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, I would’ve to read that more in depth and go through it in a very methodical and slow way. But my initial response to that is that we’re not confined within theistic frameworks of an explanation being only with regard to the immediate causes of the chicken and the egg or the explanatory causes of the chicken and the egg for one could hypothesize that just forever there has been a chicken and the egg with an outside cause that accounts for the existence of these things such that the egg doesn’t always have to be explained by the chicken since the egg could be explained by the cause outside of the temporal succession, which also accounts for the chicken. So the cause outside of the temporal succession accounts for both the chicken and the eggs for an infinity into the past. So the contradiction only arises if we confine ourselves to the causal explanations within the temporal succession of cause and effect.

But that logical contradiction would not arise if we hypothesize a cause outside of the temporal succession like in classical theism, IE God. And so therefore it would seem that cause God could bring about such an effect or an order of providence to where you have chicken and egg causal explanation in a temporal mode going back infinitely into the past. So those are at least my initial thoughts, whether they work as a critique or not, I would’ve to think about it some more and think through it. But that’s my initial thought. Just to geek out a little bit

Matthew:

Here, I would say that even if we grant this sort of response, this response presupposes the truth of classical theism. And hence you could still use this argument against an atheist who would deny that there is this cause outside of the theory in question. And you say that without postulating classical theism, you could not resolve this paradox. And so either you have to accept this argument or you have to accept the existence of God. And so it would still be an argument against atheism.

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, I’m not convinced about that because I’m not presupposing the truth of classical theism. I’m simply appealing to a logically possible scenario that allows for me to get out of the logical contradiction alleged to be embedded within the infinite past. And that’s all somebody has to do is to propose a scenario where the logical contradiction does not arise. And if that’s the case, well then the infinite pass does not lead, or excuse me, the finite, a finite pass is not known with metaphysical certainty because if a finite pass were to be known with metaphysical certainty, well then I wouldn’t be able to postulate or conceptualize a scenario that gets out of the logical contradiction in any way whatsoever. And so it seems to me that the only way all a deni of the finite past argument needs is to show that the infinite past does not necessarily lead to a logical contradiction. It may lead to a logical contradiction given certain assumptions, but if I can reasonably deny those assumptions with some other conceptualized scenario where there is no logical contradiction being involved, well then it seems to me that the argument of the finite pass does not necessarily lead to metaphysical certainty. And so those are my initial thoughts on it.

Matthew:

Okay. Well I have something more to say about that, but let’s go to other questions. Yeah, totally. There are many interesting topics in natural theology and I encourage everyone

Dr. Karlo:

To, and just for your listener’s sake to know that this is not a disagreement with regard to the conclusions of whether God exists or whether there is in fact a finite pass. This is just a disagreement in inner intra debate and disagreement as to whether a particular argument for those conclusions works. So just so that your listeners are clear on that,

Matthew:

And as we said, even Thomas disagree with each other on this argument, so absolutely David Oberg Alexander per Robert Konz would disagree with Edward Feezer and others.

Dr. Karlo:

And hey, listen Matthew, those guys are way smarter than I am. So if at the end of the day I need to bow a difference to the smarter guys, I am totally willing to do that and say, yeah, they’re probably right. I’m probably wrong.

Matthew:

However, something that we all agree on as classical theists is that God is simple, he is metaphysically simple, he’s not composed of parts. This is dogma, I think it’s fourth ladder council to 1215 that has dogmatize this. And so we all agree on this. The question is there’s sometimes objections by skeptics to classical theism saying, well, this doctrine of divine simplicity is in contradiction with the doctrine of the Trinity. So how would you reconcile the two doctrines of divine simplicity and the doctrine of the Trinity?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, so this gets us into some deep waters, and I’ll just say this for our conversation here, is that divine simplicity pertains to divine being the trinity and the three persons pertains to relations within a single divine being. So there would be a logical contradiction and incompatibility if we were saying the Trinity involves three beings and divine simplicity. And speaking of a simplicity in a single divine being, there would be a logical contradiction. But divine simplicity, as I said, pertains to simplicity of being and does not exclude non simplicity or a multiplicity of relations within that single being. And so that would be the short answer as to why these two doctrines do not entail a logical incompatibility, because the Trinitarian relations or within the single divine being the single divine being is still simple in being the relations that we have of the Father to the son, the son that’s paternity the son to the Father affiliation, and the relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son.

Those relations and the three persons that are constituted by the relations do not bear on the divine being itself. Now that requires further argumentation as to how you can have relations without it dividing the being itself. And for answers to those questions, I would recommend, I think it’s Gilles is how you pronounce it, G-I-L-E-S, Gilles Emery and his book on istic Trinitarian theology, I can’t remember the exact title there. It might just be Trinitarian Theology according to Aquinas. I’d have to look. But he goes into great detail to provide a philosophical argument as to how you can have relation or relations without it dividing the being itself for us within the creaturely mode of being relations will entail or things that relations will entail at times divisions of being to where if you have more than one relation, you’re going to have more than one being. But when it comes to the Trinity itself, you’re able to ascribe truthfully the idea of relations without the being itself being divided. And this is at least a path as to how Thomas will reconcile divine simplicity and the Trinitarian relations.

Matthew:

And on this, I encourage people reading guys like Christopher Thomas Shefsky who has defended extensively a divine simplicity from the attacks of what we call theistic ISTs. So non-classical theists who sometimes object to this doctrine. And Christopher Tomsky is a good thomistic philosopher who has articles on this. So my next question would be more on the problem of evil, which is an intellectual problem and an emotional problem.

Dr. Karlo:

So

Matthew:

There’s a distinction to be made between the intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil on the intellectual aspect of things. It has been thought by guys like Mackey that the three omni divine attributes, omnipotent, omniscience, and goodness of God were incompatible because of the evil we find in the world. And there have been lots of theistic response to this. Are you more, do you like to more to start giving Theo, or do you operate with some sort of skeptical theism? Please explain both of these terms for the audience who doesn’t know the relevant terms, but what would be your approach to responding to this problem?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, I think when it comes to the problem of evil, really, I mean sometimes it all depends on what the problem of evil is. If the problem is, well, God’s the creator and he’s all good, so therefore he can’t create evil things, well then you have the response of evil being a privation. It’s not an existing thing, and so it’s not going to be some effect from the creator, and you can get out of that logical problem like that. Evil’s not a created substance by the all good creator, it’s a permitted defect. But if normally the problem of evil has to do with God reconciling God’s goodness with his permission of evil when he has the power to eliminate it. Now, in response to that, I think the first question we have to answer is, is this incompatible? Is it incompatible to have an all good God and the permission of evil when he has the power to eliminate it?

And so that would just simply be a defense of God without trying to offer any sort of reasons why he permits it. Those are two different questions. The first question is, is it an injustice for an all good creator God to permit evil when he has the power to eliminate it? My short response is no. And the reason is because if it were an injustice, then the elimination of evil would be due to all creatures, but the elimination of all evil is not due to creatures, and so therefore it’s not an injustice for God to eliminate all evil for creatures. Now of course, premise two is doing the work there that it’s not an injustice. And the short form of the argument is that defects are natural to defect the creatures. It’s part and parcel of these types of creatures, whether we’re talking about physical defect or moral defect.

So if God were to eliminate such defects, whether physical or moral, he would have to give something to the creatures over and above their nature. But God is not bound in justice to himself or to creatures to give that which is over and above their nature. And so therefore God is not bound and justice to himself or to creatures to eliminate all defect among creatures, whether physical or moral. And so that would be a sketch of the argument I would employ in order to show that it is not an injustice for God to permit defect among his creatures whether physical defect or that is physical evil or moral defect. And that is to say moral, evil or sin. Now as to the question of why God permits these things, there you have what you call the Odyssey where you’re trying to offer at least an account of some good that God intends to preserve or manifest in this order of providence where he permits the defects, whether physical or moral.

And one short answer to that, there’s more, but I think a short answer to that is the good of the creatures themselves, the manifestation of the truth of the natures of those creatures as defect beings, whether that be the plant type, the non-rational animal type or the animal type. If we’re talking about physical defect, it’s a manifestation of the limitations of the nature of these types things as corporeal beings. And when we’re talking about the permission of moral defect, it’s a manifestation of the truth of the defect ability of such moral agents where he permits these moral defects and the good of these kinds of things. The good is the manifestation of the truth of these kinds of things. Now that might not move somebody emotionally, but it at least provides an intellectual account of a good that is preserved and manifest in this order of providence.

I do think there are more that we can think through and think about, but I think at bottom line at base, you can offer this as a good that is being preserved and manifest within this permitted order of providence. So that’s the distinction between offering a defense or a reconcili ability of God’s goodness and permitted defect, whether physical or moral. And then the second question, offering an answer as to why he permits it rather than not. And Aquinas, I mean at sometimes Aquinas appeals to mystery here, why this order of providence rather than some other why permit Judas to sin rather than give them the grace of repentance and Aquinas just and those sorts of issues appeals to the divine will and battles and humility and says, we really don’t know, and God would have to reveal that to us and we’ll get that revelation in the beatific vision.

Matthew:

Yeah. Do you think it’s a theological truth that God only permits evil if he can get a greater good out of its or stop a greater evil? Do you think this is deday for Catholics?

Dr. Karlo:

Well, that’s an interesting question. Deday would imply that this is something that the church has taught to be divinely revealed, whether in scripture or tradition. I haven’t encountered any sort of magisterial reference that makes that assertion or says things that would allowed us to reasonably conclude with that sort of conclusion. I haven’t encountered anything like that. Maybe you have a magisterial reference to share that would lead to that conclusion, but I haven’t. So if it is true that there is no magisterial reference that gives us that teaching that this reason for God’s permission is divinely revealed, then if that is true, then if there is such a magisterial reference, it would be davide, right? But if there is no magisterial reference, I don’t know if I couldn’t bind the conscience of a Catholic to say, this is Davide, this is divine revealed. Now, it is true that you do have in sacred scripture, right?

If we look to sacred scripture, then we see that God works all things to the good. For those who believe in him in Romans 8 28, that would include even permitted evil. So we could see in there an implicit hint to what we’re saying, but I’m not aware of the church definitively interpreting that text to be teaching such in order for me to bind the conscience of a Catholic to say, you got to have divine and Catholic faith here concerning this explanation or this line of reasoning. I mean, this is the classic line that Thomas gives, right? And Aquinas gives coming from Augustine as well that God will permit an evil only to bring about some good. Now, in my mind, my mind debates whether the greater good, what do we mean by greater? In my mind, I think bringing about a good preserving a good, the manifestation of some good is sufficient in order to reconcile permitted evil and God’s goodness.

Because any good that is present is a manifestation of the divine goodness. Are there greater goods? Are there more goods or some other good that could manifest the divine goodness more so than another? Yes, that is true, but of course there’s an infinite right spectrum of goods that could be brought about by God to manifest his divine goodness more that would never bro or broach the ceiling of divine goodness itself, right? Because we’re dealing with the created order of being. So I think it is sufficient to say that God will permit defect whether physical or moral, only insofar as he is preserving or manifesting some good, and that’s what’s necessary for permission of defect or evil, to be reconciliable with God’s goodness. I think that’s what Aquinas means by saying permitting only to bring about some greater good.

Matthew:

Yes, I was saying this because in the philosophical literature you have this arguments of premise. One, God cannot permit any gratuitous evil, meaning evil without a greater good coming from its premise too. But it seems that there are gratuitous evils in the world, and I think it’s William Rowe who gives the example of a farm that’s burning in a forest fire. And since it concerns animals and not humans, you cannot appeal to the of soul building or things like that. And it seems that yes, all this animal suffering that has come about in the world from millions and millions of years, it’s difficult to see what possibly could be a greater reason, greater good that comes out of it. And so that’s why I was asking if the only response to this is from a Catholic’s perspective, yes, there is a greater good, but we just cannot know it necessarily, but we know that there is a greater good and that’s defeated logical consequence of the teaching. Or could a Catholic hold to the position that God permits some gratuitous evils in the world? And yeah, I haven’t found any magisterial statements on this side,

Dr. Karlo:

Right? I think philosophically we could argue that no, it is not possible for God to permit gratuitous evil that given God being pure goodness itself, whatever effect there is within the created order of being, there’s going to have to be some good manifest in order for the divine goodness to be manifest because it isn’t metaphysically impossible for some effect to be without manifesting the divine goodness or being itself. So there must be some good that is preserved or manifests with any effect that God brings about. And so I do think we can safely say at least on the grounds of philosophy and classical theism, that it is metaphysically impossible for there to be any such gratuitous evil, some permitted evil that is not ordered towards some good in any way whatsoever. So in response to that argument, I think premise two there, Matthew just begs the question against the classical theists, because in order to get gratuitous evils, you have to have no God.

The only way given the classical understanding of God is pure goodness. The only way you’re going to get some evil that is not order to some good or the manifestation of some good is if you do not have a God that is pure goodness itself and who is omnipotent for whom no greater good could possibly not be brought about. And so if you have to assume that there is no God who is pure goodness itself in order to get gratuitous evil, then that just begs the question against the classical theists who’s arguing for God being pure goodness. Because if God classically defined exists as pure goodness itself, well then there’s going to be some good that the permitted evil is ordered toward, in which case you don’t have gratuitous evil. And this is interesting, Matthew, just to tease a little bit to get back to our prior conversation, this is the same logical form of my response earlier. So just as you can’t get gratuitous evil with, you cannot get gratuitous evil without assuming there’s no classical version of God. So too you cannot get an actual infinity without assuming there’s no classical God.

Dr. Karlo:

And so that’s why I said earlier that those scenarios are begging the question against classical theists. I think there’s a

Dr. Karlo:

Parallel here, at least with regard to the gratuitous evil. The postulation of a gratuitous evil is begging the question against the classical theists.

Matthew:

Exactly. So you could do in what you call in philosophy the Morian shift and say, well, if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil premise two, but God exists. We have independent reasons confirming it. Therefore, there is no gratuitous evil, and it’s not begging the question since we have independent reasons to justify premise two. So that’s how I think a classical theist should answer the

Problem of gratuitous evil. As for theod for moral evil, we usually appeal to free will God respecting free will of creatures. This doesn’t always answers all the aspects of the problem of evil, since we still need to account for natural evil. And so Aquinas’s traditional solution and church fathers usually appeal to the fall, the original sin, evil entered creation, and we live in a fallen world where there’s deficiencies in the laws of natures, things like that. And that’s why there’s a world filled with natural evils. However, today we know with science that an evolutionary science, that evil or suffering in the world existed prior to the fall. We have good scientific evidence for that. And so one solution I’ve thought to solve this problem is to explain that we live in a world with natural, even not at the moment of the fall of original sin, but at the moment of the fall of the angels, when the angels became fallen just after creation, that’s where creation well had all its deficiencies since angels were designed by God to participate in the creation of the world. That’s what Augustine says when he writes on Genesis one, three saying that the angels were designed by God to have some type of role in creation, and you could postulate as a theological hypothesis that when the fall of the angels occurred, this is when natural evil entered into the world. What is your stance on this theist?

Dr. Karlo:

Alright, two thoughts come to mind immediately. First of all, I do not think you need a theological explanation to account for natural evil because you have a more natural philosophical explanation that is just part and parcel of material beings to corrupt and die. And that in no way is incompatible with an all good God because the all good God is willing for such material beings to exist, which in and of themselves as material beings manifest the divine goodness slash being. And so that’s sufficient to account for natural evil. God is not bound in justice to himself or to the animals or even plants in order to give them what is over and above their nature, namely preservation from corruption and death. And so we can appeal to God intending and willing the very nature of material beings to account for natural evil or physical defect.

I don’t think you need to appeal to some theological explanation to account for natural evil when you have a philosophical one. My second immediate thought that came to mind is, well, how do you reckon if it were true that the angelic fall was the cause of natural evils, then would it be the case that Adam and Eve would not have been eating plants? Like when God commands Adam and Eve to eat of all the trees in the garden, is their eating of the trees in the garden only on account of the angelic fall, such that if there were no angelic fall, would Adam and Eve not be eating? So that would seem to make the death of plants. That’s an effect of humans eating plants and eating the produce of the plants a result of the angelic fall, at least intuitively, I would’ve to think about it more, to provide a more substantial argument, at least intuitively that seems to be, that doesn’t sit right with me, that human beings eating plants and bringing about death of living organisms would be a part of the world, part and parcel of the fallen world as opposed to human beings eating plants, bringing about death of living organisms being part and parcel of the natural order world.

That’s not fallen.

Matthew:

I would say it’s not an evil to eat plants or things like that because presumably in heaven we would be eating plants or things like that. And this wouldn’t lead to evil because there’s no natural evil in heaven. So I don’t think that just the destruction of biological organism in itself is an evil by evil. I was referring to something that implies suffering on conscious creatures like tsunamis, earthquakes.

Dr. Karlo:

So natural evils affecting us. Okay, I’m glad you brought that up, because that’s a very

Matthew:

Conscious creatures, conscious creatures like animals, even non-rational animals, for

Dr. Karlo:

Example. Yeah. Alright, so that’s an important distinction. The distinction there is between physical defect and natural evils and natural evils affecting conscious creatures.

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah.

Dr. Karlo:

Alright. So with regard to that, again, my first thought is I don’t think you need a theological explanation to account for natural evils affecting conscious creatures who are material in nature, because I think you have a philosophical explanation of that’s just part and parcel of material things. It belongs to material beings to experience corruption and death, even on account of other material beings affecting them. And so this gets to the variety of beings within the physical world that Aquinas argues God wield as a manifestation of the divine goodness and being and his wisdom and with a variety and hierarchy of beings, even within the physical corporeal world that naturally involves or entails that the good of the higher physical beings will entail the curtailment of the good of the lower physical beings. And that framework of physical reality and the hierarchy of beings and what that logically entails given their natures itself is a manifestation of divine wisdom, divine goodness and divine being.

Because God is willing, this particular order of being material beings and with material being comes physical defects. And so again, for God to permit such physical defects that naturally follow from that hierarchy of material beings, you have something natural, naturally ordered according to their natures and therefore manifestation of divine being. So again, I don’t think you would need a theological explanation to account for that. I think a philosophical explanation suffices and thereby showing the compatibility of an all good God and even natural evil affecting other beings such as conscious beings, like non-rational animals and rational animals. So we are physical beings, and so consequently, in so far as we’re physical beings, it could be within the natural order that other physical beings affect us in negative ways. Now, it is true based upon divine revelation, we can appeal to the original sin of Adam and Eve to account for natural evil affecting us human beings that we can appeal to. I don’t think it would be needed to justify God in his permission of natural evil affecting human beings, but at least given this order of providence and divine revelation, we can appeal to original sin as an explanation as to why natural evils affect us as human beings.

Matthew:

The problem I have with the philosophical response given by Aquinas on this is that I don’t see how I can reconcile it with Christian theology on heaven because the church teaches that there will be no suffering in heaven and that even material beings in heaven will not be corrupt. There will be absolutely no suffering. So if God can create heaven with material beings without any suffering of conscious creatures like animals, well, he could also have done that before the fall or create materials being that do not, not suffer horribly like animals do. So yeah,

Dr. Karlo:

I have a couple of thoughts on that. So notice there’s a difference between what God could have and can or will do, and what is metaphysically necessary. So I grant that God could have willed that order of providence in which maybe perhaps natural evils affecting conscious beings as a result of some sin like the angels. That’s a very real possibility whether or not it is in fact. So I don’t know, I would to do further research to see if there’s any indication that that’s probably the way it happened. But my point is that it would not be necessary for it to be so we could account for the natural evil effect and conscious physical beings on philosophical grounds without having to give up God’s goodness, right? We could reconcile God’s goodness with that order of providence. Now you appeal to in the future of heaven, where God will preserve all material things from corruption and death.

And I agree it has been revealed to us he will do that, but it’s not out of necessity of what the natures of those things are. Rather it is a gift, a gratuitous gift that will be given to the material order of being where he will suspend material being keep material being from playing out according to its nature by divine power and keeping material being in, being from corruption and death. But that is not a requirement for material being. It is a gift that’s given to material being. So again, you could hypothetically have an order of providence to where a pure natural order exists to where material beings are just consistently corrupting dying in new material beings coming into existence. And that would not be incompatible with an all good God because for the reasons that I’ve stated earlier. But what has been revealed to us is that God is going to give the material world something over and above its nature as material being, and that is preservation from corruption and death.

Matthew:

Well that’s an interesting response and we could go back and forth on this, but I have another question on that is linked that concerns the problem of evil, but specifically for Christian theology, it’s the problem of hell and eternal conscious torments. Some atheists could say, well, I can see how God and evil are not logically incompatible, but I don’t see how Christian theology on eternal conscious torment is compatible with absolute divine mercy and unconditional divine love. And so how would you reconcile the two? It seems that there’s an intuitive contradiction. How would you answer this and how would you answer the objection of the fact that annihilationism would seem to be more fitting because it would fulfill God’s justice like God could punish someone in hell millions and millions of years proportionately to the crime he has committed and then just put him out of existence. And annihilationists argue that this is still conformed to God’s justice and also it fits more divine love than eternal conscious torments. So how would you answer this objection?

Dr. Karlo:

Well, with regard to God’s mercy that would entail that God would be bound to take a soul out of hell. To demand that God be merciful is to misconceive what mercy is. Mercy is the gratuitous gift on somebody to forgive them. To speak of mercy being due to someone you lose the very concept of mercy. So for someone to demand that God be merciful to the damned is to say that God is bound in justice to forgive them. But if God were bound in justice to forgive them, then that wouldn’t be mercy. So you can’t demand mercy and justice. Alright, so that’s just a misconception of mercy. Now, to demand that a loving God forgive the damned and give them the grace of repentance, that seems to imply that love and punishment are incompatible. Like why would and all loving God need to not punish someone unless number one, you think that the punishment doesn’t fit the crime that would be incompatible with love or you think punishment itself is incompatible with love?

And so those are two distinct issues that we would have to have conversations about where we would argue that punishment and love are compatible because love entails bringing order where there is disorder, which is what punishment actually is because it’s an imposition of displeasure where displeasure is due because pleasure was taken where it ought not to have been taken. So there’s a rectification of the disorder to bring about order displeasure associated with bad behavior. That’s order according to God’s divine wisdom and design of human behavior. Now if you think the punishment, it doesn’t fit the crime well then we have other responses there. And those responses would be just simply based upon the metaphysical reality that the choice that is made upon the separation of soul from the body, that choice is irrevocable. And so the individual is forever rejecting. God is forever in a state of incompatibility with God’s love and consequently is forever due, the imposition of punishment for that incompatibility with love.

And so you have an everlasting punishment simply because the damned or in a state of everlasting choice against God’s love and thereby an everlasting manifestation of God’s justice by imposing punishment upon those who everlastingly are rejecting God’s love and are in a state of incompatibility with God’s love. And so that would lead to the conclusion that there is no disproportion between the all loving God, no, excuse me, no disproportion between the punishment and the crime of rejecting God since the crime is forever perpetrated and rejecting God’s love, that individual forever receives the due punishment for that constant everlasting rejection of God. And so we can see that love and punishment are compatible and we can see that love and everlasting punishment are compatible when considered metaphysically based upon the nature of in corporeal choice. Now that assumes a whole host of metaphysics of the reality of in corporeal choice.

Faser has done a great job in his article on this, does God damn you, I wrote a brief essay for catholic.com on this Why Soul Can’t Change. I think maybe the title is something like that@catholic.com. I can’t remember the exact title of my own article, but that would be a sketch of how we would begin to respond to that. So we see that mercy is compatible with damnation, love is compatible with damnation because there’s a willing of the good. And then thirdly, you asked about annihilation. My simple response there would be given the reality of the soul, God creates the soul to be an in corporeal principle of the human being that subsistent existence for the rest of its existence and duration of existence. That’s what a soul is. It is immortal by nature. That’s the kind of thing that it is. And so it would be unbefitting of divine wisdom to create an immortal principle of a human being and not let it be immortal.

And so I think to me in my mind that’s the most persuasive argument against annihilationism. Even though God of course has the power to annihilate, all he’s got to do is simply stop willing being of the soul in the separated state. It would be unbefitting of his wisdom to do so because it would be contrary to the nature of the thing that he created that would be creating an angel, an angel that goes out of existence Well, like why did you create an everlasting intellectual being in the first place? Or you could even argue why even create a material being and never let a material being corrupt defect or die? Like why even create material beings in the first place? I think a similar line of reasoning can be employed there. So I think it’s the nature of the soul as an corporeal principle, which by nature is immortal, that accounts for why God doesn’t annihilate.

And with regard to the justice argument, justice would still be served well, at least some justice would still be served. But again, that just begs the question against the one who would argue for the irrevocability of the choice in the separated state and immortality of the soul. So sure God might manifest as justice for a temporal punishment, temporary duration of punishment than annihilate them, but the defender of hell could argue back and say God’s justice would be more manifest by allowing the soul to function and exist according to its nature, in its perpetual everlasting state in the irrevocable choice and to do punishment be bestowed to the soul and thereby God’s justice be manifest in a way that’s consistent with the nature of the soul. In my mind that seems to be an order of providence that’s more consistent with what things are as opposed to the former order of providence.

Matthew:

And how would you answer someone who says, okay, Carlo, I agree with you that hell, eternal conscious torment is not strictly incompatible with divine love, but why would God create someone knowing they would go to hell if God knows that if he creates Bob, then Bob will reject him and go to hell? Why not refrain simply from creating Bob? And so I know there’s a debate here with middle knowledge and Molin and Thomas, but what is your personal response to this problem?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, Matthew. So this is actually a question I am currently trying to think about honestly, and my first thought is that notice this is a why question of why this order of providence versus some other order of providence. This is not a question. If this is a question as well why God didn’t do it some other way to suggest that God is unjust for not doing it the other way, then I think the apal response that I’ve given earlier would suffice here that if God is not bound to create in the first place, then he’s not bound to create a particular kind of order of providence with some degree of goodness in it or less good. So if it’s proposed as a challenge to God’s justice or goodness, I think we have a legitimate response. But if it’s an honest question as to which goods are being preserved or manifest in this order of providence where he creates Bob knowing to permit him to finally defect and go to hell as opposed to some other order of providence, ultimately I think we have to bow in humility there and say that we don’t know ultimately but or there are some goods that are manifest in this order of providence and I think we can at least identify some of them.

We have the very good of Bob’s existence itself. That’s a good that is manifest. Now, somebody might counter and say, well car, come on Carla, I don’t buy that. Well, that could possibly be a lack of finitude of our intellectual insight to the goodness of being itself our very existence. So that’s not a problem with God or being that’s a problem with our finite intellectual insight. The problem might be with our intellectual vagueness and incapacity to see the goodness of being as opposed to God’s problem. I think you also have the manifestation of the truth of the nature of a defect creature itself. That truth of the nature of a defect creature is a good, and so that’s at least another good that is preserved and manifest within this particular order of providence. Again, that might not move somebody emotionally, but intellectually that’s a good God.

Wills an order of providence of defect creatures and so it’s at least befitting of his goodness and justice to permit such defect creatures to actually defect morally even permanently given the nature of those kinds of things. And so you have God intending to manifest the truth of the nature of a defect creature that’s a good that is being preserved and manifest within this particular order of providence. I think we can think deeply about this and come up with more goods, but those are at least two that come to my mind initially off the top of my head in order again, apologetically speaking to preserve the reconcili ability of God’s goodness and willing and order of providence in which he will permit someone to finally defect.

Matthew:

And have you read about Jimmy Aiken’s solution to this problem where he says that you could possibly deny that God has such a knowledge that if he creates Bob, then Bob will go to hell. Have you read his article on the subject?

Dr. Karlo:

I haven’t read his article. I did listen to his episode. It’s been a while since I listened to it and my memory is not fresh on the details, so I’m going to refrain from making any comments on Jimmy’s episode on this particular issue in order to engage with because just simply my memory is not fresh to have the details in a succinct way. I do remember just generally speaking that I do remember Jimmy did deny that God would have knowledge of what Bob would actually do in a counterfactual situation as if that were real. And he’s right on that. He’s denying middle knowledge. Even Thomas Aquinas says, it is impossible to God for even God to know what is not real. He knows what is possible. He knows a possible manifestation of the divine being an order of providence where Bob does Y instead of X. That’s a possible reality that God knows as a possibility. But Aquinas would even conclude that God cannot know Bob actually choosing Y without willing Bob to choose why. And from what I remember in listening to Jimmy’s episode, I remember walking away concluding, that’s all Jimmy’s denying. And so Jimmy would affirm that God knows the choice that Bob’s going to make tomorrow, right? He’s just simply how I read Aquinas agreeing with Aquinas that God would only know what Bob possibly could choose tomorrow, but he wouldn’t be knowing that choice as an actual reality.

Matthew:

Jim Aikens says that God in his omniscience knows the past, the present, and the future of this world because he has created this world. Correct. He says that in order for God to know Bob’s future decisions, he would already have made the choice of created. Because if God did not create Bob, then Bob will never make any future decision of rejecting him. And so God could not have that knowledge. So in order for God to have the knowledge of Bob’s decisions, Bob needs to exist in the first place. And so God creates no one knowing that they will choose to go to hell. That’s basically the solution.

Dr. Karlo:

So like I said, I’d have to listen to it again. I did not walk away with a reading of Jimmy’s statements in the way that seemingly you’re articulating it is true. If Bob didn’t exist, then God wouldn’t know the decisions Bob’s going to actually make. That’s just the same thing as saying God doesn’t know the counterfactual decisions Bob will actually make because they’re not actual, they’re not wheeled by God. They’re only possible manifestations of the divine being. So God only knows them as possibility, not actuality. But as I interpreted Jimmy, I seem to remember him affirming that God knows the actual choice that God Bob will make tomorrow or I will make because God in its omnipotence and in his omniscience has willed for me to make those choices in his providential plan. Now again, I would have to listen in order to see which reading is correct, but that’s at least how I interpreted him. But I’ll leave that open for further reflection and investigation.

I don’t want to put any words in Jimmy’s mouth and make a judgment as to what he’s arguing without him being here to defend himself. But I mean we can entertain the ideas of what these ideas entail. Can God know actually Bob’s counterfactual decision like choosing why I would go with Aquinas and say, no, God can’t even know that as actual because he hasn’t wielded to be actual. He knows what is actual inso far as he wields that to be actual namely choice X and knows choice Y only as a possible manifestation of the divine being a finite manifestation of infinite being.

Matthew:

How would you answer Molin this who says that scriptures does give evidence that God knows counterfactual knowledge? Like Jesus says, if these miracles had been made in these cities, they would have converted or things like that. And that there are other passages in Samuel?

Dr. Karlo:

Well, first of all, to know is very vague, so you could specify the different kinds of knowledge. But from a Thomas perspective, I think this is right. I think Atoma could just simply answer that and say, yeah, it is true. If they would have repented, then their city would not have destroyed. But notice premise too, they repented well, that would be caused by God. So God can say, Hey guys, if you repent, your city won’t be destroyed. The implication being if I move you to repent, you will repent and consequently your city will not be destroyed. And the fact that they don’t repent from a tomomi perspective is because God didn’t move them supernaturally to repent. And so God can express these hypothetical situations because he knows if he were to move them to repent, they would in fact repent. And consequently God would not destroy their city, but God permits them to not repent. He permits the moral defect refraining from giving the supernatural movement of repentance and consequently destroys the city in due proportion to their failure to follow his will and commands. So it’s not like God is having, it’s not from a Thomas perspective, God is not expressing, I know factually as actual being this counterfactual decision. He’s just simply saying, if I will that counterfactual decision, I will know it as actual.

Matthew:

Yeah, I agree with that. That’s a sensible response. I think perhaps in order to end the show on a lighter note, we’ve been speaking about the problem of evil.

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, you’ve been taking into some deep waters here, man. I’ve enjoyed it. It’s great.

Matthew:

Yeah, it’s very enjoyable. I love speaking about philosophy and the implications of Catholic theology. It’s fascinating. But perhaps in order to end on the lighter notes I would like to speak about on the last question that concerns miracles because I think the argument for miracles has been underestimated in Catholic apologetics and Christian apologetics in general. We argue for the resurrection, but there are actually very good arguments you can make from modern miracles. Caleb Jackson has done some great work on this. Have you studied some of these particular miracle cases? Have you done some investigations on miracles like Fatima, Lord Une, Eucharistic miracles, things like that? Do you have any miracles that you would defend publicly in a debate with Nathe? What is your stance on this argument from miracles?

Dr. Karlo:

Yeah, so unfortunately I haven’t done in depth research to where I would be able to go toe to toe argument, counter argument on specific contemporary miracles, just a cursory understanding and a reading of presenting some of the miracles, like I’m thinking of James Strom from Illinois Peoria who was healed, who was brought back to life after being dead for 61 minutes on account of the intercessory prayer of Bishop Sheen would be one example. There are other examples that we can appeal to for the intercession of the saints, I think that are pretty persuasive. I do think that the Eucharistic miracles are pretty persuasive. Just the fact that you have a material substance remaining in existence for 1300 years with the miracle of Lonciano is quite persuasive. And I do think that the miracle of Fatima would be a legitimate miracle to appeal to in order to sway someone from skepticism to at least some sort of religious belief and even perhaps all the way to accept Mary as being real and in heaven and doing all this stuff.

I haven’t done the research such that I would be confident to debate that particular miracle and respond to the various counterarguments. I just simply haven’t gotten there in my research. But I’m aware of it as a robust, robustly defended, miraculous account that could be utilized in debates with skeptics. I just haven’t done the research yet in order for me to be able to step into the ring to defend that miraculous account. But I agree with you that the argument from miracles is a tool in the toolkit that is often neglected and not utilized. But I think we have to be careful with regard whom we use those arguments, right? Assessing the audience, trying to discern prudentially their dispositions. I do think some people will be more disposed to be persuaded by the miraculous evidence, whereas others might not be properly disposed. And the key there is to try and offer the evidence of miracles in a way that excludes any possible retreat to natural causation of some sort, right? You have to be able to exclude all possible natural explanations of the alleged miracle in order for the mind to be persuaded to make the jump that this is miraculous, because you’re assuming that there has to be a proportionate cause for this sort of effect. So it’s just a matter of assessing the disposition of the individual to see with whom the miraculous evidence will work. I do think it’s effective, but again, depending upon the audience, that is our target.

Matthew:

Sure. And pastorally speaking, I would say that the audience is generally more persuaded by arguments from miracles than from to mystic, sophisticated to mystic arguments like the Deante argument.

Dr. Karlo:

If you

Matthew:

Tell my grandma about the Deante argument or the modal contingency argument, she will not understand anything. Whereas if I tell her, well, there’s this healing at Lord that is well attested, medically verified and documented, then everyone understands whether you’re a grandma, whether you’re in eighth grade, whether, I mean, it speaks to everyone. So I think that pastorally speaking miracles are very efficient in aps.

Dr. Karlo:

Yep. I do not agree, and I agree 100%.

Matthew:

Yeah, so that’s ends what I wanted to say. Perhaps if you want to look, if the audience wants to look deeper into miracles, you can check out Caleb Jackson’s miracle presentations on YouTube are very, very detailed and interesting. He has gone in depth in studying Catholic miracles, even Marin apparitions like Zune, which are very well documented. Jimmy Aiken also has very good podcasts on these Marin Apparitions on his channel. So I would recommend everyone to check this out because I think it makes a good cumulative evidential case for the truth of Catholicism. And to me, I think it’s a pity that in academia, philosophers, atheistic philosophers do not take the argument from miracles too seriously. They basically rehearse Hume Hume Hume as if David Hume had solved everything on the argument from miracles. I was reading this in Mackey’s book, the Miracle of Theism, Graham Oppy, who has a big book arguing about Gods, where he answers sophisticated natural theology arguments. But when you look at the chapter on the argument from miracles, it’s very short, and he doesn’t go in depth in studying the concrete cases that have been put forward. So I would encourage every atheist to dig deep in these cases like Fatima Lured Zune, Eucharistic Miracles, things like that. And yeah, that’s just my last thoughts. Any last word?

Dr. Karlo:

Well, I just want to say thank you for the opportunity to come on your channel and geek out with you. Man, it was a blast. You were challenging my intellectual stamina. It’s been a while since I swam in those waters of natural theology, so I was grateful to try to get the rust off a little bit. I enjoyed it, man. Thank you for

Matthew:

That. No problem. It was a pleasure too, and it’s a good thing that we have good sophisticated philosophers doing apologetics because it’s good for the credibility of the faith, and it shows that we do not believe our theological doctrines without irrationality or without evidence. So the work you guys are doing at Catholic Answers is great, and so keep doing the good work, and I hope we could do some more episodes sometimes in the future if you’re

Dr. Karlo:

Free. Yeah, I would love to, Matthew and I would like to recommend your viewers to check out my new YouTube channel at Dior dash carlo, Dr. Carlo, if you just type in Dr. Carlo YouTube, it’ll come up. It’s a brand new YouTube channel. As we’re recording this video today, episode four drops tonight, and it’ll be on what John really taught about the Assurance of Heaven, looking at one John five 13. We also have a Patreon page, dr carlo.com, with Dr. Spelled out four different levels of membership that people can sign up for to help support the podcast, Dr. Carlo podcast. So yeah, thanks again for letting me come on your channel, man.

Matthew:

Please, Carlo for coming. And yeah, everyone subscribe to his channel, subscribe to Catholic Answers. God bless everyone, and have a good day.