Grace (gratia, [Gr.] charis), in general, is a supernatural gift of God to intellectual creatures (men, angels) for their eternal salvation, whether the latter be furthered and attained through salutary acts or a state of holiness. Eternal salvation itself consists in heavenly bliss resulting from the intuitive knowledge of the Triune God, who to the one not endowed with grace "inhabiteth light inaccessible" (I Tim., vi, 16). Christian grace is a fundamental idea of the Christian religion, the pillar on which, by a special ordination of God, the majestic edifice of Christianity rests in its entirety. Among the three fundamental ideas—sin, redemption, and grace—grace plays the part of the means, indispensable and Divinely ordained, to effect the redemption from sin through Christ and to lead men to their eternal destiny in heaven. Before the Council of Trent, the Schoolmen seldom used the term gratia actualis, preferring auxilium speciale, motio divina, and similar designations; nor did they formally distinguish actual grace from sanctifying grace. But, in consequence of modern controversies regarding grace, it has become usual and necessary in theology to draw a sharper distinction between the transient help to act (actual grace) and the permanent state of grace (sanctifying grace). For this reason we adopt this distinction as our principle of division in the following exposition of the Catholic doctrine.
I. ACTUAL GRACE
It derives its name, actual, from the Latin actualis (ad actum), for it is granted by God for the performance of salutary acts and is present and disappears with the action itself. Its opposite, therefore, is not possible grace, which is without usefulness or importance, but habitual grace, which causes a state of holiness, so that the mutual relations between these two kinds of grace are the relations between action and state, not those between actuality arid potentiality. Later, we shall discuss habitual grace more fully under the name of sanctifying or justifying grace. As to actual grace, we have to examine: (I) its Nature; (2) its Properties. The third, and difficult, question of the relationship between grace and liberty shall be reserved for discussion in the article Controversies on Grace.
(1) Nature of Actual Grace
To know the nature of actual graced, we must consider both the comprehension and extension of the term. Its comprehension is exhibited to us by (a) its definition; its extension, by the complete enumeration of all Divine helps of grace; in other words, by (b) the logical division of the idea, inasmuch as the sum of all the particulars represents, in every science, the logical extent of an idea or term.
(a) The definition of actual grace is based on the idea of grace in general, which, in Biblical, classical, and modern language, admits of a fourfold meaning. In the first place, subjectively, grace signifies good will, benevolence; then, objectively, it designates every favor which proceeds from this benevolence and, consequently, every gratuitous gift (donum gratuitum, beneficium). In the former (subjective) sense, the king's grace grants life to the criminal condemned to death; in the latter (objective) sense the king distributes graces to his lieges. In this connection grace also stands for charm, attractiveness; as when we speak of the three Graces in mythology, or of the grace poured forth on the lips of the bridegroom (Ps. xliv, 3), because charm calls forth benevolent love in the giver and prompts him to the bestowal of benefactions. As the recipient of graces experiences, on his part, sentiments of gratefulness, and expresses these sentiments in thanks, the word gratioe (plural of gratia) also stands for thanksgiving in the expressions gratias agere and Deo gratias, which have their counterpart in the English, to say grace after meals.
A comparison of these four senses of the word grace reveals a clear relationship of analogy among them, since grace, in its objective signification of "gratuitous gift" or "favor", occupies a central position around which the other meanings may be logically grouped. For the attractiveness of the recipient, as well as the benevolence of the giver is the cause, whereas the expression of thanks which proceeds from the grateful disposition is the effect, of the gratuitous gift of grace. This last-mentioned meaning is, consequently, the fundamental one in grace. The characteristic idea of a free gift must be taken in the strict sense and exclude merit in every form, be it in the range of commutative justice as, e.g., in sale and purchase, or in that of distributive justice, as is the case in the so-called remunerations and gratuities. Hence St. Paul says: "If by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom., xi, 6).
True, even gratuitous Divine gifts may still fall within the range of mere nature. Thus we petition God, under the guidance of the Church, for mere natural graces, as health, favorable weather, deliverance from plague, famine, and war. Now such natural graces, which appear simultaneously as due and gratuitous, are by no means a contradiction in themselves. For, first, the whole creation is for mankind a gratuitous gift of the love of God, whom neither justice nor equity compelled to create the world. And secondly, the individual man can, in virtue of his title of creation, lay a rightful claim only to the essential endowments of his nature. Goods granted over and above this class, though belonging to the just demands of human nature in general, have for him the significance of an actual grace, or favor, as, for example, eminent talents, robust health, perfect limbs, fortitude. We would have omitted mentioning this so-called "grace of creation", had not Pelagius, by emphasizing the gratuitous character of such natural graces, succeeded, at the Synod of Diospolis or Lydda (A.D. 415) in deluding the unsuspecting bishops in regard to the dangers of his heresy. The five African bishops, Augustine among them, in their report to Pope Innocent I, rightly called attention to the fact that Pelagius admitted only the grace through which we are men, but denied grace properly so called, through which we are Christians and children of God. Whenever Scripture and tradition speak simply of grace, reference is made to a supernatural grace which is opposed to natural grace as to its contrary and lies so far beyond all rightful claim and strenuous effort to the creature that it remains positively undue to the already existing nature, because it includes goods of a Divine order, as, e.g., Divine sonship, indwelling of the Spirit, vision of God. Actual grace is of this kind, because, as a means, it stands in intrinsic and essential relation to these Divine goods which are the end. As a consequence, the most important element characteristic of its nature must be the supernatural.
As a further determining factor must be added its necessary derivation from the merits of Christ's redemption; for there is the question of Christian grace. In the Thomist theory of redemption, which considers not Christ, but the Trinity, as the cause of grace in the angels and in our first parents in Paradise, the addition of this new characteristic appears self-explanatory. As to the Scotists, they derive each and every supernatural grace in heaven and on earth solely from the merits of Christ, inasmuch as the God-Man would have appeared on earth even had Adam not sinned. But they, too, are compelled to introduce, in the present dispensation, a distinction between the "grace of Christ" and the "grace of the Redeemer" for the reason that, in their ideal theory, neither the angels nor the inhabitants of Paradise owe their holiness to the Redeemer. The addition, ex meritis Christi, must therefore be included in the notion of actual grace. But there are also merely external graces, which owe their existence to the merits of Christ's redemption—as the Bible, preaching, the crucifix, the example of Christ. One of these, the hypostatic union, marks even the highest point of all possible graces. The Pelagians themselves sought to outdo one another in their encomiums on the excellency of Christ's example and its effectiveness in suggesting pious thoughts and salutary resolutions. They thus endeavored to avoid the admission of interior graces inherent in the soul; for these alone were opposed to Pelagius's proudly virtuous supremacy of the free will (liberum arbitrium), the whole strength of which resided within itself. For this reason the Church all the more emphatically proclaimed, and still proclaims, the necessity of interior grace for which exterior graces are merely a preparation. Yet there are also interior graces which do not procure the individual sanctification of the recipient, but the sanctification of others through the recipient. These, by the extension of the generic term to specifically designate a new subdivision, are, by antonomasia, called gratuitously given graces (gratioe gratis datoe). To this class belong the extraordinary charismata of the miracle-worker, the prophet, the speaker of tongues, etc. (see I Cor., xii, 4 sqq.), as well as the ordinary powers of the priest and confessor. As the object of these graces is, according to their nature, the spread of the kingdom of God on earth and the sanctification of men, their possession in itself does not exclude personal unholiness. The will of God, however, is that personal righteousness and holiness should also distinguish the possessor. With regard to the personal holiness of man, only that interior grace is of importance which is interiorly inherent in the soul and renders it holy and pleasing to God. Hence its name, ingratiating grace (gratia gratum faciens). To this category belongs not only sanctifying, but also actual grace.
Taking into account, then, all the elements so far considered, we may define actual grace as a supernatural help of God for salutary acts granted in consideration of the merits of Christ.—It is called a "help of God for salutary acts", because, on the one hand, it differs from permanent sanctifying grace, in that it consists only in a passing influence of God on the soul, and, on the other, it is destined only for actions which have a necessary relation to man's eternal salvation. It is further called a "supernatural help" so as to exclude from its definition not only all merely natural graces, but also, in a special manner, ordinary Divine conservation and concurrence (concursus generarlis divinus). Finally, the "merits of Christ" are named as its meritorious cause because all graces granted to fallen man are derived from this one source. It is for this reason that the prayers of the Church either invoke Christ directly or conclude with the words: Through Jesus Christ Our Lord.
We have laid down above, as the most important characteristic of the nature of actual (and of every Christian) grace, its supernatural character. This was done partly because a deeper insight into its nature may be gained from the analysis of this element. As pure nature is in itself completely incapable of performing salutary acts through its own strength, actual grace must come to the rescue of its incapacity and supply the deficient powers, without which no supernatural activity is possible. Actual grace thus becomes a special causal principle which communicates to impotent nature moral, and especially physical, powers.
Grace, as a moral cause, presupposes the existence of obstacles which render the work of salvation so difficult that their removal is morally impossible without special Divine help. Grace must be brought into operation as healing grace (gratia sanans, medicinalis); free will, bent towards the earth and weakened by concupiscence, is yet filled with love of good and horror of evil. The consciousness of the necessity of this moral influence may become so perfect that we beg of God the grace of a violent victory over our evil nature; witness the celebrated prayer of the Church: "Ad to nostras, etiam rebelles, compelle propitius voluntates" (Vouchsafe to compel our wills to Thee, albeit they resist). In the ordinary course of things the Divine inspiration of joy in virtue and aversion from sin will, no doubt, methodically lead to the free performance of salutary acts; but the moral influence of grace can effect the temporary control of freedom in the sinner. The sudden conversion of the Apostle Paul is an illustration of this. It will be readily understood that the above-mentioned triumph over the obstacles to salvation demands in itself a grace which is natural only in substance, but supernatural in mode. Hence many theologians require even for the so-called state of pure nature (which never existed) such natural graces as are mere remedies against the fomes peccati of natural concupiscence. The end of supernatural bliss and the consequently necessary endowment with supernatural means of grace would not have existed in this state (status naturoe puroe), but the disastrous results of an evil tendency unbridled would have been experienced to the same extent as after the fall.
More important than the moral causality of grace is its physical causality, for man must also receive from God the physical power to perform salutary works. Without it, activity in the order of salvation is not only more difficult and laborious, it is altogether impossible. The feet of a child, to draw a comparison from actual life, may he so weak that a mere moral influence, such as the holding out of a beautiful toy, will not suffice to enable it to walk without the physical support of the mother—the use of the leading-strings. The latter situation is the one in which man is placed with regard to supernatural activity.
From the question which is to be discussed later, and which regards the metaphysical necessity of grace for all salutary acts, whether of an easy or difficult nature, it follows, with irresistible logic, that the incapacity of nature cannot be ascribed solely to a mere weakened condition and moral difficulties resulting from sin, but that it must be attributed also, and principally, to physical inability. The communication of the physical power to the soul admits, theologically, of only one interpretation, namely, that grace raises the faculties of the soul (intellect and will) above their natural constitution into a supernatural sphere of being and thus renders them capable of substantially supernatural operations. The reason why, through our inner consciousness, we can gain no psychological knowledge of this higher activity of the soul lies in the fact that our self-consciousness extends solely to the acts, and in no wise to the substance, of the soul. From this same fact arises the philosophical necessity of proving the spirituality, the immortality, and the very existence of the human soul from the characteristic nature of its activity. Inexorable theological logic postulates the supernatural nature of the acts tending towards our salvation, because theological faith, for example, "the beginning, foundation, and source of all justification", must certainly be of the same supernatural order as the intuitive vision of God to which it ultimately leads. The necessity of the physical causality of grace, as is readily seen, is nowise dependent on the existence of concupiscence, but remains just as imperative for our first parents in their state of innocence and for the angels subject to no evil tendency. Actual grace, therefore, considered under this aspect, bears the name of "elevating grace" (gratia elevans), though not in a sense which would exclude from it the possibility of simultaneously fulfilling the moral function of healing grace in the present state of man. It is only after these considerations that the comprehension of the nature of actual grace in all its relations becomes possible, that we may say, with Perrone: Actual grace is that unmerited interior assistance which God, in virtue of the merits of Christ, confers upon fallen man in order to strengthen, on the one hand, his infirmity resulting from sin and, on the other, to render him capable, by elevation to the supernatural order, of supernatural acts of the soul, so that he may attain justification, persevere in it to the end, and thus enter into everlasting life.
(b) The Logical Division of actual grace should enumerate all the kinds to which the definition is universally applicable. If we adopt the different faculties of the soul as our principle of division, we shall have three kinds: graces of the intellect, of the will, and of the sensitive faculties. With regard to the consent of the will we distinguish two pairs of graces: first, preventing and cooperating; then efficacious and merely sufficient grace. It must be immediately shown that all these graces are no arbitrarily invented entities, but actually existing realities.
(a) Graces of the Different Faculties of the Soul.—The illuminating grace of the intellect (gratia illuminationis, illustrationis) first presents itself for consideration. It is that grace which in the work of salvation suggests good thoughts to the intellect. This may happen in a twofold manner, either mediately or immediately. The existence of mediate graces of the mind is not only vouched for a priori by the presence of merely external graces, as when a stirring sermon or the sight of the crucifix forces the sinner to earnest reflection; it is also explicitly attested by Holy Writ, where the "commandment of the Lord" is represented as "enlightening the eyes" (Ps. xviii, 9), and the external example of Christ as a model for our imitation (I Pet., ii, 21). But, as this mediate grace need neither interrupt the psychological course of the law governing the association of ideas nor be of a strictly supernatural nature, its sole object will be to prepare unostentatiously the way for a grace of greater importance and necessity, immediate illuminating grace. In the latter, the Holy Ghost Himself through immediate elevation and penetration of the powers of the mind prompts the soul and manifests to it in a supernatural light the eternal truths of salvation. Though our sacred discourses be perfect masterpieces of eloquence, though our picture of the wounds of the crucified Savior be ever so vivid and realistic, they alone can never be the first step towards the conversion of a sinner, except when God by a vigorous impulse stirs the heart and, according to an expression of St. Fulgenius (Ep. Xvii, De incarn. Et grat., n. 67) "opens the ear of the interior man" St. Paul acknowledges, also, that the faith which his own preaching and that of his disciple Apollo had sown in Corinth, and which, under their "planting and watering" (mediate grace of preaching), had taken root, would have miserably perished, had not God himself given "the increase". (See I Cor., iii, 6: "Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit, sed Deus incrementum dedit.") Among the Fathers of the Church none has more strongly emphasized the fruitlessness of preaching without interior illumination than the Doctor of Grace, Augustine, who says among other things: "Magisteria forinsecus adjutoria quaedam sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet qui Gorda tenet" ("Instruction and admonition help somewhat externally, but he who reaches the heart has a place in heaven"—(Tract. III, 13, in I Joh.). The more speculative question may now be asked: Whether the mediate and immediate grace of the mind affects the idea, the judgment, or the reasoning. There can be no doubt that it primarily influences the judgment (judicium), be the latter theoretical (e.g. on the credibility of revelation) or practical (e.g. regarding the hideous character of sin). But the reasoning process and the idea (apprehensio) may also become a grace of the mind, firstly, because they both belong to the essence of human knowledge, and grace always operates in a manner conformable to nature; secondly, because ideas are in final analysis but the result and fruit of condensed judgments and reasonings.
Besides the grace of the mind, the strengthening grace of the will (generally called gratia inspirationis) plays not only the most important, but an indispensable, part, for no works of salvation are even thinkable without operations of the will. It may also be either mediate or immediate, according as the pious affections and wholesome resolutions are awakened in the soul by the immediately preceding illumination of the mind or by God Himself (by appropriation the Holy Ghost). Owing to the psychological interpenetration of cognition and volition, every (mediate or immediate) grace of the mind is in itself also a grace affecting the will. This twofold action—on intellect and will—has therefore the significance of two different acts of the soul, but of only one grace. Consequently, immediate elevation and motion of the will by the Holy Spirit can alone be considered a new grace. The Pelagians logically denied the existence especially of this grace, even if, according to the improbable opinion of some historians of dogma, they were forced by Augustine in the course of the debate to admit at least the immediate grace of the mind. Augustine threw in the whole weight of his personality in favor of the existence and necessity of the grace of the will, to which he applied the names, delectatio coelestis, inspiratio dilectionis, cupiditas boni, and the like. The celebrated Provincial Council of Carthage (A. D. 418) confirmed his teaching when it declared that grace does not simply consist in the manifestation of the Divine precepts whereby we may know our positive and negative duties, but it also confers upon us the power to love and accomplish whatever we have recognized as righteous in things pertaining to salvation (cf. Denzinger, "Enchiridion", 10th ed., n. 104, Freiburg, 1905). The Church has never shared the ethical optimism of Socrates, which made virtue consist in mere knowledge, and held that mere teaching was sufficient to inculcate it. If even natural virtue must be fought for, and is acquired only through energetic work and constant practice, how much more does not a supernatural life of virtue require the Divine help of grace with which the Christian must freely cooperate, and thus advance by slow degrees in perfection. The strengthening grace of the will, like the grace of the mind, assumes the form of vital acts of the soul and manifest itself chiefly in what are called affections of the will. Scholastic psychology eumerates eleven such affections: namely: love and hatred, delight and sadness, desire and aversion, hope an despair, daring and fear, finally, anger. This whole list of feelings has, with the sole exception of despair, which imperils the work of salvation, a practical significance in relation to good and evil; these affections may therefore develop into real graces of the will. But, inasmuch as all motions of the will may be ultimately reduced to love as fundamental feeling (cf. St. Thomas, "Summa", I—II, Q. xxv, a.2), the functions of the grace of the will may be systematically focused in love; hence the concise declaration of the above-mentioned Synod of Carthage (l.c.): "Cum cit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus et diligere ut faciamus" (Since both are gifts of God—the knowing what we ought to do, and the desire to do it). But care must be taken not to understand immediately, by this "love", perfect love of God, which comes only at the end of the process of justification as the crowning-stone of the edifice, even though Augustine (De Trinit., VIII, 10, and frequently) honors with the name caritas the mere love for good and any good motion of the will whatsoever. Berti (De theol. discipl., XIV, 7), therefore, is wrong when he asserts that, according to Augustine, the only grace properly so called is the theological virtue of charity. Are faith, hope, contrition, fear, only graces improperly so called, or do they become graces in the true sense only in connection with charity?
It cannot be determined with certainty of faith whether to the graces of mind and will so far spoken of should be added special actual graces affecting the sensitive faculties of the soul. But their existence may be asserted with great probability. For if, according to an appropriate remark of Aristotle (De animae, I, viii), it is true that thinking is impossible without imagination, supernatural thought also must find its originator and point of support in a corresponding phantasm to which, like the ivy on the wall, it clings and thus creeps upward. At any rate, the harmonious agreement of the grace of the intellect with the accompanying phantasm can but be of favorable influence on the soul visited by grace. It is likewise clear that in the rebellious motions of concupiscence, which reside in the sensitive faculties, the grace of the will has a dangerous enemy which must be overcome by the infusion of contrary dispositions, as aversion from sin, before the will is aroused to make firm resolutions. Paul, consequently, thrice besought the Lord that the sting of the flesh might depart from him, but was answered: "Sufficit tibi gratia mea" (II Cor., xii, 9).
(Œ?) Graces regarding Free Will.—If we take the attitude of free will as the dividing principle of actual grace, we must first have a grace which precedes the free determination of the will and another which follows this determination and cooperates with the will. This is the first pair of graces, preventing and cooperating grace (gratia proeveniens et cooperans). Preventing grace must, according to its physical nature, consist in unfree, indeliberate vital acts of the soul cooperating grace, on the contrary, solely in free, deliberate actions of the will. The latter assume the character of actual graces, not only because they are immediately suggested by God, but also because they may become, after the achievement of success, the principle of new salutary acts. In this manner an intense act of perfect love of God may simultaneously effect and, as it were, assure by itself the observance of the Divine commandments. The existence of preventing grace, officially determined by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. v), must be admitted with the same certainty as the facts that the illuminating grace of the intellect belongs to a faculty not free in itself and that the grace of the will must first and foremost exhibit itself in spontaneous, deliberate, unfree emotions. This is proved by the Biblical metaphors of the reluctant hearing of the voice God (Jer., xvii, 23; Ps. xciv, 8), of the drawing by the Father (John, vi 44), of the knocking at the gate (Apoc., iii, 20). The Fathers of the Church bear witness to the reality of preventing grace in their very appropriate formula "Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis", that is, grace as a vital act is in the soul, but as an unfree, salutary act it does not proceed from the soul, but immediately from God. Thus Augustine (De grat. et lib. arbitr., xvii 33), Gregory the Great (Moral., XVI, x), Bernard of Clairvaux (De grat. et lib. arbitr., xiv), and others. As the unfree emotions of the will are by their very nature destined to elicit free salutary acts, it is clear that preventing grace must develop into helping or cooperating grace as soon as free will gives its consent. These free salutary acts are, according to the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. xvi), not only actual graces, but also meritorious actions (actus meritorii). There is just as little doubt possible regarding their existence as concerning the fact that many men freely follow the call of grace, work out their eternal salvation, and attain the beatific vision, so that the dogma of the Christian heaven proves simultaneously the reality of cooperating graces. Their principal advocate is Augustine (De grat. et lib. arbitr., xvi, 32). If the more philosophical question of the cooperation of grace and liberty be raised, it will be easily perceived that the supernatural element of the free salutary act can be only from God, its vitality only from the will. The postulated unity of the action of the will could evidently not be safeguarded, if God and the will performed either two separate acts or mere halves of an act. It can exist only when the supernatural power of grace transforms itself into the vital strength of the will, constitutes the latter as a free faculty in actu primo by elevation to the supernatural order, and simultaneously cooperates as supernatural Divine concurrence in the performance of the real salutary act or actus secundus. This cooperation is not unlike that of God with the creature in the natural order, in which both perform together one and the same act, God as first cause (causa prima), the creature as secondary cause (causa secunda). For further particulars see St. Thomas, "Contra Gent.", III, lxx.
A second pair of graces important for the understanding of the controversies on grace is that of efficacious and merely sufficient grace (gratia efficax et mere sufficiens). By efficacious grace is understood that Divine assistance which, considered even in actu primo, includes with infallible certainty, and consequently in its definition, the free salutary act; for did it remain inefficacious, it would cease to be efficacious and would therefore be self-contradictory. As to whether the infallibility of its success is the result of the physical nature of this grace or of the infallible foreknowledge of God (scientia media) is a much debated question between Thomists and Molinists which need not be further treated here. Its existence, however, is admitted as an article of faith by both sides and is established with the same firmness as the predestination of the elect or the existence of a heaven peopled with innumerable saints. As to "merely sufficient grace", Calvinists and Jansenists have, as is well known, eliminated it from their doctrinal system. They admitted only efficacious graces whose action overpowers the will and leaves no room for freedom. If Jansen (d. 1638) nominally admitted "sufficient grace", calling it "little grace" (gratia parva), he understood by it, in reality, only "insufficient grace", i.e. "one from which no action can result, except its insufficiency be removed by another grace" (De grat. Christ., IV, x). He did not shrink from reviling sufficient grace, understood in the Catholic sense, as a monstrous conception and a means of filling hell with reprobates, while later Jansneists discovered in it such a pernicious character as to infer the appropriateness of the prayer: "A gratiae sufficiente, libera nos Domine" ("From sufficient grace, O Lord deliver us".—Cf. prop. damn. ab Alex. VIII, a. 1690 in Denzinger, n. 1296). The Catholic idea of sufficient grace is obtained by the distinction of a twofold element in every actual grace, its intrinsic energy (potestas agendi, vis) and its extrinsic efficiency (efficientia). Under the former aspect there exists between sufficient and efficacious grace, both considered in actu primo, no real, but only a logical, distinction; for sufficient grace also confers full power for action, but is condemned to unfruitfulness owing to the free resistance of the will. If, on the contrary, extrinsic efficiency be considered, it is evident that the will either cooperates freely or not. If it refuses its cooperation, even the strongest grace remains a merely sufficient one (gratia mere sufficiens) although by nature it would have been completely sufficient (gratia vere sufficiens) and with good will could have been efficacious. This ecclesiastical conception of the nature of sufficient grace, to which the Catholic systems of grace must invariably conform themselves, is nothing else but a reproduction of the teaching of the Bible. To cite only one text (Prov., i 24), the calling and the stretching-out of the hand of God certainly signifies the complete sufficiency of grace, just as the obstinate refusal of the sinner "to regard" is tantamount to the free rejection of the proffered hand. Augustine is in complete agreement with the constant tradition on this point, and Jansenists have vainly claimed him as one of their own. We have an example of his teaching in the following text "Gratia Dei est quae hominum adjuvat voluntates quae ut non adjuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo" ("It is the grace of God that helps the wills of men; and when they are not helped by it, the reason is in themselves, not in God."—"De pecc. men et rem." II, xvii). On the Greek Fathers see Isaac Habert Theologia Graecor. Patrum, II, 6 sq. (Paris, 1646).
(2) Properties of Actual Grace
After the treatment of the nature of actual grace, we come logically to the discussion of its properties. These are three in number: necessity, gratuity, and universality.
(a) Necessity.—With the early Protestants and Jansenists, the necessity of actual grace may be so exaggerated as to lead to the assertion of the absolute and complete incapacity of mere nature to do good or, with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, it may be so understood as to extend the capacity of nature to each and every thing, even to supernatural activity, or at least to its essential elements. The three heresies o early Protestantism and Jansenism, Pelagianism, and Semipelagianism furnish us with the practical division which we adopt for the systematic exposition of the Catholic doctrine.
(a) We maintain against Early Protestantism and Jansenism the capacity of mere nature in regard to both religious knowledge and moral action. Funda-mental for natural religion and ethics is the article of faith which asserts the power of mere reason to derive a certain natural knowledge of God from creation (Vatican., Sess. III, de revelat., can. i). This is a central truth which is most clearly attested by Scripture (Wisdom, xiii, 1 sqq.; Rom., i, 20 sq.; ii, 14 sq.) and tradition (see God). Unswervingly adhering to this position, the Church has ever exhibited herself as a mighty defender of reason and its inherent power against the ravages of scepticism so subversive of all truth. Through the whole course of centuries she has steadfastly clung to the unalterable conviction that a faculty of perception constituted for vision, like human reason, cannot possibly be condemned to blindness, and that its natural powers enable it to know, even in the fallen state, whatever is within it legitimate sphere. On the other hand, the Church also erected against presumptuous Rationalism and Theosophism a bulwark for the defense of knowledge by faith, a knowledge superior to, and different in principle from rational knowledge. With Clement of Alexandria she drew a sharp distinction between gnosis and pistis—knowledge and faith, philosophy and revelation, assigning to reason the double role of indispensable forerunner and docile handmaid (cf. Vati can., Sess. III, cap. iv). This noble struggle of the Church for the rights of reason and its true relation to faith explains historically her decidedly hostile attitude towards the scepticism of Nicholas de Ultricuria (A.D. 1348), towards the Renaissance philosophy of Pomponatius (1513) defending a "twofold truth" towards the so-called "log-stick-and-stone" theory (Klotz-Stock-und-Steintheorie) of Martin Luther an his followers, so inimical to reason, towards the doctrine of the complete powerlessness of nature without grace defended by Baius and Jansen, towards the system of Hermes impregnated with Kantian criticism, towards traditionalism, which based all moral and religious knowledge on the authority of language and instruction, finally, against the modern Agnosticism of the Modernists, which undermines the very foundations of faith, and which was only recently dealt so fatal a blow by Pope Pius X's condemnation. Documentary evidence has thus been produced that the Catholic Church far from being an "institution of obscurantism", has at all times fulfilled a powerful and far-reaching mission of civilization, since she took reason and science under her powerful patronage and defended their rights against those very oppressors of reason who are accustomed to bring against her the groundless charge of intellectual inferiority. A sound intellectualism is just as indispensable a condition of her life as the doctrine of a supernatural order raised above all the limits of nature. (Cf. Chastel, "De la valeur de la raison humaine", Paris, 1854.)
Not less reasonable an attitude was assumed by the Church respecting the moral capabilities of fallen man in the domain of natural ethics. Against Baianism, the forerunner of Jansenism, she adhered in her teaching to the conviction confirmed by healthy experience, that natural man is capable of performing some naturally good works without actual grace, and particularly without the grace of faith, and that not all the deeds of infidels and pagans are sins. This is evidenced by the condemnation of two propositions of Baius by Pope Pius V in the year 1567: "Liberum arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adjutorio nonnisi ad peccandum valet" ("Free will without the aid of God's grace avails for nothing but sin."—Prop. xxvii); and again: "Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia" ("All the acts of infidels are sins, and their virtues are vices."—Prop. 25). The history of paganism and everyday experience condemn, moreover, with equal emphasis these extravagant exaggerations of Baius. Among the duties of the natural moral law some—as love for parents or children, abstention from theft and drunkenness—are of such an elementary character that it is impossible to perceive why they could not be fulfilled without grace and faith at least by judicious, cultured, and noble-minded pagans. Did not the Savior himself recognize as something good natural human love and fraternal greeting, such as they exist also among publicans and pagans? He denied to them only a supernatural reward (mercedem, Matt., v, 46 sq.). And Paul has explicitly stated that "the Gentiles, who have not the [Mosaic] law, do by nature [naturaliter, phusei] those things that are of the law" (Rom., ii, 14). The Fathers of the Church did not judge differently. Baius, it is true, adduced Augustine as his chief witness, and in the latter's writings we find, to be sure, sentences which seem to favor him. Baius, however, overlooked the fact that the former rhetorician and Platonic idealist of Hippo does not always weigh every word as carefully as the wary Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, but consciously delights (cf. Enarr, in Ps. xcvi, n. 19) in antonomastically applying to genus the designate which belongs only to the highest species. As he calls the least good motion of the will caritas, by anticipation, so he brands every unmeritorious work (opus steriliter bonum) as sin (peccaturn) and false virtue (falsa virtus). In both cases it is an obvious use of the rhetorical figure called catachresis. With a strong perception for the ethically good, wherever it may be found, he eulogizes elsewhere the chastity of his heathen friend Alypius (Confess., VI, x) and of the pagan Polemo (Ep. cxl, 2), admires the civil virtues of the Romans, the masters of the world (Ep. cxxxviii, 3), and gives expression to the truth that even the most wicked man is not found completely wanting in naturally good works ("De Spiritu et literae", c. xxviii.—Cf. Ripalda, "De Ente supernaturali", tom. III: "Adversus Baium et Baianos", Cologne, 1648; J. Ernst, "Werke and Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach Augustinus", Freiburg, 1871).
The ethical capacity of pure, and especially of fallen, nature has undoubtedly also its determined limits which it cannot overstep. In a general manner, the possibility of the observance of the easier natural precepts without the aid of natural or supernatural grace may be asserted, but not the possibility of the observance of the more difficult commandments and prohibitions of the natural law. The difficulty of determining where the easy ends and the difficult begins will naturally lead, in some secondary questions, to great diversity of opinion among theologians. In fundamental points, however, harmony is easily obtainable and exists in fact. In the first place, all without exception are agreed on the proposition that fallen man cannot of his own strength observe the natural law in its entirety and for a long time without occasional errors and lapses into grievous sin. And how could he? For, according to the council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. xiii), even the already justified man will be victorious in the "conflict with the flesh, the world, and the devil" only on condition that he cooperate with never-failing grace (cf. Rom., vii, 22 sqq.). Secondly, all theologians admit that the natural will, unaided by Divine assistance, succumbs, especially in the fallen state, with moral (not physical) necessity to the attack of vehement and enduring temptations against the Decalogue. For could it by its own strength decide the conflict in its own favor even at the most critical moments, that power which we have just eliminated would be restored to it, namely the power to observe unaided, through the prompt victory over vehement temptations, the whole natural law in all its extent. The practical significance of this second universally admitted proposition lies in the acknowledgment that, according to revelation, there is no man on earth who does not occasionally meet with this or that grievous temptation to mortal sin, and even the justified are no exception to this law; wherefore, even they are bound to constant vigilance in fear and trembling and to never-ceasing prayer for Divine assistance (cf. Council of Trent, 1. c.). In the third question, whether natural love of God, even in its highest form (amor Dei naturalis perfectus), is possible without grace, the opinions of theologians are still very divergent. Bellarmine denies this possibility on the ground that, without any grace, a mere natural justification could in such a case be brought into being through the love of God. Scotus, on the contrary, spiritedly defends the attainability of the highest natural love for God. A golden middle course will easily open to the one who accurately distinguishes between affective and effective love. The affective element of the highest love is, as natural duty, accessible to the mere natural will without grace. Effective love, on the contrary, since it supposes an unchanging, systematic, and active will, would entail the above-discarded possibility of triumphing over all temptations and of observing the whole moral law. (For further details on these interesting problems, see Pohle "Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", 4th ed., II, 364-70, Paderborn,1909.)
According to Jansenism, the mere absence of the state of grace and love (status gratioe et caritatis) branded as sins all the deeds of the sinner, even the ethically good ones (e.g., almsgiving). This was the lowest ebb in its disparagement and depreciation of the moral forces in man; and here, too, Baius had paved the way. The possession of sanctifying grace or theological love thus became the measure and criterion of natural morality. Taking as his basis the total corruption of nature through original sin (i.e. concupiscence) as taught by early Protestantism, Quesnel, especially (Prop. xliv in Denzinger, n. 1394), gave the above-expressed thought the alleged Augustinian form that there is no medium between love of God and love of the world, charity and concupiscence, so that even the prayers of the impious are nothing else but sins. (Cfr. Prop. xlix: "Oratio impiorum est novum peccatum et quod Deus illis concedit, est novum in eos judicium"). The answer of the Church to such severe exaggerations was the dogmatic Bull, "Unigenitus" (1713), of Pope Clement XI. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. vii) had however already decreed against Martin Luther: "Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quae ante justificationem fiunt...vere esse peccata ...anathema sit" (If anyone shall say that all the works done before justification are indeed sins, let him be anathema). Moreover, what reasonable man would concede that the process of justification with its so-called dispositions consists in a long series of sins? And if the Bible, in order to effect the conversion of the sinner, frequently summons him to contrition and penance, to prayer and almsdeeds, shall we admit the blasphemy that the Most Holy summons him to the commission of so many sins?—The Catholic doctrine on this point, obstinately adhered to through all the centuries, is so clear that even an Augustine could not have departed from it without becoming a public heretic. True, Baius and Quesnel succeeded in cleverly concealing their heresy in a phraseology similar to the Augustinian, but without penetrating the meaning of Augustine. The latter, it must be conceded, in the course of the struggle with self-confident Pelagianism, ultimately so strongly emphasized the opposition between grace and sin, love of God and love of the world, that the intermediary domain of naturally good works almost completely disappeared. But Scholasticism had long since applied the necessary correction to this exaggeration. That the sinner, in consequence of his habitual state of sin, must sin in everything, is not the doctrine of Augustine. The universality of sin in the world which he contemplated, is not for him the result of a fundamental necessity, but merely the manifestation of a general historical phenomenon which admits of exceptions (De spir. et lit., c. xxvii, n. 48). He specifically declares marital love, love of children and friends to be something lawful in all men, something commendable, natural and dutiful, even though Divine love alone leads to heaven. He admits the possibility of these natural virtues also in the impious: "Sed videtis, istam caritatem esse posse et impiorum, i.e. paganorum, Judaeorum, haereticorum" (Serm. cccxlix de temp. in Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 1529).
(B) Pelagianism, which still survives under new forms, fell into the extreme directly opposed to the theories rejected above. It exaggerated the capacity of human nature to an incredible degree, and hardly left any room for Christian grace. It amounted to nothing less than the divinization of the moral forces of free will. Even when it was question of acts tending to supernatural salvation, natural will was declared able to rise by its own strength from justification to eternal life. Rank naturalism in its essence, Pelagianism contained, as a logical consequence, the supression of original sin and the negation of grace. It laid down the proud assertion that the sovereign will may ultimately raise itself to complete holiness and impeccability (impeccantia, anamartesia) through the persevering observance of all precepts, even the most difficult, and through the infallible triumph over very temptation, even the most vehement. This was an unmistakable reproduction of the ancient Stoic ideal of virtue. For the self-confident Pelagian, the petition of the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation", served, properly speaking, no purpose: it was at most a proof of his humility, not a profession of the truth. In no other part of the system is the vanity of the Christian Diogenes so glaringly perceptible through the lacerated cloak of the philosopher. Hence the Provincial Synod of Carthage (418) insisted on the true doctrine on this very point (see Denzinger, nn. 106-8) and emphasized the absolute necessity of grace for all salutary acts. True, Pelagius (d. 405) and his disciple Coelestius, who found an active associate in the skillful and learned Bishop Julian of Eclanum, admitted from the beginning the improper creative grace, later also a merely external supernatural grace, such as the Bible and the example of Christ. But the heresiarch rejected with all the more obstinacy the inner grace of the Holy Ghost, especially for the will. The object of grace was, at the most, to facilitate the work of salvation, in no wise to make it fundamentally possible. Never before had a heretic dared to lay the axe so unsparingly to the deepest roots of Christianity. And never again did it occur in ecclesiastical history that one man alone, with the weapons of the mind and ecclesiastical science, overthrew and annihilated in one generation an equally dangerous heresy. This man was Augustine. In the short period between A.D. 411 and A.D. 413 no fewer than twenty-four synods were held which considered the heresy of Pelagius. But the death-blow was dealt as early as 416 at Mileve, where fifty-nine bishops, under the leadership of St. Augustine, laid down the fundamental canons which were subsequently (418) repeated at Carthage and received, after the celebrated "Tractoria" of Pope Zosimus (418), the value of definitions of faith. It was there that the absolute necessity of grace for salvation triumphed over the Pelagian idea of its mere utility, and the absolute incapacity of nature over supreme self-sufficiency. When Augustine died, in 430, Pelagianism was dead. The decisions of faith issued at Mileve and Carthage were frequently renewed by ecumenical councils, as in 529 at Orange, lastly at Trent (Sess. VI, can. ii).
The beautiful parable of the vine and its branches (John, xv, 1 sqq.) should have been sufficient to reveal to Pelagianism what a striking contrast there was between it and antecedent Christianity. Augustine and the synods time and again used it in the controversy as a very decisive proof out of the mouth of the Savior Himself. Only when the supernatural vital union of the Apostles with the vine (Christ) planted by the Father is established, does it become possible to bring forth supernatural fruit; for "without me you can do nothing" (John, xv, 5). The categorical assertion of the necessity of grace for the holy Apostles themselves brings home to us still more forcibly the absolute incapacity of mere fallen nature in the performance of salutary acts. All supernatural activity may be concretely summed up in the three following elements: salutary thoughts, holy resolves, good actions. Now the Apostle Paul teaches that right thinking is from God (II Cor., iii, 5), that the righteous will must be based on Divine mercy (Rom., ix, 16), finally that it is God who works in us, "both to will and to accomplish" (Phil., ii, 13). The victorious struggle of St. Augustine, which earned for him the honorable title of "Doctor of Grace", was merely a struggle for the ancient Catholic truth. Pelagianism was immediately felt in the Christian community as a thorn in the flesh and a poison of novelty. Before all the world Augustine could attest: "Talis est haeresis pelagiana, non antiqua, sed ante non multum tempus exorta" (Such is the Pelagian heresy, not ancient, but having sprung up a short time ago."—De grat., et lib. arbitr., c. iv). In fact, the teaching of the most ancient Fathers of the Church, e.g. Irenaeus (Adv. haer., III, xvii, 2), did not differ from that of Augustine, although it was less vigorous and explicit. The constant practice of prayer in the ancient Church pointed significantly to her lively faith in the necessity of grace, for prayer and grace are correlative ideas, which cannot be separated. Hence the celebrated axiom of Pope Celestine I (d. 432): "Ut legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi" ("That the law of prayer may determine the law of belief".—See Denzinger, n. 139). It is clearly evident that the Fathers of the Church wished the universally expressed necessity of grace to be understood not merely as a moral necessity for the strengthening of human weakness, but as a metaphysical one for the communication of physical powers. For in their comparisons they state that grace is not less necessary than are wings for flying, the eyes for seeing, the rain for the growth of plants, etc. In accordance with this, they also declare that, in as far as supernatural activity is concerned, grace is just as indispensable for the angels not subject to concupiscence, and was for man before the fall, as it is for man after the sin of Adam.
There is need of special refutation of Pelagius's presumptuous contention that man is capable of avoiding unaided during his whole lifetime all sins; nay, that he can even rise to impeccability. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xxiii), with much more precision than the Synod of Mileve (416), answered this monstrosity with the definition of faith: "Si quis hominem semel justificatum dixerit ... posse in totae vitae peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare, nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beatae Virgine tenet ecclesia, anathema sit" (If anyone shall say that a man once justified...can, throughout his life, avoid all sins, even venial ones, unless by a special privilege of God, as the Church believes of the Bl. Virgin Mary, let him be anathema).
This celebrated canon presents some difficulties of thought which must be briefly discussed. In its gist it is an affirmation that not even the justified, much less the sinner and infidel, can avoid all sins, especially venial ones, through his whole life except by special privilege such as was granted to the Mother of God. The canon does not assert that besides Mary other saints, as St. Joseph or St. John the Baptist, possessed this privilege. Almost all theologians rightly consider this to be the sole exception, justified only by the dignity of the Divine maternity. Justice is done to the wording of the canon, if by totae vita we understand a long period, about a generation, and by peccata venialia chiefly the semi-deliberate venial sins due to surprise or precipitancy. It is in no way declared that a great saint is unable to keep free from all sin during a short interval, as the interval of a day; nor that he is incapable of avoiding for a long time with ordinary grace and without special privilege all venial sins committed with full deliberation or complete liberty. The same must be said with still greater reason of mortal sins, although the preservation of baptismal innocence may be of rare occurrence. The expression, omnia peccata, must be understood collectively, as applying to the sum, and not distributively, as meaning each individual sin, which would no longer be a sin if it could not be avoided in every instance. For the same reason the words, non posse, designate not a physical, but a moral impossibility of avoiding sin, i.e. a difficulty based on insuperable obstacles which only a special privilege could suppress. The meaning is, therefore: The observer of a long series of temptations in the life of a just man will find that at some time or other, today or tomorrow, the will held captive by concupiscence will succumb with moral necessity. This may be due to negligence, surprise, weariness, or moral weakness—all of which are factors that do not completely destroy the freedom of the will and thus admit at least of a venial sin. This hard truth must naturally grieve a proud heart. But it is precisely to curb pride, that most dangerous enemy of our salvation, and to nourish in us the precious virtue of humility, that God permits these falls into sin. Nothing incites us more powerfully to vigilance and perseverance in prayer than the consciousness of our sinfulness and infirmity. Even the greatest saint must, therefore, pray daily not out of hypocrisy or self-deception, but out of an intimate knowledge of his heart: "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors" (Matt., vi, 12). A holy Apostle had to acknowledge of himself and his intimate friends: "In many things we all offend" (James, iii, 2). Boldly could the hagiographer in the Old Testament raise the question not difficult of answer: "Who can say: My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?" (Proverbs, xx, 9). This view, defended by the Bible, was also the constant sentiment of the Fathers of the Church, to whom the proud language of the Pelagians was unknown. To the latter's consideration Augustine (De nat. et grat., xxxvi) presents the impressive thoughts: "Could we bring together here in living form all the saints of both sexes and question them whether they were without sin, would they not exclaim unanimously: `If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us'?" (I John, i, 8.)
(g) Semipelagianism is an unsuccessful attempt to effect a compromise between Pelagianism and Augustinism, attributing to mere nature and its capabilities a somewhat greater importance in matters pertaining to salvation than Augustine was willing to concede. Several pious monks of Marseilles (hence also the name of "Massilians"), John Cassian (d. 432) at their head, held (about A.D. 428) the following opinion of the relationship between nature and grace: (I) A distinction must be established between "the beginning of faith" (initium fidei) and "increase in the faith" (augmentum frdei); the former may be referred to the natural power of free will, while increase in the faith and faith itself can only be the work of Christian grace. (2) Nature can merit grace through its own efforts, but this natural merit (meritum natures) is only founded in equity, it does not confer, as Pelagius contended, a right in strict justice. (3) "Final perseverance" (donum perseverantioe) specifically can be secured by the justified with their own strength, and is therefore not a special grace. (4) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in children is dependent on their conditional future merits or demerits, which the Omniscience of God foresaw not historically, but hypothetically from eternity.—Although this last proposition is philosophically false, the Church has never condemned it as heretical; the first three theses, on the contrary, have been rejected as opposed to Catholic teaching.
Informed by his disciples, Prosper and Hilary, of events at Marseilles, Augustine energetically set to work, in spite of his advanced age, and wrote his two books against the Semipelagians: "De Praedestinatione sanctorum" and "De dono perseverantiae". Simultaneously he humbly acknowledged that he had the misfortune of having professed similar errors previously to his episcopal consecration (A.D. 394). He attacked resolutely, though with mildness and moderation, all the positions of his adversaries, rightly looking upon their attitude as a relapse into the already defeated Pelagianism. After Augustine's death, his disciples resumed the struggle. They succeeded in interesting in their cause Pope Celestine I, who, in his dogmatic writing to the bishops of Gaul (431), laid down as a rule of faith the fundamental teaching of St. Augustine on original sin and grace. But as this so-called "Indiculus" was issued more as a papal instruction than as an ex cathedrae definition, the controversy still continued for almost a century, until St. Caesarius of Arles convoked the Second Synod of Orange (A.D. 529). This synod received the solemn confirmation of Pope Boniface II (530) and was thus vested with ecumenical authority. (According to the opinion of Scheeben and Gutberlet this confirmation extended only to the first eight canons and the epilogue.) From now on Semipelagianism, also, was proscribed as heresy, and Augustinism was completely victorious.
In the refutation of Semipelagianism, in so far as the necessity of actual grace is concerned, it will not be amiss to follow an adult through all the stages on the way to salvation, from the state of unbelief and mortal sin to the state of grace and a happy death. With regard, first, to the period of unbelief, the Second Synod of Orange (can. v) decreed that prevenient grace is absolutely necessary to the infidel not only for faith itself, but also for the very beginning of faith. By the "beginning of faith", it intended to designate all the good aspirations and motions to believe which precede faith properly so called, as early dawn precedes sunrise. Consequently, the whole preparation for the faith is made under the influence of grace, e.g. the instruction of persons to be converted. The accuracy of this view is confirmed by the Bible. According to the assurance of the Savior, external preaching is useless if the invisible influence of grace (the being drawn by the Father) does not set in to effect the gradual "coming" to Christ (John, vi, 44). Were faith rooted in mere nature, were it based on mere natural inclination to believe or on natural merit, nature could legitimately glory in its own achievement of the work of salvation in its entirety, from faith to justification—nay, to beatific vision itself. And still Paul (I Cor., iv, 7; Eph., ii, 8 sq.) abominates nothing so much as the "glorying" of nature. Although Augustine could substantiate his doctrine by references to the anterior Fathers of the Church, as Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of Nazianzus, he seems to have been embarrassed by the Semipelagian appeal to the Greeks, chiefly Chrysostom. He pleaded the circumstances of the time (De praed. sanctor., c. xiv). In fact, difference of doctrine between the East and the West cannot be denied. With delight could the Semipelagians quote from Chrysostom passages like the following: "We must first select good and then God adds what appertains to his office; he does not act antecedently to our will so as not to destroy our liberty" (Hom. xii in Hebr., n. 3). How must this attitude of the Eastern Church be explained?—To gain a correct notion of the then existing circumstances, it must be remembered that the Greeks had to defend not only grace, but almost more so the freedom of the will. For the anti-Christian systems of Gnosticism, Manichaeism, and neo-Platonism—all products of the East—stood completely under the spell of the liberty destroying philosophy of fatalism. In such an environment it was important to preserve intact the freedom of the will even under the influence of grace, to arouse slothful nature from the fatalistic sleep, and to recommend the ascetical maxim: "Help yourself, and Heaven will help you." It may have been imprudent to leave the necessity of prevenient grace altogether in the background because of false considerations of timeliness, and to insist almost exclusively on cooperating grace while silently presupposing the existence of prevenient grace. But was Chrysostom opposing a Pelagius or a Cassian? In fact he also knew and admitted prevenient grace, as when he writes: "You do not hold of yourself, but you have received from God. Hence you have received what you possess, and not only this or that, but everything you have. For these are not your own merits, but the grace of God. Although you cite faith, you owe it nevertheless to call." (Hom. xii in I Cor.). Chrysostom was always orthodox in the doctrine on grace.
After the triumph over unbelief, the process of justification begins with faith and concludes only with the infusion of sanctifying grace and theological love. The question is whether, on this arduous road, grace must precede and cooperate with every salutary step of the believing sinner. The negative attitude of the Semipelagians, who ascribed the dispositions for justification to the natural efforts of free will, was proscribed as heretical at Orange (can. vii) and again at Trent (Sess. VI, can. iii). Rightly so. For the thoroughly supernatural sonship of God (filiatio adoptiva), which ultimately terminates the process of justification, can be attained only through absolutely supernatural acts, for the performance of which nature without grace is physically incapable. Hence the Bible, besides faith, also refers other dispositions, as "hope" (Rom., xv, 13) and "love" (I John, iv, 7) explicitly to God as their author: and tradition has unswervingly adhered to the priority of grace (cf. St. Augustine, "Enchir.", xxxii). Once the adult has finally reached the state of grace after a happy termination of the process of justification, the obligation devolves upon him of complying with many negative and positive duties in order to preserve sanctifying grace, persevere in virtue until the end, and gain heaven after a happy death. Will he be capable of accomplishing all this without a constant stream of actual graces? It might appear so. For the justified person is, through the possession of sanctifying grace and supernatural virtues, permanently maintained in the supernatural order. It is not unnatural, therefore, to admit, prescinding from final perseverance, that he is enabled by his supernatural habit to perform salutary actions. This is in reality the teaching of Molina, Bellarmine, Billot, and others. But to this view Perrone (De gratiae, n. 203) rightly objects that Holy Writ makes no distinction between the different degrees of the work of salvation, that Augustine (De nat. et grat., xxiv) proclaims the constant need of grace also for the "healthy" and "justified", and finally that the Church requires an uninterrupted influence of grace even for the good works of the just, and puts in the mouths of all Christians without exception the prayer: "Actiones nostras, quaesumus Domine, aspirando praeveni et adjuvando prosequere", etc. And does not concupiscence, which remains also in the justified, stand in need of at least healing grace? Moreover, no passive habit puts itself in motion, but, like a well-tuned harp, must be, as it were, brought into play by some external agency. It might be added that nature, raised to a permanent supernatural state, still retains its natural activity and consequently requires a supernatural impulse for supernatural actions.
The most important concern, however, which the just man must take to heart is final perseverance, because it is a decided characteristic of the predestined and assures entrance into heaven with infallible certainty. The Semipelagian delusion that this great grace may be due to the initiative and power of the just was refuted, after the Second Synod of Orange (can. x), chiefly by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xxii) in the following proposition of faith: "Si quis dixerit, justificatum ... sine speciali auxilio Dei in acceptae justitiae perseverare posse ..., anathema sit." Here, also, the explanation of some difficulties will facilitate the correct interpretation of the canon. Final perseverance, in its most perfect sense, consists in the untarnished preservation of baptismal innocence until death. In a less strict sense it is the preservation of the state of grace from the last conversion until death. In both senses we have what is called perfect perseverance (perseverantia perfecta). By imperfect, perseverance (perseverantia imperfecta) must be understood the temporary continuance in grace, e.g., for a month or a year, until the commission of the next mortal sin. We must distinguish also between passive and active perseverance, according as the justified dies in the state of grace, independently of his will, as baptized children and the insane, or actively cooperates with grace whenever the state of grace is imperilled by grievous temptations. The Council of Trent had, above all, this latter Cage in view, since it speaks of the necessity of a special assistance (auxilium speciale), which can designate nothing else but an actual grace or rather a whole series of these. This "special grace" is, consequently not conferred with the possession of sanctifying grace nor is it to be confounded with ordinary graces, nor finally to be looked upon as a result of the mere power of perseverance (posse perseverare). Hence, as a new and special grace, it ultimately is but a continuous series of efficacious (not merely sufficient) graces combined with a particular external protection of God against fall into sin and with the final experience of a happy death. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. xvi) is therefore justified in speaking of it as a great gift—"magnum donum". The Bible extols final perseverance, now as a special grace not included in the bare notion of justification (Phil., i, 6; I Pet., i, 5), now as the precious fruit of special prayer (Matt., xxvi, 41; John, xvii, 11; Col., iv, 12). Augustine (De dono persev., c. iii) used the necessity of such prayer as a basis of argumentation, but added, for the consolation of the faithful, that, while this great grace could not be merited by good works, it could by persevering, genuine prayer be obtained with infallible certainty. Hence the practice of pious Christians to pray daily for a good death can never be too earnestly commended.
(b) Gratuity.—Beside the necessity of actual grace, its absolute gratuity stands out as the second fundamental question in the Christian doctrine on this subject. The very name of grace excludes the notion of merit. But the gratuity of specifically Christian grace is so great and of such a superior character that even mere natural petition for grace or positive natural dispositions cannot determine God to the bestowal of his supernatural assistance. A mere negative preparation or mere negative dispositions, on the contrary, which consist only in the natural removal of obstacles, are in all probability not essentially opposed to gratuity. Owing to its gratuitous character, grace cannot be earned by strictly natural merit either in strict justice (meritum de condigno) or as a matter of fitness (meritum de congruo). But is not this assertion in conflict with the dogma that the just man can, through supernatural works, merit de condigno an increase in the state of grace and eternal glory, just as the sinner can, through salutary acts, earn de congruo justification and all graces leading up to it? That it is not, will be clearly evident if it be remembered that the merits springing from supernatural grace are no longer natural, but supernatural (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. xvi). The absolute gratuity of grace is, therefore, safeguarded if it is referred to the initial grace (prima gratia vocans), with which the work of salvation begins, and which is preceded by pure and mere nature. For it then follows that the whole subsequent series of graces, up to justification, is not and cannot be merited any more than the initial grace. We shall now briefly examine the gratuity of grace in its several degrees as indicated above.
(a) The gratuitous character of grace categorically excludes real and strict natural merit with a rightful claim to just compensation as well as merit improperly so called implying a claim to reward as a matter of fitness. The meritorious character of our actions in the former sense was defended by the Pelagians, while the Semipelagia advocated it in the latter meaning. To this twofold error the infallible teaching authority of the Church opposed the dogmatic declaration that the initial grace preparatory to justification is in no wise due to natural merit as a determining factor (Cf. Second Synod of Orange, epilogue; Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. v). The categorical synodal expression, nullis proecedentibus meritis, wards off from grace, as a poisonous breath, not only the Pelagian condign merit, but also the Semipelagian congruous merit. The presupposition that grace can be merited by natural deeds involves a latent contradiction. For it would be attributing to nature the power to bridge over with its own strength the chasm lying between the natural and the supernatural order. In powerfully eloquent words does Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, declare that the vocation to the Faith was not granted to the Jews in consequence of the works of the Mosaic Law, nor to the pagans because of the observance of the natural moral law, but that the concession was entirely gratuitous. He inserts the harsh statement: "Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth" (Rom., ix, 18). The Doctor of Grace, Augustine (De peccato orig., xxiv, 28), like a second Paul, advocates the absolute gratuity of grace, when he writes: "Non enim gratia Dei erit ullo modo, nisi gratuita fuerit omni modo" (For it will not be the grace of God in any way unless it has been gratuitous in every way). He lays stress on the fundamental principle: "Grace does not find the merits in existence, but causes them", and substantiates it decisively thus: "Non gratia ex merito, sed meritum ex gratiae. Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti, non gratis accepisti" (Not grace by merit, but merit by grace. For if grace by merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis.—Serm. 169, c. II). Not even Chrysostom could be suspected of Semipelagianism, as he thought in this matter precisely like Paul and Augustine.
(Œ?) While natural merit suppresses the idea of gratuity in grace, the same cannot be affirmed of natural prayer (preces naturoe, oratio naturalis), as long as we do not ascribe to it any intrinsic right to be heard and to God a duty to answer it—a right and duty which are undoubtedly implied in supernatural petitions (cf. John, xvi, 23 sq.). Prayer does not, like merit, appeal to the justice or equity of God, but to his liberality and mercy. The sphere of influence of prayer is consequently much more extensive than the power of merit. The gratuity of Christian grace is, nevertheless, to be understood so strictly that pure nature cannot obtain even the smallest grace by the most fervent prayer. Such is the doctrine asserted by the Second Synod of Orange (can. iii) against the Semipelagians. It is based on a positive Divine decree and can no longer be deduced from the intrinsic impossibility of the contrary. It is therefore permissible, without prejudice to the Faith, to adopt Ripalda's opinion (De ente supernat., disp. xix, sect. 3), which holds that, in an economy of salvation different from the present, natural prayer for grace would be entitled to be heard. How little this is the case in the present dispensation is best learned from the language of the Bible. We are told that in our infirmity "we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings" (Rom. viii, 26; cf. I Cor., xii, 3). The supernatural union with Christ is, moreover, represented as the indispensable condition of every successful petition (John, xv, 7). Every wholesome prayer being in itself a salutary act, it must, according to antecedent statements, spring from prevenient grace. Augustine (De dono persev., xxiii, 64) in vivid descriptions brings home to the Semipelagians their delusion in thinking that true prayer comes from us and not from God who inspires it.
On an almost identical level with natural prayer stand the positive preparation and dispositions to grace (capacitas, sive proeparatio positiva). It often occurs in human, life that the positive disposition to a natural good includes in itself a certain claim to satisfaction, as, e.g. thirst of itself calls for quenching. This is still more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive preparation for the good in question. Thus the student has acquired by his preparation for the examination a certain claim to be sooner or later admitted to it. But how about grace? Does there exist in man a positive disposition and a claim to grace in the sense that the withholding of this expected blessing would sensibly injure and bitterly disappoint the soul? Or can man, unaided, positively dispose himself for the reception of grace, confident that God will reward his natural efforts with the bestowal of supernatural grace? Both suppositions are untenable. For, according to the express teaching of the Apostle Paul and of the Fathers of the Church, the gratuity of grace is rooted solely in the supreme freedom of the Divine will, and the nature of man possesses not even the slightest claim to grace. As a consequence, the relapse into Semipelagianism is unavoidable as soon as we seek in the positive disposition or preparation a cause for the bestowal of grace. It should be remembered, moreover, that nature is never found in its pure form, but that, from the beginning, mankind is defiled by original sin. This consideration still more forcibly puts before us the necessity of denying to sinful nature the power to draw down upon itself, like an arid region, the effusion of Divine grace, either by its natural constitution or its own endeavors.
(Œ?) Negative disposition or preparation (capacitas sive proeparatio negativa) designates, in general, the absence or removal of obstacles which are an impediment to the introduction of a new form, as green wood is dried up to become fit for burning. The question arises, whether the requirement of such merely negative natural preparation is reconcilable with the absolute gratuity of grace. Some of the earlier Schoolmen cited in answer the celebrated much-debated axiom: Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam (To the one who does what in him lies, God does not deny grace). If among the proposed interpretations of this proposition we adopt the one asserting that, in consequence of the commendable endeavors of the natural will, God does not withhold from anyone the first grace of vocation, we necessarily fall into the Semipelagian heresy refuted above. In order systematically to exclude this contingency, many Schoolmen thus interpreted the axiom with St. Thomas (Summa, I—II, Q. cix, a. 6): "To the one who accomplishes what he can with the help of supernatural grace God grants further and more powerful graces up to justification." But, interpreted in this manner, the axiom offers nothing new and has nothing to do with the above-proposed question. There remains, therefore, a third interpretation: God, out of mere liberality, does not withhold His grace from the one who accomplishes what he can with his natural moral strength, i.e. from the one who, by deliberate abstention from offenses, seeks to dispose God favorably towards him and thus prepares himself negatively for grace. Some theologians (e.g. Vasquez, Glossner) declared even this most mitigated and mildest interpretation to be Semipelagian. Most modern theological authorities, however, with Molina, Suarez, and Lessius, see in it nothing else but the expression of the truth: To the one who prepares himself negatively and places no obstacle to the ever-ready influence of grace, God in general is more inclined to offer his grace than to another who wallows in the mire of sin and thus neglects to accomplish what lies in his power. In this manner the cause of the distribution of grace is located not in the dignity of nature, but, conformably to orthodoxy, in the universal will of God to save mankind.
(c) Universality.—The universality of grace does not conflict with its gratuity, if God, in virtue of his will to save all men, distributes with sovereign liberty his graces to adults without exception. But if the universality of grace is only a result of the Divine will to save all mankind, we must first turn our attention to the latter as the basis of the former.
(a) By the "will to save" (voluntas Dei salvifica) theologians understand the earnest and sincere will of God to free all men from sin and lead them to super-natural happiness. As this will refers to human nature as such, it is a merciful will, also called "first" or "antecedent will" (voluntas prima sive antecedens). It is not absolute, but conditional, inasmuch as no one is saved if he does not will it or does not comply with the conditions laid down by God for salvation. The "second" or "consequent will" (voluntas secunda sive consequens), on the contrary, can only be absolute, i.e. a will of justice, as God must simply reward or punish according as one has deserved by his works heaven or hell.—We consider here solely the "antecedent will" to save; regarding the will of justice see Predestination.
Against the error of the Calvinists and Jansenists the ecclesiastical teaching authority (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, can. xvii; Prop. v Jansenii damn., in Denzinger, n. 827, 1096) proclaimed in the first place the doctrine that God seriously wills the salvation not of the predestined only, but also of other men. As the Church obliged all her faithful to the recital of the passage of the creed, "Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis", it is also established with certainty of faith that at least all the faithful are included in the universality of salvation willed by God. Not to mention the touching scene in which Jesus weeps over the impenitent Jerusalem (cf. Matt., xxiii, 37), the following is the declaration of the Savior himself respecting believers: "For God so loved the world, as to give his only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John, iii, 16). Far from limiting the will to save to these two classes of men, the predestined and believers, theologians adhere to the theological conclusion that God, without regard to original sin, wills the eternal salvation of all the posterity of Adam. The range of this will certainly extends further than the circle of believers, the eternal reprobation of many of whom is a notorious fact. For Pope Alexander VIII (1690) condemned the proposition that Christ died "for all the faithful and only for them" (pro omnibus et soils fidelibus.—See Denzinger, n. 1294). The foreknowledge of original sin is no reason for God to except some men from his will of redemption, as the Calvinist sect called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians (from infra, or post, lapsum) asserted in Holland against the strictly Calvinist opinion of those called Supralapsarians or Antelapsarians (from supra, or ante, lapsum.—See Arminianism). In proof of the Catholic contention, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. ii) rested on the Biblical text which exhibits the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ as offered not only for our sins, "but also for those of the whole world" (I John, ii, 2). We possess, besides, two classical Scriptural passages which exclude all doubt. The Book of Wisdom (xi, 24 sqq.) eulogizes in stirring language the all-exceeding mercy of God and bases its universality on the omnipotence of God (quia omnia potes), on his universal domination (quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia, quae fecisti), and on his love for souls (qui amas animas). Wherever, therefore, Divine omnipotence and domination extend, wherever immortal souls are to be found, thither also the will to grant salvation extends, so that it cannot be exclusive of any human being. After St. Paul (I Tim., ii, 1 sqq.) has ordained prayers for all men and proclaimed them "acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who will have all men to be saved" (omnes homines vult salvos fieri), he adds a threefold motivation: "For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus: who gave himself a redemption for all" (I. c.). Hence it is just as true that the will to grant salvation extends to all men as it is that God is the God of all men, and that Christ as mediator assumed the nature of all men and redeemed them on the Cross. In regard to tradition, Passaglia, as early as 1851, brilliantly demonstrated the universality of this Divine intention from two hundred Fathers of the Church and ecclesiastical writers. Augustine alone presents some difficulty. It may, however, be considered as certain today that the great Bishop of Hippo interpreted in the year 412 the Pauline text with all the other Fathers of the Church in the sense of a universal will to save all men without exception and that subsequently he never explicitly retracted this view (De spir. et lit., xxiii, 58). But it is equally certain that from 421 onwards (cf. Enchir., xxvii, 103; Contr. Julian., IV, viii, 42; De corr. et grat., xv, 47) he attempted such tortuous and violent interpretations of the clear, unmistakable text that the Divine will regarding human salvation was no longer universal, but particular. The mystery can only be solved by the admission that Augustine still believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible (cf. Confess., XII, xvii sqq.). To avoid the necessity of imputing to the Holy Ghost the inspiration of contradictions in the same text, he conceived in his three divergent interpretations the Divine will concerning salvation as the "second" or "consequent will", which, as absolute will destining men to eternal happiness, must naturally be particular, no less than the consequent will affecting the reprobate (cf. J. B. Faure, "Notae in Enchir. s. Augustini", c. 103, p. 195 sqq., Naples, 1847). The most difficult problem concerning this Divine will to save all men, a real crux theologorum, lies in the mysterious attitude of God towards children dying without baptism. Did God sincerely and earnestly will the salvation also of the little ones who, without fault of their own, fail to receive the baptism of water or blood and are thus forever deprived of the beatific vision? Only a few theologians (e.g. Bellarmine, Vasquez) are bold enough to answer this question in the negative. Either invincible ignorance, as among the pagans, or the physical order of nature, as in still-births, precludes the possibility of the administration of baptism without the least culpability on the part of the children. The difficulty lies, therefore, in the fact that God, the author of the natural order, eventually declines to remove the existing obstacles by means of a miracle. The well-meant opinion of some theologians (Arrubal, Kilber, Mannens) that the whole and full guilt falls in all instances not on God, but on men (for example, on the imprudence of the mothers), is evidently too airy an hypothesis to be entitled to consideration. The subterfuge of Klee, the writer on dogma, that self-consciousness is awakened for a short time in dying children, to render baptism of desire possible to them, is just as unsatisfactory and objectionable as Cardinal Cajetan's admission, disapproved of by Pius X, that the prayer of Christian parents, acting like a baptism of desire, saves their children for heaven. We are thus confronted with an unsolved mystery. Our ignorance of the manner does not destroy, however, the theological certainty of the fact. For the above-cited Biblical texts are of such unquestionable universality that it is impossible to exclude a priori millions of children from the Divine will to save humankind.—Cf. Bolgeni, "Stato dei bambini morti senza battesimo" (Rome, 1787); Didiot, "Ungetauft verstorbene Kinder, Dogmatische Trostbriefe" (Kempen, 1898); A. Seitz, "Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche" (Freiburg, 1903), pp. 301 sqq.
(Œ?) The universality of grace is a necessary consequence of the will to save all men. For adults this will transforms itself into the concrete Divine will to distribute "sufficient" graces; it evidently involves no obligation on God to bestow only "efficacious" graces. If it can be established, therefore, that God grants to the three classes of the just, sinners, and infidels truly sufficient graces for their eternal salvation, the proof of the universality of grace will have been furnished. Without prejudice to this universality, God may either await the moment of its actual necessity before bestowing grace, or He may, even in time of need (e.g. in vehement temptation), grant immediately only the grace of prayer (gratia orationis sive remote sufficiens). But in the latter case he must be ever ready to confer immediate grace for action (gr. operationis s. proxime sufficiens), if the adult has made a faithful use of the grace of prayer.
So far as the category of the just is concerned, the heretical proposition of Jansen, that "the observance of some commandments of God is impossible to the just for want of grace" (see Denzinger, n. 1092), had already been exploded by the anathema of the Council of Trent (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, can. xviii). In fact Holy Writ teaches concerning the just, that the yoke of Jesus is sweet, and His burden light (Matt., xi, 30), that the commandments of God are not heavy (I John, v, 3), that "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it" (I Cor., x, 13). These statements warrant not only the full possibility of the observance of the Divine commandments and the triumph over vehement temptations; they virtually express simultaneously the concession of the necessary grace without which all these salutary acts are known to be absolutely impossible. It is true that in the polemical writings of some Fathers of the Church against the Pelagians and Semipelagians we read the proposition: "The grace of God is not granted to all." But a closer examination of the passages immediately reveals the fact that they speak of efficacious, not of sufficient, grace. This distinction is expressly stated by the anonymous writer of the fifth century whom Pope Gelasius commends as an "experienced ecclesiastical teacher" (probatus ecclesioe magister). In his excellent work "De vocatione gentium", he differentiates the "general" (benignitas Dei generalis) and the "particular" economy of grace (specialis misericordia), referring the former to the distribution of sufficient, the latter to that of efficacious, graces. We come to the second class, that of Christian sinners, among whom we reckon apostates and formal heretics, as these can hardly be placed on a par with the heathen. In their valuation of the distribution of grace, theologians distinguish somewhat sharply between ordinary sinners (among whom they include habitual and relapsing sinners) and those sinners whose intellect is blinded, and whose heart is hardened, the so-called obdurate sinners (obcoecati et indurati, impoenitentes). The bestowal of grace on the former group is, they say, of a higher degree of certainty than its concession to the latter, although for both the universality of sufficient grace is beyond any doubt. Not only is it said of sinners in general: "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live" (Ezech., xxxiii, 11), and again: "The Lord ... dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance" (II Peter, iii, 9), but even the obdurate and impenitent sinners are energetically summoned by the Bible to dutiful penance or at least are most vehemently reprimanded because of their wickedness (Is., lxv, 2; Rom., ii, 4; Acts, vii, 51). Now where a duty of conversion exists, the necessary grace must be at hand without which no conversion is possible. For, as Augustine (De nat. et grat., xliii, n. 50) affirms: "Deus impossibilia non jubet" (God does not give impossible orders). Obduracy, however, forms such a powerful obstacle to conversion that some ancient theologians embraced the untenable opinion that God finally completely withdraws from these sinners, a withdrawal due to His mercy, which desires to save them from a more severe punishment in hell. But St. Thomas Aquinas (De verit.,. Q. xxiv, a. 11) stated that "complete obduracy" (obstinatio perfecta), or absolute impossibility of conversion, begins only in hell itself; "incomplete obduracy", on the contrary, ever presents on earth in the enfeebled moral affections of the heart a point of contact through which the appeal of grace may obtain entrance. Were the rigorist opinion of God's complete abandonment of the obdurate correct, despair of God's mercy would be perfectly justified in such souls. The Catholic catechism, however, presents this as a new grievous sin.
The third and last question arises: Is the grace of God also conceded to the heathen? The Divine readiness to grant assistance also to the heathen (see Denzinger, n. 1295, 1379) is a certain truth confirmed by the Church against the Jansenists Arnauld and Quesnel. To question it is to deny the above-demonstrated intention of God to save all men; for the overwhelming majority of mankind would fall outside its range. The Apostle of the Gentiles, Paul (Rom., ii, 6 sqq.), lays stress on God's impartiality towards Jews and Greeks, without "respect of persons", on the Day of Judgment, when he will reward also the Greek "that worketh good" with eternal life. The Fathers of the Church, as Clement of Rome (I ep. ad Cor., vii), Clement of Alexandria (Cohort. ad gent., 9), and Chrysostom (Horn. viii in John, n. 1), do not doubt the dispensation of sufficient graces to the nations "that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death". Orosius (De arbitr. libert., n. 19), a disciple of St. Augustine, proceeds se far in his optimism as to believe in this distribution of grace "quotidie per ternpora, per dies, per momenta, per aroma et cunctis et singulis" (daily through the seasons, through the days, through the moments, through the smallest possible divisions of time, and to all men and every man). But the clearer the fact, the more obscure the manner. In what way, one instinctively asks, did God provide for the salvation of the heathen? Theologians today generally give the following presentation of the process: It is presupposed that, according to Hebr., xi, 6, the two dogmas of the existence of God and of future retribution must be, in all instances, believed not only by necessity of means (necessitate medii), but also with explicit faith (fide explicita) before the process of justification can be initiated. As a consequence, God will not refrain in extraordinary cases from miraculous intervention in order to save a noble-minded heathen who conscientiously observes the natural moral law. He may either, in a miraculous manner, depute a missionary to him (Acts, i, 1 sqq.), or teach him the revealed "truths through an angel (Cardinal Toletus), or he may come to his assistance by an interior private revelation. It is clear, nevertheless, that these different ways cannot be considered as everyday ordinary means. For the multitude of heathen this assistance must be found in a universal means of salvation equally independent of wonderful events and of the preaching of Christian missionaries. Some modern theologians discover it in the circumstance that the two dogmas mentioned above were already contained in the primitive supernatural revelation made in Paradise for all mankind. These truths were subsequently spread over the whole world, survive, as a meagre remnant, in the traditions of the pagan nations, and are orally transmitted from generation to generation as supernatural truths of salvation. The knowableness of these dogmas by unaided reason does not constitute an objection, for they are simultaneously natural and revealed truths. Once the condition of external preaching (cf. Rom., x, 17: "fides ex auditu") has thus been fulfilled, it only remains for God to hasten to man's assistance with his supernatural illuminating and strengthening grace and to initate with the faith in God and retribution (which implicitly includes all else necessary for salvation) the process of justification. In this manner the attainment of the state of grace and of eternal glory becomes possible for the heathen who faithfully cooperates with the grace of vocation. However all this may be, one thing is certain: every heathen who incurs eternal damnation will be forced on the last day to the honest confession: "It is not for want of grace, but through my own fault that I am lost."
(For the relation between grace and liberty, see Controversies on Grace.)
II. SANCTIFYING GRACE
Since the end and aim of all efficacious grace is directed to the production of sanctifying grace where it does not already exist, or to retain and increase it where it is already present, its excellence, dignity, and importance become immediately apparent; for holiness and the sonship of God depend solely upon the possession of sanctifying grace, wherefore it is frequently called simply grace without any qualifying word to accompany it as, for instance, in the phrases "to live in grace" or "to fall from grace".
All pertinent questions group themselves around three points of view from which the subject may be considered:—
(1) The preparation for sanctifying grace, or the process of justification.
(2) The nature of sanctifying grace.
(3) The characteristics of sanctifying grace.
(1) Preparation for Sanctifying Grace, or the Process of Justification
(for exhaustive treatment of justification see article on Justification)
The word justification (justificatio, from justum facere) derives its name from justice (justitia), by which is not merely meant the cardinal virtue in the sense of a constant purpose to respect the rights of others (suum cuique), nor is the term taken in the concept of all those virtues which go to make up the moral law, but connotes, especially, the whole inner relation of man to God as to his supernatural end. Every adult soul stained either with original sin or with actual mortal sin (children are of course excepted) must, in order to arrive at the state of justification, pass through a short or long process of justification, which may be likened to the gradual development of the child in its mother's womb. This development attains its fullness in the birth of the child, accompanied by the anguish and suffering with which this birth is invariably attended; our rebirth in God is likewise preceded by great spiritual sufferings of fear and contrition.
In the process of justification we must distinguish two periods: first, the preparatory acts or dispositions (faith, fear, hope, etc.); then the last, decisive moment of the transformation of the sinner from the state of sin to that of justification or sanctifying grace, which may be called the active justification (actus justificationis); with this the real process comes to an end, and the state of habitual holiness and sonship of God begins. Touching both of these periods there has existed, and still exists, in part, a great conflict of opinion between Catholicism and Protestantism. This conflict may be reduced to four differences of teaching. By a justifying faith the Church understands qualitatively the theoretical faith in the truths of Revelation, and demands over and above this faith other acts of preparation for justification. Protestantism, on the other hand, reduces the process of justification to merely a fiduciary faith; and maintains that this faith, exclusive even of good works, is all-sufficient for justification, laying great stress upon the scriptural statement sola fides justificat. The Church teaches that justification consists of an actual obliteration of sin and an interior sanctification. Protestantism, on the other hand, makes of the forgiveness of sin merely a concealment of it, so to speak; and of the sanctification a forensic declaration of justification, or an external imputation of the justice of Christ. In the presentation of the process of justification, we willeverywhere note this fourfold confessional conflict.
(a) The Fiduciary Faith of the Protestants
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vi, and can. xii) decrees that not the fiduciary faith, but a real mental act of faith, consisting of a firm belief in all revealed truths makes up the faith of justification and the "beginning, foundation, and source" (loc. cit., cap. viii) of justification. What did the Reformers with Luther understand by fiduciary faith? They understood thereby not the first or fundamental deposition or preparation for the (active) justification, but merely the spiritual grasp (instrumentum) with which we seize and lay hold of the external justice of Christ and with it, as with a mantle of grace, cover our sins (which still continue to exist interiorly) in the infallible, certain belief (fiducia) that God, for the sake of Christ, will no longer hold our sins against us. Hereby the seat of justifying faith is transferred from the intellect to the will; and faith itself, in as far as it still abides in the intellect, is converted into a certain belief in one's own justification. The main question is: "Is this conception Biblical?" Murray (De gratia, disp. x, n. 18, Dublin, 1877) states in his statistics that the word fides (pistis) occurs eighty times in the Epistle to the Romans and in the synoptic Gospels, and in only six of these can it be construed to mean fiducia. But neither here nor anywhere else does it ever mean the conviction of, or belief in, one's own justification, or the Lutheran fiduciary faith. Even in the leading text (Rom., iv, 5) the justifying faith of St. Paul is identical with the mental act of faith or belief in Divine truth; for Abraham was justified not by faith in his own justification, but by faith in the truth of the Divine promise that he would be the "father of many nations" (cf. Rom., iv, 9 sqq.). In strict accord with this is the Pauline teaching that the faith of justification, which we must profess "with heart and mouth", is identical with the mental act of faith in the Resurrection of Christ, the central dogma of Christianity (Rom., x, 9 sq.), and that the minimum expressly necessary for justification is contained in the two dogmas: the existence of God, and the doctrine of eternal reward (Heb., xi, 6).
The Redeemer Himself made belief in the teaching of the Gospel a necessary condition for salvation, when he solemnly commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel to the whole world (Mark, xvi, 15). St. John the Evangelist declares his Gospel has been written for the purpose of exciting belief in the Divine Sonship of Christ, and links to this faith the possession of eternal life (John, xx, 31). Such was the mind of the Christian Church from the beginning. To say nothing of the testimony of the Fathers (cf. Bellarmine, De justific., I, 9), Saint Fulgentius, a disciple of St. Augustine, in his precious booklet, "De verae fide ad Petrum", does not understand by true faith a fiduciary faith, but the firm belief in all the truths contained in the Apostles' Creed, and he calls this faith the "Foundation of all good things", and the "Beginning of human salvation" (loc. cit., Prolog.). The practice of the Church in the earliest ages, as shown by the ancient custom, going back to Apostolic times, of giving the catechumens (katechoumenoi from katechein, vivae voce instruere) a verbal instruction in the articles of faith and of directing them, shortly before baptism, to make a public recitation of the Apostles' Creed, strengthens this view. After this they were called not fiduciales but fideles, in contra-distinction to infideles and hoeretici (from aireisthai, to select, to proceed eclectically) who rejected Revelation as a whole or in part.
In answer to the theological question: How many truths of faith must one expressly (fide explicitae) believe under command (necessitate proecepti) ? theologians say that an ordinary Catholic must expressly know and believe the most important dogmas and the truths of the moral law, for instance, the Apostles Creed, the Decalogue, the six precepts of the Church, the Seven Sacraments, the Our Father. Greater things are, of course, expected from the educated, especially from catechists, confessors, preachers, wherefore upon these the study of theology rests as an obligation. If the question be put: In how many truths as a means (necessitate medii) must one believe to be saved? many catechists answer Six things: God's existence; an eternal reward; the Trinity; the Incarnation; the immortality of the soul; the necessity of Grace. But according to St. Paul (Heb., xi, 6) we can only be certain of the necessity of the first two dogmas, while the belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation could not of course be exacted from ante-Christian Judaism or from Paganism. Then, too, belief in the Trinity may be implicitly included in the dogma of God's existence, and belief in the Incarnation in the dogma of the Divine providence, just as the immortality of the soul is implicitly included in the dogma of an eternal reward. However, there arises for any one baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, and entering thus the Church of Christ, the necessity of making an act of explicit faith (fides explicita). This necessity (necessitas medii) arises per accidens, and is suspended only by a Divine dispensation in cases of extreme necessity, where such an act of faith is either physically or morally impossible, as in the case of pagans or those dying in a state of unconsciousness. For further matter on this point see Pohle, "Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", 4th ed., II, 488 sqq. (Paderborn, 1909).
(b) The Sola-fides doctrine of the Protestants
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. ix) decrees that over and above the faith which formally dwells in the intellect, other acts of predisposition, arising from the will, such as fear, hope, love, contrition, and good resolution (loc. cit., cap. vi), are necessary for the reception of the grace of justification. This definition was made by the council as against the second fundamental error of Protestantism, namely that "faith alone justifies" (solo fides justificat).
Martin Luther stands as the originator of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, for he hoped that in this wise he might be able to calm his own conscience, which was in a state of great perturbation, and consequently he took refuge behind the assertion that the necessity of good works over and above mere faith was altogether a pharisaical supposition. Manifestly this did not bring him the peace and comfort for which he had hoped, and at least it brought no conviction to his mind; for many times, in a spirit of honesty and sheer good nature, he applauded good works, but recognized them only as necessary concomitants, not as efficient dispositions, for justification. This was also the tenor of Calvin's interpretation (Institutes, III, 11, 19). Luther was surprised to find himself by his unprecedented doctrine in direct contradiction to the Bible, therefore he rejected the Epistle of St. James as "one of straw" and into the text of St. Paul to the Romans (iii, 28) he boldly inserted the word alone. This falsification of the Bible was certainly not done in the spirit of the Apostle's teaching, for nowhere does St. Paul teach that faith alone (without charity) will bring justification, even though we should accept as also Pauline the text given in a different context, that supernatural faith alone justifies, but the fruitless works of the Jewish Law do not.
In this statement St. Paul emphasizes the fact that grace is purely gratuitous; that no merely natural good works can merit grace; but he does not state that no other acts in their nature and purport predisposing are necessary for justification over and above the requisite faith. Any other construction of the above passage would be violent and incorrect. If Luther's interpretation were allowed to stand, then St. Paul would come into direct contradiction not only with St. James (ii,24 sqq.), but also with himself; for except St. John, the favorite Apostle, he is the most outspoken of all Apostles in proclaiming the necessity and excellence of charity over faith in the matter of justification (cf. I Cor., xiii, 1, sqq.). Whenever faith justifies it is not faith alone, but faith made operative and replenished by charity (cf. Gal., v, 6, "fides, quae per caritatem operatur"). In the plainest language the Apostle St. James says this: "ex operibus justificatur homo, et non ex fide tantum" (James, ii, 24); and here, by works, he does not understand the pagan good works to which St. Paul refers in the Epistle to the Romans, or the works done in fulfilment of the Jewish Law, but the works of salvation made possible by the operation of supernatural grace, which was recognized by St. Augustine (lib. LXXXIII, Q. lxxvi, n. 2). In conformity with this interpretation and with this only is the tenor of the Scriptural doctrine, namely, that over and above faith other acts are necessary for justification, such as fear (Ecclus., i, 28), and hope (Rom., viii, 24), charity (Luke, vii, 47), penance with contrition (Luke, xiii, 3; Acts, ii, 38; iii, 19), almsgiving (Dan., iv, 24; Tob., xii, 9). Without charity and the works of charity faith is dead. Faith receives life only from and through charity (James, ii, 26). Only to dead faith (fides informis) is the doctrine applied: "Faith alone does not justify". On the other hand, faith informed by charity (fides formata) has the power of justification. St. Augustine (De Trinit., XV, 18) expresses it pithily thus: "Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse, sed non et prodesse." Hence we see that from the very beginning the Church has taught that not only faith but that a sincere conversion of heart effected by charity and contrition is also requisite for justification—witness the regular method of administering baptism and the discipline of penance in the early Church.
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. viii) has, in the light of Revelation, assigned to faith the only correct status in the process of justification, inasmuch as the council, by declaring it to be the "beginning, the foundation, and the root", has placed faith at the very front in the whole process.
Faith is the beginning of salvation, because no one can be converted to God unless he recognize Him as his supernatural end and aim, just as a mariner without an objective and without a compass wanders aimlessly over the sea at the mercy of wind and wave.
Faith is not only the initiatory act of justification, but the foundation as well, because upon it all the other predisposing acts rest securely, not in geometric regularity or inert as the stones of a building rest upon a foundation, but organically and imbued with life as the branches and blossoms spring from a root or stem. Thus there is preserved to faith in the Catholic system its fundamental and coordinating significance in the matter of justification. A masterly, psychological description of the whole process of justification, which even Ad Harnack styles "a magnificent work of art", will be found in the famous cap. vi, "Disponuntur" (Denzinger, n. 798). According to this the process of justification follows a regular order of progression in four stages: from faith to fear, from fear to hope, from hope to incipient charity, from incipient charity to contrition with purpose of amendment. If the contrition be perfect (contritio caritate perfecta), then active justification results, that is, the soul is immediately placed in the state of grace even before the reception of the sacrament of baptism or penance, though not without the desire for the sacrament (votum sacramenti). If, on the other hand, the contrition be only an imperfect one (attritio), then the sanctifying grace can only be imparted by the actual reception of the sacrament (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cc. iv and xiv). The Council of Trent had no intention, however, of making the sequence of the various stages in the process of justification, given above, inflexible; nor of making any one stage indispensable. Since a real conversion is inconceivable without faith and contrition, we naturally place faith at the beginning and contrition at the end of the process. In exceptional cases, however, for example in sudden conversions, it is quite possible for the sinner to overlap the intervening stages between faith and charity, in which case fear, hope, and contrition are virtually included in charity.
The "justification by faith alone" theory was by Luther styled the article of the standing and falling church (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesioe), and by his followers was regarded as the material principle of Protestantism, just as the sufficiency of the Bible without tradition was considered its formal principle.
Both of these principles are un-Biblical and are not accepted anywhere today in their original severity, save only in the very small circle of orthodox Lutherans.
The Lutheran Church of Scandinavia has, according to the Swedish theologian Krogh-Tonningh, experienced a silent reformation which in the lapse of the several centuries has gradually brought it back to the Catholic view of justification, which view alone can be supported by Revelation and Christian experience (cf. Dorner, "Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie", 361 sqq., Munich, 1867; Mohler, "Symbolik", §16, Mainz, 1890; "Realencyk. für prot. Theol", s.v."Rechtfertigung").
(c) The Protestant theory of non-Imputation
Embarrassed by the fatal notion that original sin wrought in man an utter destruction extending even to the annihilation of all moral freedom of election, and that it continues its existence even in the just man as sin in the shape of an ineradicable concupiscence, Martin Luther and Calvin taught very logically that a sinner is justified by fiduciary faith, in such a way, however, that sin is not absolutely removed or wiped out, but merely covered up or not held against the sinner. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, however, in active justification an actual and real forgiveness of sins takes place so that the sin is really removed from the soul, not only original sin by baptism but also mortal sin by the sacrament of penance (Trent, Sess. V, can. v; Sess. VI, cap. xiv; Sess. XIV, cap. ii). This view is entirely consonant with the teaching of Holy Scripture, for the Biblical expressions: "blotting out" as applied to sin (Ps., 1, 3; Is., xliii, 25; xliv, 22; Acts, iii, 19), "exhausting" (Heb., ix, 28), "taking away" [II Kings, xii, 13; I Par., xxi, 8; Mich., vii, 18; Ps. x (Heb.), 15; cii, 12], cannot be reconciled with the idea of a mere covering up of sin which is supposed to continue its existence in a covert manner. Other Biblical expressions are just as irreconcilable with this Lutheran idea, for instance, the expression of "cleansing" and "washing away" the mire of sin (Ps., 1, 4, 9; Is., i, 18; Ezech., xxxvi, 25; I Con, vi, 11; Apoc., i, 5), that of coming "from death to life" (Col., ii, 13; I John, iii, 14); the removal from darkness to light (Eph., v, 9). Especially these latter expressions are significant, because they characterize the justification as a movement from one thing to another which is directly contrary or opposed to the thing from which the movement is made. The opposites, black and white, night and day, darkness and light, life and death, have this peculiarity, that the presence of one means the extinction of its opposite. Just as the sun dispels all darkness, so does the advent of justifying grace drive away sin, which ceases from that on to have an existence at least in the ethical order of things, though in the knowledge of God it may have a shadowy kind of existence as something which once was, but has ceased to be. It becomes intelligible, therefore, that in him who is justified, though concupiscence remain, there is "no condemnation" (Rom., viii, 1); and why, according to James (I,14sqq.), concupiscence as such is really no sin; and it is apparent that St. Paul (Rom., vii, 17) is speaking only figuratively when he calls concupiscence sin, because it springs from sin and brings sin in its train. Where in the Bible the expressions "covering up" and "not imputing" sin occur, as for instance in Ps. xxxi, 1 sq., they must be interpreted in accordance with the Divine perfections, for it is repugnant that God should declare any one free from sin to whom sin is still actually cleaving. It is one of God's attributes always to substantiate His declarations; if He covers sin and does not impute it, this can only be effected by an utter extinction or blotting out of the sin. Tradition also has always taught this view of the forgiveness of sins. (See Denifle, "Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther fiber justitia Dei and justificatio", Mainz, 1905).
(d) The Protestant theory of Imputation
Calvin rested his theory with the negative moment, holding that justification ends with the mere forgiveness of sin, in the sense of not imputing the sin; but other Reformers (Luther and Melanchthon) demanded a positive moment as well, concerning the nature of which there was a very pronounced disagreement. At the time of Osiander (d. 1552) there were from fourteen to twenty opinions on the matter, each differing from every other; but they had this in common that they all denied the interior holiness and the inherent justification of the Catholic idea of the process. Among the adherents of the Augsburg Confession the following view was rather generally accepted: The person to be justified seizes by means of the fiduciary faith the exterior justice of Christ, and therewith covers his sins; this exterior justice is imputed to him as if it were his own, and he stands before God as having an outward justification, but in his inner self he remains the same sinner as of old. This exterior, forensic declaration of justification was received with great acclaim by the frenzied, fanatical masses of that time, and was given wide and vociferous expression in the cry: "Justitia Christi extra nos".
The Catholic idea maintains that the formal cause of justification does not consist in an exterior imputation of the justice of Christ, but in a real, interior sanctification effected by grace, which abounds in the soul and makes it permanently holy before God (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii; can. xi). Although the sinner is justified by the justice of Christ, inasmuch as the Redeemer has merited for him the grace of justification (causa meritoria), nevertheless he is formally justified and made holy by his own personal justice and holiness (causa formalis), just as a philosopher by his own inherent learning becomes a scholar, not, however, by any exterior imputation of the wisdom of God (Trent, Sess. VI, can. x). To this idea of inherent holiness which theologians call sanctifying grace are we safely conducted by the words of Holy Writ.
To prove this we may remark that the word justificare (Gr. dikaioun, Heb. TSDQ in Hiphil) in the Bible may have a fourfold meaning:—
(a) The forensic declaration of justice by a tribunal or court (cf. Is., v, 23; Prov., xvii, 15).
(b) The interior growth in holiness (Apoc., xxii, 11).
(c) As a substantive, justificatio, the external law (Ps. cxviii, 8, and elsewhere).
(d) The inner, immanent sanctification of the sinner
Only this last meaning can be intended where there is mention of passing to a new life (Eph., ii, 5 Col., ii, 13; I John, iii, 14); renovation in spirit (Eph., iv, 23 sq.); supernatural likeness to God (Rom., viii, 29; II Cor., iii, 18; II Pet., i, 4); a new creation (II Cor., v, 17; Gal., vi, 15); rebirth in God (John, iii, 5 Tit., iii, 5; James, i, 18), etc., all of which designations not only imply a setting aside of sin, but express as well a permanent state of holiness. All of these terms express not an aid to action, but rather a form of being; and this appears also from the fact that the grace of justification is described as being "poured forth in our hearts" (Rom., v 5); as "spirit of adoption of sons" of God (Rom., viii, 15); as the "spirit, born of the spirit" (John, iii, 6); making us "conformable to the image of the Son" (Rom., viii, 28); as a participation in the Divine nature (II Pet., i, 4); the abiding seed in us (I John, iii, 9), and so on. As regards the tradition of the Church, even Harnack admits that St. Augustine faithfully reproduces the teaching of St. Paul. Hence the Council of Trent need not go back to St. Paul, but only to St. Augustine, for the purpose of demonstrating that the Protestant theory of imputation is at once against St. Paul and St. Augustine.
Moreover, this theory must be rejected as not being in accordance with reason. For in a man who is at once sinful and just, half holy and half unholy, we cannot possibly recognize a masterpiece of God's omnipotence, but only a wretched caricature, the deformity of which is exaggerated all the more by the violent introduction of the justice of Christ. The logical consequences which follow from this system, and which have been deduced by the Reformers themselves, are indeed appalling to Catholics. It would follow that, since the justice of Christ is always and ever the same, every person justified, from the ordinary everyday person to the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, would possess precisely the same justification and would have, in degree and kind, the same holiness and justice. This deduction was expressly made by Luther. Can any man of sound mind accept it? If this be so, then the justification of children by baptism is impossible, for, not having come to the age of reason, they cannot have the fiduciary faith wherewith they must seize the justice of Christ to cover up their original sin. Very logically, therefore, the Anabaptists, Mennonites, and Baptists reject the validity of infant baptism. It would likewise follow that the justification acquired by faith alone could be forfeited only by infidelity, a most awful consequence which Luther (De Wette, II, 37) clothed in the following words, though he could hardly have meant them seriously: "Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et mille stupra." Luckily this inexorable logic falls powerless against the decency and good morals of the Lutherans of our time, and is, therefore, harmless now, though it was not so at the time of the Peasants' War in the Reformation.
The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vii) defined that the inherent justice is not only the formal cause of justification, but as well the only formal cause (unica formalis causa); this was done as against the heretical teaching of the Reformer Bucer (d. 1551), who held that the inherent justice must be supplemented by the imputed justice of Christ. A further object of this decree was to check the Catholic theologian Albert Pighius and others, who seemed to doubt that the inner justice could be ample for justification without being supplemented by another favor of God (favor Dei externus) (cf. Pallavacini, Hist. Conc. Trident., VIII, 11, 12). This decree was well-founded, for the nature and operation of justification are determined by the infusion of sanctifying grace. In other words, without the aid of other factors, sanctifying grace in itself possesses the power to effect the destruction of sin and the interior sanctification of the soul to be justified. For since sin and grace are diametrically opposed to each other, the mere advent of grace is sufficient to drive sin away; and thus grace, in its positive operations, immediately brings about holiness, kinship of God, and a renovation of spirit, etc. From this it follows that in the present process of justification, the remission of sin, both original and mortal, is linked to the infusion of sanctifying grace as a conditio sine quae non, and therefore a remission of sin without a simultaneous interior sanctification is theologically impossible. As to the interesting controversy whether the incompatibility of grace and sin rests on merely moral, or physical, or metaphysical contrariety, refer to Pohle ("Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", II, 511 sqq., Paderborn, 1909); Scheeben ("Die Myst. des Christentums", 543 sqq., Freiburg, 1898).
(2) The Nature of Sanctifying Grace
The real nature of sanctifying grace is, by reason of its direct invisibility, veiled in mystery, so that we can learn its nature better by a study of its formal operations in the soul than by a study of the grace itself. Indissolubly linked to the nature of this grace and to its formal operations are other manifestations of grace which are referable not to any intrinsic necessity but to the goodness of God; accordingly three questions present themselves for consideration:
(a) The inner nature of sanctifying grace.
(b) Its formal operations.
(c) Its supernatural retinue.
(a) The Inner Nature
(a) As we have seen that sanctifying grace designates a grace producing a permanent condition, it follows that it must not be confounded with a particular actual grace nor with a series of actual graces, as some ante-Tridentine theologians seem to have held. This view is confirmed by the fact that the grace imparted to children in baptism does not differ essentially from the sanctifying grace imparted to adults, an opinion which was not considered as altogether certain under Pope Innocent III (1201), was regarded as having a high degree of probability by Pope Clement V (1311), and was defined as certain by the Council of Trent (Sess. V, can. iii-v). Baptized infants cannot be justified by the use of actual grace, but only by a grace which effects or produces a certain condition in the recipient. Is this grace of condition or state, as Peter Lombard (Sent., I, dist. xvii, §18) held, identical with the Holy Spirit, whom we may call the permanent, untreated grace (gratia increata)? It is quite impossible. For the person of the Holy Ghost cannot be poured out into our hearts (Rom., v, 5), nor does it cleave to the soul as inherent justice (Trent, sess. VI, can. xi), nor can it be increased by good works (loc. cit., can. xxiv), and all this is apart from the fact that the justifying grace in Holy Writ is expressly termed a "gift [or grace] of the Holy Ghost" (Acts, ii, 38; x, 45), and as the abiding seed of God (I John, iii, 9). From this it follows that the grace must be as distinct from the Holy Ghost as the gift from the giver and the seed from the sower; consequently the Holy Spirit is our holiness, not by the holiness by which He Himself is holy, but by that holiness by which He makes us holy. He is not, therefore, the causa formalis, but merely the causa efficiens, of our holiness.
Moreover, sanctifying grace as an active reality, and not a merely external relation, must be philosophically either substance or accident. Now, it is certainly not a substance which exists by itself, or apart from the soul, therefore it is a physical accident inhering in the soul, so that the soul becomes the subject in which grace inheres; but such an accident is in metaphysics called quality (qualitas, poiotes), therefore sanctifying grace may be philosophically termed a "permanent, supernatural quality of the soul", or, as the Roman Catechism (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50) says, "divina qualitas in animae inhaerens"
(b) Sanctifying grace cannot be termed a habit (habitus) with the same precision as it is called a quality. Metaphysicians enumerate four kinds of quality: habit and disposition; power and want of power; passion and passible quality, for example, to blush, pale with wrath; form and figure (cf. Aristotle, Categ., VI). Manifestly sanctifying grace must be placed in the first of these four classes, namely habit or disposition; but as dispositions are fleeting things, and habit has a permanency, theologians agree that sanctifying grace is undoubtedly a habit, hence the name: Habitual Grace (gratia habitualis). Habitus is subdivided into habitus entitativus and habitus operativius. A habitus entitativus is a quality or condition added to a substance by which condition or quality the substance is found permentantly good or bad, for instance: sickness or health, beauty, deformity, etc. Habitus operativus is a disposition to produce certain operations or acts, for instance, moderation or extravagance; this habitus is called either virtue or vice just as the soul is inclined thereby to a moral good or to a moral evil. Now, since sanctifying grace does not of itself impart any such readiness, celerity, or facility in action, we must consider it primarily as a habitus entitativus, not as a habitus operativus. Therefore, since the popular concept of habitus, which usually designates a readiness does not accurately express the idea of sanctifying grace, another term is employed, i.e. a quality after the manner of a habit (qualitas per modum habitus), and this term is applied with Bellarmine (De grat. et lib. arbit., I, iii). Grace, however, preserves an inner relation to a supernatural activity, because it does not impart to the soul the act but rather the disposition to perform supernatural and meritorious acts; therefore grace is remotely and mediately a disposition to act (habitus remote operativus). On account of this and other metaphysical subtleties the Council of Trent has refrained from applying the term habitus to sanctifying grace.
In the order of nature a distinction is made between natural and acquired habits (habitus innatus, and habitus acquisitus), to distinguish between natural instincts, such, for instance, as are common to the brute creation, and acquired habits such as we develop by practice, for instance skill in playing a musical instrument etc. But grace is supernatural, and can not, therefore, be classed either as a natural or an acquired habit; it can only be received, accordingly, by infusion from above, therefore it is a supernatural infused habit (habitus infusus).
(c) If theologians could succeed in establishing the identity sometimes maintained between the nature of grace and charity, a great step forward would be taken in the examination of the nature of grace, for we are more familiar with the infused virtue of charity than with the hidden mysterious nature of sanctifying grace. For the identity of grace and charity some of the older theologians have contended—Peter Lombard, Scotus, Bellarmine, Lessius, and others—declaring that, according to the Bible and the teaching of the Fathers, the process of justification may be at times attributable to sanctifying grace and at other times to the virtue of charity. Similar effects demand a similar cause; therefore there exists, in this view, merely a virtual distinction between the two, inasmuch as one and the same reality appears under one aspect as grace, and under another as charity. This similarity is confirmed by the further fact that the life or death of the soul is occasioned respectively by the presence in, or absence from, the soul of charity. Nevertheless, all these arguments may tend to establish a similarity, but do not prove a case of identity. Probably the correct view is that which sees a real distinction between grace and charity, and this view is held by most theologians, including St. Thomas Aquinas and Suarez. Many passages in Scripture and patrology and in the enactments of synods confirm this view. Often, indeed, grace and charity are placed side by side, which could not be done without a pleonasm if they were identical. Lastly, sanctifying grace is a habitus entitativus, and theological charity a habitus operativus: the former, namely sanctifying grace, being a habitus entitativus, informs and transforms the substance of the soul; the latter, namely charity, being a habitus operativus, supernaturally informs and influences the will (cf. Ripalda, "De ente sup.", disp. cxxiii; Billuart, "De gratiae", disp. iv, 4).
(d) The climax of the presentation of the nature of sanctifying grace is found in its character as a participation in the Divine nature, which in a measure indicates its specific difference. To this undeniable fact of the supernatural participation in the Divine nature is our attention directed not only by the express words of Holy Writ: ut efficiamini divinoe consortes naturoe; (II Pet., i, 4), but also by the Biblical concept of "the issue and birth from God", since the begotten must receive of the nature of the progenitor, though in this case it only holds in an accidental and analogical sense. Since this same idea has been found in the writings of the Fathers, and is incorporated in the liturgy of the Mass, to dispute or reject it would be nothing short of temerity. It is difficult to excogitate a manner (modus) in which this participation of the Divine nature is effected. Two extremes must be avoided, so that the truth will be found.
An exaggerated theory was taught by certain mystics and quietists, a theory not free from pantheistic taint. In this view the soul is formally changed into God, an altogether untenable and impossible hypothesis, since concupiscence remains even after justification, and the presence of concupiscence is, of course, absolutely repugnant to the Divine nature.
Another theory, held by the Scotists, teaches that the participation is merely of a moral-juridical nature, and not in the least a physical participation. But since sanctifying grace is a physical accident in the soul, one cannot help referring such participation in the Divine nature to a physical and interior assimilation with God, by virtue of which we are permitted to share those goods of the Divine order to which God alone by His own nature can lay claim. In any event the "participatio divinae naturae" is not in any sense to be considered a deification, but only a making of the soul "like unto God". To the difficult question: Of which special attribute of God does this participation partake? theologians can answer only by conjectures. Manifestly only the communicable attributes can at all be considered in the matter, wherefore Gonet (Clyp. thomist., IV, ii, x) was clearly wrong when he said that the attribute of participation was the aseitas, absolutely the most incommunicable of all the Divine attributes. Ripalda (loc. cit., disp. xx, sect. 14) is probably nearer the truth when he suggests Divine sanctity as the attribute, for the very idea of sanctifying grace brings the sanctity of God into the foreground.
The theory of Suarez (De grat., VII, i, xxx), which is also favored by Scripture and the Fathers, is perhaps the most plausible. In this theory sanctifying grace imparts to the soul a participation in the Divine spirituality, which no rational creature can by its own unaided powers penetrate or comprehend. It is, therefore, the office of grace to impart to the soul, in a supernatural way, that degree of spirituality which is absolutely necessary to give us an idea of God and His spirit, either here below in the shadows of earthly existence, or there above in the unveiled splendor of Heaven. If we were asked to condense all that we have thus far been considering into a definition, we would formulate the following: Sanctifying grace is "a quality strictly supernatural, inherent in the soul as a habitus, by which we are made to participate in the divine nature".
(b) Formal Operations
Sanctifying Grace has its formal operations, which are fundamentally nothing else than the formal cause considered in its various moments. These operations are made known by Revelation; therefore to children and to the faithful can the splendor of grace best be presented by a vivid description of its operations. These are: sanctity, beauty, friendship, and sonship of God.
(a) The Sanctity of the soul, as its first formal operation, is contained in the idea itself of sanctifying grace, inasmuch as the infusion of it makes the subject holy and inaugurates the state or condition of sanctity. So far it is, as to its nature, a physical adornment of the soul; it as also a moral form of sanctification, which of itself makes baptized children just and holy in the sight of God. This first operation is thrown into relief by the fact that the "new man", created in justice and holiness (Eph., iv, 24), was preceded by the "old man" of sin, and that grace changed the sinner into a saint (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii: ex injusto fit justus). The two moments of actual justification, namely the remission of sin and the sanctification, are at the same time moments of habitual justification, and become the formal operations of grace. The mere infusion of the grace effects at once the remission of original and mortal sin, and inaugurates the condition or state of holiness. (See Pohle, Lehrb. der Dogm., 527 sq.)
(b) Although the beauty of the soul is not mentioned by the teaching office of the Church as one of the operations of grace, nevertheless the Roman Catechism refers to it (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50). If it be permissible to understand by the spouse in the Canticle of Canticles a symbol of the soul decked in grace, then all the passages touching the ravishing beauty of the spouse may find a fitting application to the soul. Hence it is that the Fathers express the supernatural beauty of a soul in grace by the most splendid comparisons and figures of speech, for instance: "a divine picture" (Ambrose); "a golden statue" (Chrysostom); "a streaming light" (Basil), etc. Assuming that, apart from the material beauty expressed in the fine arts, there exists a purely spiritual beauty, we can safely state that grace, as the participation in the Divine nature, calls forth in the soul a physical reflection of the untreated beauty of God, which is not to be compared with the soul's natural likeness to God. We can attain to a more intimate idea of the Divine likeness in the soul adorned with grace, if we refer the picture not merely to the absolute Divine nature, as the prototype of all beauty, but more especially to the Trinity whose glorious nature is so charmingly mirrored in the soul by the Divine adoption and the inhabitation of the Holy Ghost (cf. H. Krug, De pulchritudine divina, Freiburg, 1902).
(g) The Friendship of God is, consequently, one of the most excellent of the effects of grace; Aristotle denied the possibility of such a friendship by reason of the great disparity between God and man. As a matter of fact man is, inasmuch as he is God's creature, His servant, and by reason of sin (original and mortal) he is God's enemy. This relation of service and enmity is transformed by sanctifying grace into one of friendship (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii: ex inimico amicus). According to the Scriptural concept (Wis., vii, 14; John, xv, 15) this friendship resembles a mystical matrimonial union between the soul and its Divine spouse (Matt., ix, 15; Apoc., xix, 7). Friendship consists in the mutual love and esteem of two persons based upon an exchange of service or good office (Aristot., "Eth. Nicom.", VIII sq.). True friendship resting only on virtue (amicitia honesta) demands undeniably a love of benevolence, which seeks only the happiness and well-being of the friend, whereas the friendly exchange of benefits rests upon a utilitarian basis (amicitia utilis) or one of pleasure (amicitia delectabilis), which presupposes a selfish love; still the benevolent love of friendship must be mutual, because an unrequited love becomes merely one of silent admiration, which is not friendship by any means. But the strong bond of union lies undeniably in the fact of a mutual benefit, by reason of which friend regards friend as his other self (alter ego). Finally, between friends an equality of position or station is demanded, and where this does not exist an elevation of the inferior's status (amicitia excellentioe), as, for example, in the case of a friendship between a king and noble subject. It is easy to perceive that all these conditions are fulfilled in the friendship between God and man affected by grace. For, just as God regards the just man with the pure love of benevolence, He likewise prepares him by the infusion of theological charity for the reception of a correspondingly pure and unselfish affection. Again, although man's knowledge of the love of God is very limited, while God's knowledge of love in man is perfect, this conjecture is sufficient—indeed in human friendships it alone is possible—to forth the basis of a friendly relation. The exchange of gifts consists, on the part of God, in the bestowal of supernatural benefits, on the part of man, in the promotion of God's glory, and partly in the performance of works of fraternal charity. There is, indeed, in the first instance, a vast difference in the respective positions of God and man; but by the infusion of grace man receives a patent of nobility, and thus a friendship of excellency (amicitic excellentioe) is established between God and the just (See Schiffini, "De gratiae divinae", 305 sqq., Freiburg 1901.)
(d) In the Divine filiation of the soul the forma workings of sanctifying grace reach their culminating point; by it man is entitled to a share in the paternal inheritance, which consists in the beatific vision This excellence of grace is not only mentioned countless times in Holy Writ (Rom., viii, 15 sq.; I John, iii 1 sq., etc.), but is included in the Scriptural idea of a re-birth in God (cf. John, i, 12 sq.; iii, 5; Titus, iii, 5 James, i, 18, etc.). Since this rebirth in God is not effected by a substantial issuance from the substance of God, as in the case of the Son of God or Logos (Christus), but is merely an analogical or accidental coming forth from God, our sonship of God is only of an adoptive kind, as we find it expressed in Scripture (Rom., viii, 15; Gal., iv, 5). This adoption was defined by St. Thomas (III, Q. xxiii, a. 1): personoe extraneoe in filium et heredem gratuita assumptio. To the nature of this adoption there are four requisites: (i) the original unrelatedness of the adopted person; (ii) fatherly love on the part of the adopting parent fox the person adopted; (iii) the absolute gratuity of the choice to sonship and heirship; (iv) the consent of the adopted child to the act of adoption. Applying these conditions to the adoption of man by God, we find that God's adoption exceeds man's in every point, for the sinner is not merely a stranger to God but is as one who has cast off His friendship and become an enemy. In the case of human adoption the mutual love is presumed as existing, in the case of God's adoption the love of God effects the requisite disposition in the soul to be adopted. The great and unfathomable love of God at once bestows the adoption and the consequent heirship to the kingdom of heaven, and the value of this inheritance is not diminished by the number of coheirs, as in the case of worldly inheritance.
God does not impose His favors upon any one, therefore a consent is expected from adult adopted sons of God (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii, per voluntariam susceptionem gratioe et donorum). It is quite in keeping with the excellence of the heavenly Father that He should supply for His children during the pilgrimage a fitting sustenance which will sustain the dignity of their position, and be to them a pledge of resurrection and eternal life; and this is the Bread of the Holy Eucharist (see Eucharist).
(c) The Supernatural Retinue
This expression is derived from the Roman Catechism (P. II., e. i, n. 51), which teaches: "Huic (gratiae sanctificanti) additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus". As the concomitants of sanctifying grace, these infused virtues are not formal operations, but gifts really distinct from this grace, connected nevertheless with it by a physical, or rather a moral, indissoluble link—relationship. Therefore the Council of Vienne (1311) speaks of informans gratia et virtutes, and the Council of Trent, in a more general way, of gratia et dona. The three theological virtues, the moral virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul are all considered. The Council of Trent (sess. VI, c. vii) teaches that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are in the process of justification infused into the soul as supernatural habits. Concerning the time of infusion, it is an article of faith (Sess. VI, can. xi) that the virtue of charity is infused immediately with sanctifying grace, so that throughout the whole term of existence sanctifying grace and charity are found as inseparable companions. Concerning the habitus of faith and hope, Suarez is of the opinion (as against St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure) that, assuming a favorable disposition in the recipient, they are infused earlier in the process of justification. Universally known is the expression of St. Paul (I Cor., xiii, 13), "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity." Since, here, faith and hope are placed on a par with charity, but charity is considered as diffused in the soul (Rom., v, 5), conveying thus the idea of an infused habit, it will be seen that the doctrine of the Church so consonant with the teaching of the Fathers is also supported by Scripture. The theological virtues have God directly as their formal object, but the moral virtues are directed in their exercise to created things in their moral relations. All the special moral virtues can be reduced to the four cardinal virtues: prudence (prudentia), justice (justitia), fortitude (fortitudo), temperance (ternperantia). The Church favors the opinion that along with grace and charity the four cardinal virtues (and, according to many theologians, their subsidiary virtues also) are communicated to the souls of the just as supernatural habitus, whose office it is to give to the intellect and the will, in their moral relations with created things, a supernatural direction and inclination. By reason of the opposition of the Scotists this view enjoys only a degree of probability, which, however, is supported by passages in Scripture (Prov., viii, 7; Ezech., xi, 19; II Pet., i, 3 sqq.) as well as the teaching of the Fathers (Augustine, Gregory the Great, and others). Some theologians add to the infusion of the theological and moral virtues also that of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though this view cannot be called anything more than a mere opinion. There are difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this opinion which cannot be here discussed.
The article of faith goes only to this extent, that Christ as man possessed the seven gifts (cf. Is., xi, 1 sqq.; lxi, 1; Luke, iv, 18). Remembering, however, that St. Paul (Rom., viii, 9 sqq.) considers Christ, as man, the mystical head of mankind, and the august exemplar of our own justification, we may possibly assume that God gives in the process of justification also the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
The crowning point of justification is found in the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is the perfection and the supreme adornment of the justified soul. Adequately considered, the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit consists of a twofold grace, the created accidental grace (gratia creata accidentalis), and the uncreated substantial grace (gratia increata substantialis). The former is the basis and the indispensable assumption for the latter; for where God Himself erects His throne, there must be found a fitting and becoming adornment. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul must not be confounded with God's presence in all created things, by virtue of the Divine attribute of Omnipresence. The personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul rests so securely upon the teaching of Holy Writ and of the Fathers that to deny it would constitute a grave error. In fact, St. Paul (Rom., v, 5) says: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us". In this passage the Apostle distinguishes clearly between the accidental grace of theological charity and the Person of the Giver. From this it follows that the Holy Spirit has been given to us, and dwells within us (Rom., viii, II), so that we really become temples of the Holy Ghost (I Cor., iii, 16 sq.;vi 19). Among all the Fathers of the Church (excepting, perhaps, St. Augustine) it is the Greeks who are more especially noteworthy for their rapturous utterances touching the infusion of the Holy Ghost. Note the expressions: "The replenishing of the soul with balsamic odors", "a glow permeating the soul", "a gilding and refining of the soul". Against the Pneumatomachians they strive to prove the real Divinity of the Holy Spirit from His indwelling, maintaining that only God can establish Himself in the soul; surely no creature can inhabit any other creatures. But clear and undeniable as the fact of the indwelling is equally difficult and perplexing is it in degree to explain the method and manner (modus) of this indwelling.
Theologians offer two explanations. The greater number hold that the indwelling must not be considered a substantial information, nor a hypostatic union, but that it really means an indwelling of the Trinity (John, xiv, 23), but is more specifically appropriated to the Holy Ghost by reason of His notional character as the Hypostatic Holiness and Personal Love.
Another small group of theologians (Petavius, Scheeben, Hurter, etc.), basing their opinion upon the teaching of the Fathers, especially the Greek, distinguish between the inhabitatio totius Trinitatis, and the inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, and decide that this latter must be regarded as a union (unio, enosis) pertaining to the Holy Ghost alone, from which the other two Persons are excluded. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this theory, in spite of its deep mystical significance, with the recognized principles of the doctrine of the Trinity, namely the law of appropriation and Divine mission. Hence this theory is almost universally rejected (see Franzelin, "De Deo trino", thes. xliii-xlviii, Rome, 1881).
(3) The Characteristics of Sanctifying Grace
The Protestant conception of justification boasts of three characteristics: absolute certainty (certitudo), complete uniformity in all the justified (oequalitas), unforfeitableness (inamissibilitas). According to the teaching of the Church, sanctifying grace has the opposite characteristics: uncertainty (incertitudo), inequality (inoequalitas), and amissibility (amissibilitas).
The heretical doctrine of the Reformers, that man by a fiduciary faith knows with absolute certainty that he is justified, received the attention of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. ix), in one entire chapter (De inani fiduciae hoereticorum), three canons (loc. cit., can. xiii-xv) condemning the necessity, the alleged power, and the function of fiduciary faith. The object of the Church in defining the dogma was not to shatter the trust in God (certitudo spei) in the matter of personal salvation, but to repel the misleading assumptions of an unwarranted certainty of salvation (certitudo fidei). In doing this the Church is altogether obedient to the instruction of Holy Writ, for, since Scripture declares that we must work out our salvation "with fear and trembling" (Phil., ii, 12), it is impossible to regard our individual salvation as something fixed and certain. Why did St. Paul (I Cor., ix, 27) chastise his body if not afraid lest, having preached to others, he might himself "become a castaway"? He says expressly (I Cor., iv, 4): "For I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet am I not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord." Tradition also rejects the Lutheran idea of certainty of justification. Pope Gregory the Great (lib. VII, ep. xxv) was asked by a pious lady of the court, named Gregoria, to say what was the state of her soul. He replied that she was putting to him a difficult and useless question, which he could not answer, because God had not vouchsafed to him any revelation concerning the state of her soul, and only after her death could she have any certain knowledge as to the forgiveness of her sins. No one can be absolutely certain of his or her salvation unless—as to Magdalen, to the man with the palsy, or to the penitent thief—a special revelation be given (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xvi). Nor can a theological certainty, any more than an absolute certainty of belief, be claimed regarding the matter of salvation, for the spirit of the Gospel is strongly opposed to anything like an unwarranted certainty of salvation. Therefore the rather hostile attitude to the Gospel spirit advanced by Ambrosius Catherinus (d. 1553), in his little work: "De certitudine gratiae", received such general opposition from other theologians. Since no metaphysical certainty can be cherished in the matter of justification in any particular case, we must content ourselves with a moral certainty, which, of course, is but warranted in the case of baptized children, and which, in the case of adults diminishes more or less, just as all the conditions of salvation are complied with—not an easy matter to determine. Nevertheless any excessive anxiety and disturbance may be allayed (Rom., viii, 16, 38 sq.) by the subjective conviction that we are probably in the state of grace.
If man, as the Protestant theory of justification teaches, is justified by faith alone, by the external justice of Christ, or God, the conclusion which Martin Luther (Sermo de Nat. Maria) drew must follow, namely that "we are all equal to Mary the Mother of God and just as holy as she". But if on the other hand, according to the teaching of the Church, we are justified by the justice and merits of Christ in such fashion that this becomes formally our own justice and holiness, then there must result an inequality of grace in individuals, and for two reasons first, because according to the generosity of God or the receptive condition of the soul an unequal amount of grace is infused; then, also, because the grace originally received can be increased by the performance of good works (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vu, can. xxiv) This possibility of increase in grace by good works whence would follow its inequality in individuals, find its warrant in those Scriptural texts in which an increase of grace is either expressed or implied (Prov. iv, 18; Ecclus., xviii, 22; II Cor., ix, 10; Eph., iv, 7 II Pet., iii, 18; Apoc., xxii, 11). Tradition had occasion, as early as the close of the fourth century, to defend the old Faith of the Church against the heretic Jovinian, who strove to introduce into the Church the Stoic doctrine of the equality of all virtue and all vice St. Jerome (Con. Jovin., II, xxiii) was the chief defender of orthodoxy in this instance. The Church never recognized any other teaching than that laid down by St. Augustine (Tract. in Jo., vi, 8): "Ips sancti in ecclesiae sunt alii aliis sanctiores, alii alii meliores." Indeed, this view should commend itself to every thinking man.
The increase of grace is by theologians justly called a second justification (justificatio secunda), as distinct from the first justification (justificatio prima), which is coupled with a remission of sin; for, though there be in the second justification no transit from sin to grace, there is an advance from grace to a more perfect sharing therein. If inquiry be made as to the mode of this increase, it can only be explained by the philosophical maxim: "Qualities are susceptible of increase and decrease"; for instance, light and heat by the varying degree of intensity increase or diminish The question is not a theological but a philosophical one to decide whether the increase be effected by an addition of grade to grade (additio gradus ad gradum) as most theologians believe; or whether it be by deeper and firmer taking of root in the soul (major radicatio in subjecto), as many Thomists claim. This question has a special connection with that concerning the multiplication of the habitual act.
But the last question that arises has decidedly a theological phase, namely, can the infusion of sanctifying grace be increased infinitely? Or is there a limit, a point at which it must be arrested? To maintain that the increase can go on to infinity, i.e. that man by successive advances in holiness can finally enter into the possession of an infinite endowment involves manifest contradiction, for such a grade is as impossible as an infinite temperature in physics. Theoretically, therefore, we can consider only an increase without any real limit (in indefinitum). Practically, however, two ideals of unattained and unattainable holiness have been determined, which, nevertheless, are finite. The one is the inconceivably great holiness of the human soul of Christ, the other the fullness of grace which dwelt in the soul of the Virgin Mary.
In consonance with his doctrine of justification by faith alone, Luther made the loss or forfeiture of justification depend solely upon infidelity, while Calvin maintained that the predestined could not possibly lose their justification; as to those not predestined, he said, God merely aroused in them a deceitful show of faith and justification. On account of the grave moral dangers which lurked in the assertion that outside of unbelief there can be no serious sin destructive of Divine grace in the soul, the Council of Trent was obliged to condemn (Sess. VI, can. xxiii, xxvii) both these views. The lax principles of "evangelical liberty", the favorite catchword of the budding Reformation, were simply repudiated (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xix-xxi). But the synod (Sess. VI, cap. xi) added that not venial but only mortal sin involved the loss of grace. In this declaration there was a perfect accord with Scripture and Tradition. Even in the Old Testament the prophet Ezechiel (Ezech., xviii, 24) says of the godless: "All his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered: in the prevarication, by which he hath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he shall die." Not in vain does St. Paul (I Cor., x, 12) warn the just: "Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall"; and state uncompromisingly: "The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God....neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers...nor covetous, nor drunkards....shall possess the kingdom of God" (I Cor., vi, 9 sq.). Hence it is not by infidelity alone that the Kingdom of Heaven will be lost. Tradition shows that the discipline of confessors in the early Church proclaims the belief that grace and justification are lost by mortal sin. The principle of justification by faith alone is unknown to the Fathers. The fact that mortal sin takes the soul out of the state of grace is due to the very nature of mortal sin. Mortal sin is an absolute turning away from God, the supernatural end of the soul, and is an absolute turning to creatures; therefore, habitual mortal sin cannot exist with habitual grace any more than fire and water can coexist in the same subject. But as venial sin does not constitute such an open rupture with God, and does not destroy the friendship of God, therefore venial sin does not expel sanctifying grace from the soul. Hence, St. Augustine says (De spir. et lit., xxviii, 48): "Non impediunt a vitae aeternae justum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur."
But does venial sin, without extinguishing grace, nevertheless diminish it, just as good works give an increase of grace? Denys the Carthusian (d. 1471) was of the opinion that it does, though St. Thomas rejects it (II-II, Q. xxiv, a. 10). A gradual decrease of grace would only be possible on the supposition that either a definite number of venial sins amounted to a mortal sin, or that the supply of grace might be diminished, grade by grade, down to ultimate extinction. The first hypothesis is contrary to the nature of venial sin; the second leads to the heretical view that grace may be lost without the commission of mortal sin. Nevertheless, venial sins have an indirect influence on the state of grace, for they make a relapse into mortal sin easy (cf. Ecclus., xix, I). Does the loss of sanctifying grace bring with it the forfeiture of the supernatural retinue of infused virtues? Since the theological virtue of charity, though not identical, nevertheless is inseparably connected with grace, it is clear that both must stand or fall together, hence the expressions "to fall from grace" and "to lose charity" are equivalent. It is an article of faith (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xxviii, cap. xv) that theological faith may survive the commission of mortal sin, and can be extinguished only by its diametrical opposite, namely, infidelity. It may be regarded as a matter of Church teaching that theological hope also survives mortal sin, unless this hope should be utterly killed by its extreme opposite, namely despair, though probably it is not destroyed by its second opposite, presumption. With regard to the moral virtues, the seven gifts and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, which invariably accompany grace and charity, it is clear that when mortal sin enters into the soul they cease to exist (cf. Suarez, "De gratiae", IX, 3 sqq.). As to the fruits of sanctifying grace, see MERIT.