Anti-Catholic apologists reject the notion the bishop of Rome ever held or was recognized as holding a primacy of universal jurisdiction in the early Church. According to this view, certain decrees of the early councils undermine the historical basis for the doctrine of papal primacy. The councils and their decrees, these apologists say, actually contradict the Catholic understanding of the primacy. William Webster claims “councils from time to time opposed the authoritative decrees of the bishops of Rome and emphasized their superior authority by passing a number of canons which dealt directly with the issue of jurisdiction within the Church and the authority of the Roman See” (The Church of Rome at the Bar of History, 61).
Canon Six of the Council of Nicaea (324)
One such decree pressed into service by anti-Catholics is the sixth canon from the Council of Nicaea: “Let the ancient customs in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis prevail, that the Bishop of Alexandria have jurisdiction in all these, since the like is customary for the Bishop of Rome also. Likewise in Antioch and the other provinces, let the Churches retain their privileges.”
Dave Hunt says the Council “decreed that the three bishops of Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch . . . be designated as ‘superior’ to other bishops of less important Christian centers” (A Woman Rides the Beast, 504). Hunt argues this places the bishop of Rome on equal footing with other sees. In an article on the council of Nicaea, James White says canon six “is significant because it demonstrates that at this time there was no concept of a single universal head of the Church with jurisdiction over everyone else” (Christian Research Journal, Spring 1997, 32).
Acontextual analysis, misunderstanding, and outright error plague these arguments. Hunt, for example, adds with regard to canon six that “the bishop of Rome at the time refused to accept such a distinction for himself” (504). This assertion is simply untrue. Hunt apparently confuses this Nicene canon with canons from later councils, such as the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon, which Rome did reject.
The history of the Nicaean canon six reveals it cannot be interpreted as excluding, much less contradicting, the universal jurisdiction of Rome. The canon was apparently adopted in reaction to a schism within the Egyptian Church caused by Meletius’s attempt to withdraw his see from its customary place under authority of the bishop of Alexandria. The council merely reaffirmed Alexandria’s customary authority over its surrounding sees, not intending to either affirm or deny Roman primacy. While the Council permits the Alexandrine and Antiochian customs to continue, no such similar language is applied to the Roman see.
Instead, Rome’s custom was clearly the precedent upon which the council based its decision regarding Alexandria, as is adduced by the statement “since the like is customary for the bishop of Rome.” The legitimacy of the Roman custom is the basis, not the result, of the canon. As Eastern Orthodox scholar John Meyendorff admits in commenting on canon six: “This witnesses explicitly to the enormous and exceptional authority enjoyed by the bishop of Rome in the Christian world of the early fourth century” (Orthodoxy and Catholicity, 54).
The Roman “custom” is only a reference to a metropolitan or patriarchal jurisdiction, not the universal primacy claimed by Rome. While the observation on this point is not without merit, it does not, if granted, prejudice the Roman claims. The pope is at the same time a priest, bishop, metropolitan or archbishop of the Roman province, Patriarch of the West, and the successor of Peter. Only in the last of these offices does the pope hold universal jurisdiction. In his role as an ordained priest the pope has no more authority than any other priest; as bishop of a diocese he has no more authority over his diocese than another bishop over his own; and so forth. One may, for example, compare on equal terms the pope as bishop with another bishop without denying the primacy-just as Peter identified himself as a “fellow elder” (1 Peter 5:1) without denying his apostleship.
That the council took as its precedent one of the lesser jurisdictions of the Roman bishop-his office as Patriarch of the West-does more to support the papal primacy than to contradict it. The mere fact Rome had a similar custom was enough to demonstrate the lawfulness of the custom in general. In effect, the council said, “Since Rome considers it lawful, we consider it lawful.” Or, put another way, “Since the like is customary for the bishop of Rome,” we “let” Alexandria and Antioch “retain” their jurisdiction and privileges.
Canon Twenty-Eight of the Council of Chalcedon (451)
This canon states that since the city of Constantinople “enjoys equal privileges with the old imperial Rome, [it] should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she [Rome] is, and rank next after her.” Webster sees this canon as an example of the Council’s opposition to papal primacy. Hunt goes a step further, quoting from one source who asserts “the patriarch of Constantinople [not of Rome] was voted the chief bishop of the entire Church” (504). The most charitable thing to be said in response to Hunt and his erroneous source is that such a claim is not supported by the text of the canon.
The justification for the canon was that since the cities of Constantinople and Rome were equally imperial capitals-one of the East and the other the West-Constantinople’s bishop should be further magnified in keeping with that city’s imperial dignity. While being raised to a patriarchal status, and in this sense being made equal to the bishop of Rome as a patriarch, the bishop of Constantinople still ranked after Rome. The Council fathers affirmed as much in a letter to the pope at the time, Leo: “[A]fter your most holy and apostolic see, the see of Constantinople shall take precedence, being placed second” (Letter 98).
Clearly, the Council hoped to raise the see of Constantinople as high as it could but in no way felt the imperial political status of Constantinople was sufficient grounds to make its bishop equal or superior in ecclesiastical matters to the pope in Rome. This consideration indicates Roman bishop’s precedence in ecclesiastical matters was not founded on the city of Rome’s imperial status-otherwise, Constantinople’s bishop would have been recognized as equal to or higher than the Roman bishop, since Constantinople was the political center.
Pope Leo rejected canon twenty-eight not because it diminished his own see but because it upset the privileges of other sees traditionally recognized as having precedence ahead of Constantinople. Though both the Emperor and the Chalcedonian fathers hoped for papal confirmation of the canon, they still affirmed in their letter to Pope Leo that he was the final authority on the matter: “Accordingly, we entreat you, honor our decision by your assent, and as we have yielded to the head [Pope Leo] our agreement on things honorable, so may the head also fulfill for the children [the council] what is fitting” (Letter 98). Anatolius, bishop of Constantinople, declared separately to Pope Leo that the pope had the full authority to confirm or reject conciliar decrees, including canon twenty-eight: “The whole force and confirmation of the acts has been reserved for the authority of your Holiness” (Epistle 132; Hefele’s A History of the Christian Councils, v. III, 447).
As a consequence of Leo’s rejection of the twenty-eighth canon, the Eastern Church-even at Constantinople-omitted it from their lists, and for hundreds of years the Greeks attributed only twenty-seven canons to Chalcedon. Only later did the East attempt to re-insert the rejected canon into the decrees of the Council in Trullo (692), a council recognized by neither the West nor the East.
Universal Head
Only an acontextual rendering of history can lead an anti-Catholic apologist to declare, as does James White, that there was no “concept of a single universal head of the Church over everyone else.” There are explicit references to the pope being considered such. St. Ignatius (ca. 110), bishop of Antioch, speaks of the Roman Church as having “presidency” (Letter to the Romans) while Tertullian (220), in his heretical phase, mocks the pope as “bishop of bishops” (On Modesty). The bishop of Rome was addressed by the fathers at the Council of Arles (314) as their “most holy lord”; at Sardica (342)-attended by bishops of West and East, including Athanasius-the pope was addressed as the “head”; and at Milevis (416) as “chief.”
At Ephesus (431) no objection was made when the papal legates spoke of the pope as the “holy head,” and by way of being Peter’s successor as “head of the whole faith” and “head of the Apostles.” Nor at Chalcedon were objections raised to the pope being called “the head of all the churches” and “archbishop of all the churches” by the papal legates. The emperor Constantinople III (680) refers to the pope as “sacred head.” Other examples are rife.
Anti-Catholic apologists pass over in silence the evidence from the councils that supports the Roman primacy. Nicaea explicitly adopted for the universal Church the ancient Roman custom for dating Easter and adhered to the Roman practice regarding the baptisms of heretics. Pope Dionysius essentially defined the Nicene Christological doctrine the previous century when he intervened in a doctrinal dispute in Alexandria.
Anti-Catholic apologists also assert the popes had no part in convoking or approving the councils. White claims Pope Sylvester did not convoke the council of Nicaea. While many early writings speak of Constantine’s role alone in convoking Nicaea, it does not follow this precludes papal involvement. The fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, Constantinople III (680), expressly noted that Constantine and Pope Sylvester assembled the Council of Nicaea. White implies this statement was an attempt by Constantinople III to cover up the role of emperors in earlier councils: “Later centuries would find the idea of an ecumenical council being called by anyone but the bishop of Rome, the pope, unthinkable. . . . Hence long after Nicaea, in A.D. 680, the story began to circulate that in fact the bishop of Rome called the Council” (Christian Research Journal, Spring 1997, 34).
The facts oppose White. It is clear from the proceedings of the Council of Nicaea that the Council fathers acknowledged the Council was called by the reigning emperor. They did not think the idea of an ecumenical council being called by anyone but a pope to be “unthinkable.” The truth is, there was no motive for Constantinople III to claim what it did about the pope’s role at Nicaea other than the Council in 680 believed it to be true.
Not all the early ecumenical councils were called by the pope. But there is no need for Catholics to deny or minimize the actual role played by the emperors in convoking councils. The maintenance of civil order certainly gave emperors a natural interest in seeing religious disputes resolved. At such times, the interests of civil and religious authorities coincided. Even if the impetus for the first councils came initially, primarily, or even exclusively from the emperor-as it certainly did on many occasions-the fact doesn’t undermine the Roman primacy. The essential point is that the resolution of the crisis from a dogmatic or ecclesiastical standpoint could not contradict the declarations of the Roman see, a fact recognized by both emperors and councils. As Socrates Scholasticus in his history of the fourth-century Church attested: “An ecclesiastical canon commands that the churches shall not make any ordinances against the opinion of the bishop of Rome” (The Ecclesiastical History II, 8).
The acts of the ecumenical councils demonstrate it was unlawful to attempt anything in opposition to the apostolic see. The papal legates at the Council of Chalcedon objected to the seating of Dioscorus, who had a prominent role in the “Robber Synod,” on the grounds that ” he dared to hold a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, a thing which had never taken place nor can take place.” The council removed Dioscorus from his place without questioning the legitimacy of the charge. Furthermore, no objection was made when the legates placed papal decrees on par with conciliar decrees.
A similar understanding of papal authority is reflected in the proceedings of the earlier ecumenical Council of Ephesus (431) where the council fathers declared they were “compelled” by the canons and decision of Pope Celestine to depose the heretic Nestorius. Local councils of the fourth and fifth centuries such as Arles, Sardica, Carthage, and Milevis sought papal confirmation of their acts. Similar examples are found among the surviving writings of the ecumenical councils, such as Chalcedon and Constantinople III. While the ravages of time and history have deprived us of the necessary evidence to prove beyond a doubt that the Council of Nicaea sought and obtained papal confirmation, there are enough references in the writings of subsequent popes and councils to accept this as highly probable.
Given the importance of tradition in the early Church and its abhorrence of doctrinal innovation, it strains credulity to assert the Roman primacy was a later innovation rather than a reflection of a more ancient understanding of the true structure of the Church. The fact that the early ecumenical councils-all held in the East-neither questioned nor objected to these papal claims and actions, but rather supported them in word and deed, is evidence of the universal acceptance of the Roman primacy by the early Church.
When the evidence is examined, we see in every age of the Church the truth of Ireneaus’s words about the Roman Church: “For with this Church, because of its superior origin, all churches must agree, that is, all the faithful in the whole world” (Against Heresies 3:3:2). These words are founded on Christ’s own words to Peter: that he is the “rock” upon which the Church is built; what he binds or looses is bound or loosed in heaven; that to him were given the keys of the kingdom (Matt. 16:18-19); and that he must “feed” and “tend” the Lord’s entire flock (John 21:15-17).
Unless otherwise noted, all quotes from ecumenical councils come from Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 2, volume 14 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans). Quotes of Pope Leo’s correspondence come from Schaff and Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 2, volume 12. Quote from Socrates Scholasticus is from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 2, volume 2. Quotes from Ignatius, Ireneaus, and Tertullian from W.A. Jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press).