
The Catholic Church has long held the Natural Law Theory (NLT) as the ethical standard in moral philosophy. It provides a strong, natural foundation for determining the morality of actions independent of revelation. This allows the Catholics to have a seat at the table when discussing moral issues ecumenically, as Church teaching on moral issues never relied on someone’s acceptance of the Bible (for non-Christians) or someone’s interpretation of the Bible (for non-Catholic Christians).
Because this law is “written in [our] hearts” (Rom 2:15), it has provided historic credibility for the Church despite the fact that so many individual Catholics have failed to live up to its demands. It is natural because it can be known by our human nature. It is also the foundation upon which grace builds. It is because we can know these things by human nature that Christ’s law of love is able to fulfill it (ST I-II, q. 107, aa. 2-3).
Many who dismiss the Church, or the gospel, or traditional morality like to highlight the problems of the Natural Law Theory. Some say it is illogical (I say, to err is Humean). Some say it is circular (Moore or less). Some say it is projection (too Nietzsche of an opinion). This might leave the faithful Catholic somewhat distraught and lost for moral direction.
But let’s consider the other two primary alternatives. Do we really want to be tied down to either of these?
Calculating Happiness
Utilitarianism seeks to order our decisions around happiness, similar to Aristotle’s eudemonia of Virtue Ethics. However, this “happiness principle” becomes impractical at best and circular at worst. Besides the obvious practical issues of making every decision in life an increasingly complicated math problem, we also discover that this “happiness principle” quickly devolves into another form of egoism (“Well, it makes me the most happy possible”) or destructive consequentialism (hello, my “Thanos was right” stans).
Even if we’re trying to be fair in determining the ever-elusive “happiness principle,” the standard is still no less arbitrary. Just because you are a really good, really thoughtful calculator, that does not mean your decision gets to trump anyone else’s of the most good for the most people. (What determines your superiority? Your personal goodness? What standard was used to determine your superior goodness? Yours? Hmmm.)
Even though it all appears to fall into place, and one can do very good, helpful, happiness-causing things from a utilitarian perspective, the whole enterprise becomes somewhat question-begging. One has a moral imperative to avoid it.
Duty Is as Duty Does
Deontological ethics comes to us by way of Immanuel Kant (though the term came before from utilitarian Jeremy Bentham). It comes from the word deontos, which means “duty.” It is based on the idea that we bind ourselves to a principle, or imperative to use Kant’s language, and obey it no matter the circumstances—categorically.
This rigidity can be comforting for some who struggle with the ambiguity of life. Although moral grey areas appear convenient when we’re confronted by our conscience, a constant appeal to them to justify ourselves will leave us untethered. An overcompensation to this capriciousness is to stand firm to some principle and refuse to yield, even if that principle is arbitrary. We can feel grounded in this sense of duty.
Most destructively, deontology lays the foundation for the infamous “Just Following Orders” defense. If our primary virtue is obedience, which is a virtue but just not the virtue, we can sacrifice the other virtues if that obedience is not formed by charity, which must form all of the virtues (ST II-II, q. 23, a. 8).
Like utilitarianism, deontology relies upon a pre-existing, arbitrary standard of goodness upon which to determine which principles or rules we will always obey. Why did you decide you could break this rule in order to follow that rule? How did you determine your hierarchy of moral truths? Is that your true standard, then? Why? Also, why do you get to decide which rule supersedes another? Because you are so good? (Because you follow all your own rules? Hmmm . . .)
VE, NLT, FTW
Ironically, for the criticisms often levied against NLT for being too abstract, it is clear that both utilitarianism and deontology are hopelessly impractical. How can we hope to calculate the happiness quotient of a given situation, considering the motivations and emotional effects that any and every seemingly insignificant word or action has on ourselves and others? How can we expect to live a life in a dynamic, developing world successfully while slavishly devoted to a small set of personal principles at the expense of others?
Even more damning for both utilitarianism and deontology than their impracticality is that they both rely upon arbitrary determinations of the individual moral agent. Who determines how much happiness a certain action will cause or how valuable happiness for one person over another is? Who determines the power or principle to which our unyielding obedience belongs? Ultimately, their appeal to goodness requires a definition independent of the self. This independent definition of goodness is realized only in the virtues.
A fair objection is, “Well, what about Virtue Ethics?” This is the third classic, historical theory of ethics competing with utilitarianism and deontology. However, Natural Law and Virtue Ethics (VE) both rely upon a recognition of teleology, which means that every substance is ordered toward its final cause, or telos. This includes the power of the moral agent, the will, which is ordered toward its final cause, goodness, as found in the virtues. It also includes every individual action, which has its own final cause. This means that Virtue Ethics does not compete with, but actually complements NLT, so although VE is technically distinct from NLT, it cannot be criticized as an alternative in the same way that utilitarianism and deontology can.
The recognition that every action is ordered toward a built-in purpose is the basis for the natural law. The will performing an action ordered away from, or against, this built-in purpose would make the action itself disordered and therefore morally wrong. For a moral agent to use the will to perform disordered actions would go against the telos, or purpose, of that moral agent. The power of the moral agent would not be realizing its purpose, the good, because it would be working against this purpose by performing disordered actions.
Any criticism one may level against Natural Law Theory, we must look realistically at the alternatives, including the prospective bullets we must bite. And we can leave the calculators at home.



